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This thesis explores the conception and representation of virtu in Dante's Commedia. In 
order to break the existing limited boundaries of the way virtue is read in the Commedia, 
and to establish a richer sense of the ideas a fourteenth-century poet might have had in 
relation to the topic, this thesis begins with two chapters which consider notions of virtue 
in the intellectual and cultural traditions prior to Dante. Chapter One focuses on the 
philosophical and theological traditions and considers works by Aristotle, Plato, 
Augustine, Gregory the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Chapter Two turns to look at virtue as 
a prominent theme in a wide variety of popular cultural forms of the medieval period. 
These include sermons, devotional literature, visual art and poetry. In the light of these 
two chapters, the thesis proposes a reading of virtu in the Commedia which acknowledges 
it as a notion which is at a nexus of being and doing, of metaphysical and physical, of idea 
and representation. What I have termed the virtu-dynamic in the Commedia, is that 
through which Dante fundamentally connects ethics and ontology, so that human 
behaviour becomes an expression of an individual's ontological state. The virtu-dynamic is 
the interaction which the Commedia traces between the creative action of God and the 
responsive action of man. The final three chapters of the thesis consider this in relation to 
different aspects of the poem. Chapter Three considers the role Dante gives to virtu in the 
process of creation and incarnation in his poem. Chapter Four looks at how Dante stages 
the interactions between God and man which are underpinned by virtu. The final chapter 
considers how Dante conceives the role of virtu in relation to the experiences and 
salvation of his own pilgrim-poet self. This analysis is based on a close focus, not only on 
the abstract ideas of virtu which the Commedia proposes, but on how those ideas are 
manifested and vivified by the text. 
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Ethics, Ontology and Representation: the Virtu-Dynamic 
of Dante's Commedia 
Introd uction 
Virtu, in its various lexical forms, is one of the most prominent terms in Dante's work and 
there are nearly one hundred instances of it in the Commedia alone. But while the term 
recurs frequently, the contexts in which it appears suggest that its meaning is not always 
the same. The 'virtute e conoscenza' (Inf. XXV1.120) which the damned Ulysses seeks 
suggests a different meaning from virtu when applied to Beatrice, the 'donna di virtu' (In! 
11.76), and both are different again from the 'gran virtute' of St Francis (Par. XI.S7). These 
instances appear in very different contexts from virtu as that which 'rains down' from the 
Primo Mobile (Par. XXVIII) or virtu as that which forms the airy bodies of Purgatory (Purg. 
XXV). Virtu is used to refer to human quality, to divine creative force, to individual vision 
and further meanings besides. It appears as a highly complex term in Dante's thought and 
perhaps because of its complexity, scholarship on virtue as a topic has tended to isolate 
and separate its meanings rather than tackling it as a whole. The apparent multiplicity of 
meanings, however, can lead us to consider how the meanings of virtu come to be 
connected in the thought of the poet, the narrative universe of his poem and perhaps in 
medieval society more broadly. Furthermore, by adopting this holistic approach it 
becomes possible to see how virtue intersects with and connects other aspects of central 
importance to Dante's work, aspects of importance both to his conceptual ideas and to his 
poetic practice. Alongside these differences in conceptual meaning, this approach also 
brings to the fore the way in which virtue is represented in the poem, suggesting that the 
images and language through which virtue is represented are equally important to the 
conceptual idea in shaping notions of virtue. That the representative form has such an 
impact on conceptual meaning also enables us to give proper weight to the fact that Dante 
constructs an idea of virtue not only through abstract consideration but through vivified 
narrative. This thesis will explore the workings of this combination. 
Virtue and the Virtues in Dante 
Before developing further my own approach to the question, I will give a brief, non-
exhaustive summary of how the idea of virtue appears most explicitly in Dante's work. The 
Enciclopedia dantesca, in its entry on virtu, identifies two principal meanings of the term in 
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Dante's works: virtue as a moral characteristic and virtue as power.l The former meaning 
presents virtue as acquired and moral modes of action and structuring principles of 
human character which pertain chiefly to the characteristics of the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic models of virtue. The second meaning is virtu as the creative, informing power 
of God imprinting upon the celestial heavens which in turn contain inferior types of virtu; 
these then go on to inform the sublunar world. 
Both dimensions of this term appear first in the Conv;v;o. Here, Dante reiterates an idea of 
virtue openly taken from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Conv. IV.xvii).2 Dante echoes 
Aristotle's definition of moral virtue as an 'abito elettivo consistente nel mezzo' (Conv. 
IV.xvii.7) which is acquired through repeated actions to become an established disposition 
of character. As in the Aristotelian source, Dante focuses on individual moral virtues, 
enumerating the list of eleven according to Aristotle: courage, temperance, liberality, 
munificence, magnanimity, love of honour, gentleness, affability, truth, good disposition 
and justice (Conv. IV.xvii.4-6). Dante's description of the moral virtues in Conv;v;o IV adds 
something to the Aristotelian account, however, by highlighting their basis as being in God. 
Virtues are the outward signs of the inner nobility which is placed in the soul by God 
(Conv. IV.xx.3; IV.xvi.9). Dante emphaSises nobility as that given by God and moral virtues 
as the 'frutti' through which that nobility is revealed in human action (Conv. IV.xvi.l0). 
Convivio III describes God as virtue itself and as the source of all creation. The extent of 
human virtue then becomes a measure of the extent to which the human can receive God's 
goodness (Conv. IIl.vii.3). In adopting the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, Dante 
describes how divine creative virtue descends into matter and transforms it into its 
'likeness' (Conv. IIl.xiv.2). Man receives divine virtue to the extent to which his own 
capacity for virtue is capable. Divine virtue, however, also has a role in the extension of 
human virtue beyond its natural capacities in order to enable man to attain his 
supranatural end (canzone of Conv;v;o III). In the transmission of divine virtue Dante allots 
a central role to the female beloved and her beauty. Beauty acquires a moral Significance 
as the manifestation ofthe perfection ofthe soul (Conv. 1II.xv.14). The beautiful woman is 
therefore the visual evidence of perfectly actuated being and acts as a hope-bringing 
stimulus to her lover. The Enciclopedia dantesca describes the beloved's role as follows: 'la 
virtu della donna indica da un lato la perfezione e l'eccellenza dell'essere in atto [ ... ] e 
quindi perfezione morale, dall'altro l'operare ad extra della perfezione come potenza 
attiva che feconda il seme dell'altrui buona natura'.3 Later, in the Paradiso, Dante develops 
1 Philippe Delhaye and Giorgio Stabile, 'Virtu' In ED, 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1970-
1976), v,10S0-S9. 
2 Dante is drawing at this point principally from Books I, 11 and III of Aristotle's Nicomachean EthicS. . 
3 Delhaye and Stabile, p. 10S6. 
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this idea in relation to Beatrice. It is Beatrice's virtue which compels the pilgrim to 
improve morally and which draws the pilgrim up through the spheres. 
Virtue and the virtues are also prominent as a theme throughout the Com media itself. 
Particularly evident are references to the four moral or cardinal virtues Uustice, prudence, 
temperance and fortitude) and the three theological virtues (faith, hope and charity). One 
of the most overt comes in Purgatorio VII, in one of Virgil's descriptions of the fault of 
himself and his fellow Limbo Dwellers: 'sto io con quei che Ie tre sante / virtu non si 
vestiro, e sanza vizio / conobber l'altre e seguir tutte quante' (34-36). Much later, towards 
the end of Paradise, the pilgrim himself is examined in the details of the three theological 
virtues in the heaven of the fixed stars. There has also been a consistent interpretation of 
the image of the four stars which appear in Purgatorio I, and the three stars and seven 
nymphs which appear in the Earthly Paradise as allegories of the seven virtues.4 
The realm of Purgatory proper is structured according to the seven capital vices and their 
opposing virtues. These vices are identified as the root cause of sinful actions. This is in 
contrast to Hell in which individual sins, rather than the vices from which they spring, 
dictated the structure of the realm. Instead, Purgatory works on reforming the basis of 
human character and this process of reformation is staged through a purgation of vice and 
an inculcation of virtue. The form in which Aristotelian moral virtue is acquired is echoed 
in the repetition of suffering on the terraces framed by the presentation of positive and 
negative exempla. The individual virtues which Dante refers to are, however, different 
from Aristotle's original list, existing as they do within the new Christianised standards of 
behaviour. Thus, pride is countered by humility, envy by charity, anger by gentleness, 
sloth by zeal, avarice by liberality, gluttony by temperance and lust by chastity. The 
process of Aristotelian correction of vice is, however, maintained. Dante describes the 
process through the imagery of horse riding and falconry, which act as metaphors for the 
controlling and taming of the will and appetites which takes place in the acquisition of 
moral virtue (for example, Purg. XIIl.37-42; XIV.143-S1). The souls undergoing Purgatory 
do not perform the virtue they are to acquire but they are compelled not to perform their 
vice. The virtues appear in the exempla presented on the terrace, three on each terrace, 
which always repeat the same pattern. The primary exemplum is consistently the Virgin 
Mary, while the other two are taken from the Bible and classical culture. 
4 This interpretation appears in the earliest examples of commentary on the Com media, for example, in the 
commentaries ofJacopo della Lana (1324-28), Francesco da Buti (1385-95) and in L'ottimo commento (1333). 
See the online data base of commentaries on the Com media at <http://dante.dartmouth.edu/>. 
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In Paradise, the heavens have come to be associated again with different virtues which are 
themselves associated with the planet to which the heaven pertains. So, for example, the 
heaven of Jupiter is the heaven of justice, the heaven of Saturn is the heaven of 
temperance. As well as structuring Paradise according to different virtues, here Dante 
makes virtu itself evident as the essential nature of an individualised created being, 
whether that be a planet, an angel or a human soul, and as the interactive force between 
God and creation which establishes the created order. The heavens act as a pOint of 
transmission between divine virtu and the sublunar world, informing the existence and 
actions of that world. 
Critical Writing on Virtue in the Commedia 
The scholarly literature on the topic of virtue has tended to focus on the evident areas 
outlined above, in which virtue and the virtues appear. An influential contribution is that 
of Patrick Boyde in Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante's 'Comedy', which focuses 
primarily on the presence of an Aristotelian understanding of virtue in the Commedia.s 
Boyde's work gives a clear exposition of Aristotelian virtue itself, in which to be virtuous 
'denotes the full and proper use of a particular potentia or virtus which is inherent in the 
given substantial form'.6 Boyde reiterates Aristotle's idea of human goodness as residing 
in the permanent possession of moral virtue which 'inclines the agent to make the right 
kind of choice'.7 He also considers Aristotle's idea of virtue as the mean between two 
opposing vices. With these ideas in mind he applies the principles of Aristotelian virtue 
onto the Commedia's structures and events. He is thus able to read the structure of Dante's 
Purgatory, with its balancing of virtue and vice through activity and exempla, as an 
Aristotelian process of the acquisition of virtue. Boyde also accepts the categories of four 
moral and three theological virtues as found in Aquinas and reveals the presence of this 
structure in the layout of the Paradiso. 
Marc Cogan's excellent work The Design in the Wax recontextualises Aristotelian virtue in 
the Commedia, identifying how the poem adopts and transforms that virtue to act within 
the Christian context.s While Boyde focuses on Aristotle as a principal source, Cogan looks 
more to Aquinas. Examining first the structural workings of the Purgatorio, Cogan 
identifies a distinction between Hell and Purgatory: 'to understand the relationship 
5 Patrick Boyde, Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante's 'Comedy' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
6 Boyde, Human Vices, p. 86. 
7 Boyde, Human Vices, p. 91. 
8 Marc Cogan, The Design in the Wax: The Structure o/the 'Divine Comedy' and its Meaning (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). 
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between Hell and Purgatory is [to understand the difference] between sin, as an action ofa 
certain sort, and vice, as a state of character'.9 The punishments of Purgatory, then, are 
correcting something more fundamental; the purgation of vice and restoration of virtue is 
addressing directly the proper workings of man: 'this restoration means the removal of a 
condition that disposes the soul to improper action [ ... ] the restoration of an original 
capacity for proper action',1o Suffering in Purgatorio, following how virtue is acquired in 
Aristotle's and Aquinas's thought, acts to restore this proper original state. Cogan 
dedicates much space to the consideration of the seven virtues and vices of Purgatoria, 
exploring their interaction. In the Christianised context which Cogan is considering, he 
points out the transition which Dantean virtue must make between moral virtue, which is 
sufficient for human life, and virtue which draws man to God and is therefore spiritually 
fulfilling. He suggests that 'Dante sees the purgatorial process as one of replacing vices 
with virtues, [but] he is at the same time deliberately substituting a new set of virtues for 
an older one'.l1 Purgatorio is the reordering of human virtue towards its new eternal ends 
and Cogan considers in particular the role of the Beatitudes in this reordering: 'the 
cardinal virtues perfect the soul for actions of this world, the Beatitudes for actions of the 
next'.12 Cogan argues that Dante's inclusion of a Beatitude at the exit of each purgatorial 
circle makes evident this shift, which is occurring in Purgatory, from the forum of the 
world to the forum of the eternal. In his analysis of Purgatorio XXV, Cogan reads Dante's 
ideas on the creation of the soul as the expression of Aristotelian biology, presenting a 
consideration of human appetites and intellect, but again in the light of the Christian 
context. 
Cogan's analysis of Paradiso paves the way for further reflections on the nature and role of 
virtue. In stating that '[t]he amount of delight or blessedness a soul experiences depends 
on the soul's capactiy for the activity in which delight resides',u he is opening the way for 
the soul's pOSitioning to be read directly in terms of virtue, since virtue stands at the nexus 
of a soul's potential and a soul's perfect activity. Cogan's analysis of Paradiso emphasises 
the role of character potential in the final location of the souls, and highlights how this 
potential is the result of divine power, their temporal actions and nature having been 
moved by 'celestial influence'. 
9 Cogan, p. 85. 
10 Cogan, p. 90. 
11 Cogan, p. 124. 
12 Cogan, p. 125. 
13 Cogan, p. 158. 
Ruth Chester 
13 
Another significant contribution to the question of virtue in Dante is made by Manuele 
Gragnolati in Experiencing the Afterlife: Soul and Body in Dante and Medieval Culture.14 
Gragnolati points out that the pattern of Purgatorio in which, simultaneously, a vice is 
curbed and a virtue inculcated on each of the terraces, is formed both through repeated 
action (that is, an Aristotelian approach) and through the use of exempla, the chief of 
whom is the Virgin Mary. The role of an exemplum of virtue in its acquisition is a vital 
point and shifts the question towards the consideration of how virtue is to be 
communicated and acquired. 
Gragnolati also stresses the relation between Mary, Christ and virtue, claiming that, 'the 
aim of purgatory is to attain the virtues that are represented by Christ and Mary-as-Christ'. 
The souls in Purgatory are carrying out an imitation of the actions of Christ and Mary and 
thus acquiring their virtues. This brings in the question of how the Com media itself uses 
exempla and how they enter into a process of education which is both ethically and 
spiritually transformative. Gragnolati is focusing on the spiritually transformative role of 
pain, in which the loving acceptance of that pain is an imitation of Christ.1s 
Other, shorter works deal with specific aspects of virtue. For example, Siegfried Wenzel 
considers virtue in relation to vice and claims a reliance in Dante on Peraldus's Summa de 
vitiis et virtutibus.16 Frank Ordiway looks specifically at the theological virtues in relation 
to the canto of the Heaven of the Moon and in the light of Aquinas' theology,17 Finally there 
are specific moments and images of the Commedia which, as we have seen in the 
commentary tradition, have been noted as being concerned with virtue. Imagery such as 
the stars of Purgatorio and Eden and the nymphs in the Earthly Paradise has been further 
analysed by Charles Singleton.1s The significance of virtue in the canto of Ulysses has 
produced various reflections including those of 0' Agostino and Pertile.19 Another 
important contribution to a particular aspect of virtue is Kenelm Foster's seminal work 
The Two Dantes, which again considers Dantean virtue in the light of Aristotelian ethics, 
but is particularly sensitive to the role of grace in human eschatological destiny.2o His 
14 Manuele Gragnolati, Experiencing the Afterlife: Soul and Body in Dante and Medieval Culture (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). 
15 Gragnolati, p. 134. 
16 Siegfried Wenzel, 'Dante's Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins (Purgatorio XVII)" Modern Lannuane Review, 
60,4 (1965), 529-33. 
17 Frank Ordiway, 'In the Earth's Shadow: The Theological Virtues Marred', Dante Studies, with the Annual 
Report of the Dante Society, 100 (1982), 77-92. 
18 Charles Singleton, Journey to Beatrice: Dante Studies 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 82, 
124-25,159. 
19 Alfonso D'Agostino, 'Canti XXVI-XXVII: Abusl d'ingegno' In Esperimenti danteschi: Inferno 2008, ed. by 
Simone Invernizzi (Genoa: Marletti, 2009), pp. 203-20; Lino Pertile, 'Dante e l'ingegno di Ulisse' Stanford 
Italian Review, I (1979),35-66. 
20 Kenelm Foster, The Two Dantes and Other Studies (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977). See 
especially Chapter 11, 'The Two Dantes (II)', pp. 190-219. 
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focus turns particularly on the problematic situation of the good pagans of Limbo, opening 
some of the virtue-related questions which surround this episode. 
It is apparent, however, that the majority of these works focus on individual virtues rather 
than virtue or virtu itself which is, in fact, a much more predominant term in the 
Commedia. Scholarship has tended to be preoccupied with the individual moral and 
theological virtues which emerge from the Aristotelian and Thomistic context. This 
labelling of the virtues under specific categories has limited the interpretative range open 
to us. There is no extended analysis of how virtue as an abstract power relates to broader 
metaphysical currents, nor is there a consideration of the significance of the form in which 
virtue is represented beyond the exempla on Purgatory's terraces. I suggest that virtue 
ought to be considered both as a complex idea within a varied intellectual tradition and as 
an active ethical principle which was a frequent subject in many forms of cultural 
production in the medieval period. 
The aim of this thesis is to show how the idea of virtue in the Com media goes beyond the 
often acknowledged episodes, forms and explicit definitions and instead, in fact, underlies 
the whole ethical, spiritual, ontological and poetic movement and form of the story: in 
individual characters, in behavioural models, in the structure of the realms, in 
communicative modes, in poetic forms and in the vision of the universe itself. To be able to 
see this requires a re-exploration of the 'presence' of virtue in medieval society and a 
recognition of it both as idea and as 'living principle'. To this end the thesis will begin with 
a thorough analysis of virtue both within the intellectual traditions and as the subject of 
cultural production. Central to this is the recognition that literary forms include within 
them, indeed sometimes manifest, the very ideas the text is discussing. My thesis will 
address virtue in relation to the particular demands and possibilities of poetic 
representation; in fact, those very demands are central to the understanding of virtue I 
will be putting forward, which is vitally linked to communication, creation and creativity. 
The possibility for such a new reading of virtue in the Commedia in the light of the text's 
ethical, metaphysical and poetic issues has been facilitated by other contributions on these 
broader issues in recent scholarship. One such contribution is that made by Claire Honess 
who explores the identification of literature and ethics which was a commonplace in the 
medieval period. Honess points out that literary theory in the medieval period categorised 
'any work of literature as falling into the philosophical category of ethics',21 Good 
literature is understood as that which inspires virtue in its audience and this is a valuable 
21 Claire Honess, 'Salus, venus, virtus: Poetry, politics, and ethics from De vulgari eloquentia to the Com media', 
The italianist 27 (2007). 185·205. 
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key for understanding the purpose of the Commedia itself or the way it would have been 
approached in the medieval period.22 In analysing the Com media, Honess considers the 
ethical lessons it teaches as being especially relevant to the construction of a well-ordered 
community.23 My particular interest in her work, and the related works of J.B. Allen and 
Suzanne Reynolds, is the acknowledgement of the ethical imperative of the Commedia.24 
Her work establishes the possibility for reading the Commedia as a text which seeks to 
actively change for the better the behaviour of its readers. With this in mind, the role of 
virtue, as a standard of positive human action, gains an important place in the ethical 
message of the poem. 
There has also been much recent and valuable scholarly work on the Commedia's 
relationship to theology. Significant amongst this is the work of Vittorio Montemaggi and 
Matthew Treherne.25 As Montemaggi has suggested, 
we might think of theology finding fruitful and illuminating expression as poetry. 
For this perspective provides a compelling invitation to engage with the idea that if 
it is true that there is more to theology than propositional objectivity, factual 
description, or mimetic representation; and if it is true that in theology, form 
matters as much as content; then this is because God, as the unfathomable ground 
of existence, is intimately related not only to how one might understand or 
represent divine being but to the acts of intellection and representation 
themselves; and because, as love, God is intimately related not only to what one 
might say about divine being but also to the ethical nature and value of one's 
utterances.Z6 
22 That literature has its own ethical imperative is not, of course, limited to the analysis of Medieval thought. 
Jean-Paul Sartre's 1948 work What is Literature? makes a similar claim: 'Thus, the writer's universe will only 
reveal itself in all its depth to the examination, the admiration, and the indignation of the reader; and the 
generous love is a promise to maintain, and the generous indignation is a promise to change, and the 
admiration a promise to imitate; although literature is one thing and morality a quite different one, at the heart 
of the aesthetic imperative we discern the moral imperative. For, since the one who writes recognizes, by the 
very fact that he takes the trouble to write, the freedom of his readers, and since the one who reads, by the 
mere fact of his opening the book, recognizes the freedom of the writer, the work of art, from whichever side 
you approach it, is an act of confidence in the freedom of men. And since readers, like the author, recognize 
this freedom only to demand that it manifest itself, the work can be defined as an imaginary presentation of 
the world in so far as it demands human freedom'. Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? (Abingdon: Routledge 
Classics, 2010), p. 47. 
23 Honess, p. 194. 
24 See J.B. Allen, The Ethical Poetic a/the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum a/Convenient Distinction (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 1982); Suzanne Reynolds, Medieval Reading: Grammar, Rhetoric and the Classical 
Text (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
lS Dante's 'Commedia': Theology as Poetry, ed. by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). See especially the editors' introduction, pp. 1-13. 
26 Vittorio Montemaggi, 'In Unknowability as Love: The Theology of Dante's Com media' in Dante's 'Com media': 
Theology as Poetry, ed. by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2010), pp. 60-94 (p. 61). 
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The nexus which Montemaggi identifies by which content and form become statements 
about man's interaction with God will be central to my own analysis, capturing as it does 
the creative and interpretative complexity at the heart of the Commedia. In this text it 
appears that interpretation and representation become a theological undertaking. The 
vital interaction of conceptual content and poetic form has also been brought to light by 
Christian Moevs in relation to Dantean metaphysics,27 Moevs is concerned with the 
revelatory nature of Dante's poetics, in which form manifests content: 'Since Dante 
conceives his Comedy as both an account and an instrument of individual and universal 
salvation history [ ... ] his central concern is the (revelatory) poetics of his own poem [ ... ] 
the metaphysical picture that grounds and motivates the Comedy, and the relation 
between those metaphysics and Dante's poetics'.28 The work of Montemaggi, Treherne and 
Moevs establishes a vital rebalancing between the ideas of the poem and poetic form, 
claiming a supraliterary significance to that form. This is particularly interesting when 
these ideas relate to the nature of creation itself and how the invisible might be revealed 
in the world, raising the question of how a human work of creativity like the Commedia 
works within this dynamic. 
This is an issue which Marc Cogan in fact raises, though not in direct relation to virtue. 
Cogan considers the significance of the physical manifestation which necessarily takes 
place in the Com media and its relation to the poem's greater issues: 
The images of the souls Dante sees and the images of the poem which he presents 
to us share a common nature, and it is that nature that renders them at once 
revelatory and obscuring. They must be concrete so that he can perceive them, and 
to be concrete they must be manifested to him (and us) as particulars as if they 
were physical entities that existed in a discrete place at a determinate time. But the 
truth they aspire to convey is itself immaterial and eternal, universal and 
indivisable.29 
This is a significant tension which I believe is at the heart of Dante's own consideration of 
virtue. As a concept, it is caught between metaphysical origin and physical expression. It 
describes a great creative power but one which finds its expression in manifested act It 
needs to be tangibly communicated because it teaches the lessons of how man becomes 
good. Manifested virtue, acting as a revelation of something invisible, will be a recurrent 
issue within my own analysis. 
~: Christian Moevs, The Metaphysics of Dante's 'Comedy' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Moevs, p. 3. 
29 Cogan, p. 151. 
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Finally, a work which begins to situate virtue within the wider concerns of the poem is the 
recent translation with commentary of Paradiso by Robin Kirkpatrick. Here he points out 
that virtu is 'perhaps the term most frequently used in the Paradiso'.30 While an analysis of 
virtue is clearly not the work's principal remit, Kirkpatrick provides the most nuanced 
understanding of virtue I have yet come across in Dante scholarship in his glossary of 
terms, also pointing out the insufficiency of the English translation, virtue, to cover all of 
its meaning: 'For Dante, the moral implications of virtue are directly related to the inner 
strength, characteristics and excellence which God, as Creator, has instilled into every 
created being'.31 That virtue is a point of meeting between man and his God as Creator 
opens the potential interpretation of virtue in the text exponentially and leads us to search 
for the concept in previously unacknowledged forms. While the link between virtue and 
the broader metaphysical, theological and poetic issues the Com media raises has not yet 
been fully explored in scholarship, Kirkpatrick's thoughts suggest that there is certainly 
something to be said. 
Research Questions and Methodology 
In Dante's poetic encyclopedia [ ... ] each word is necessarily wrapped in a network of 
infinite resonances, of transversal associations with other words which may be either 
proximate or distant from one another. From this standpoint the meaning of a word in a 
text can never be definitively fixed or encapsulated: the mobile sense of words is 
guaranteed, in effect, by the inexhaustible imaginative context surrounding them.32 
Giuseppe Mazzotta, Dante's Vision and the Circle of Knowledge 
II terreno tradizionale per l'abbraccio tra filosofia e letteratura e l'etica. 0 meglio: l'etica ha 
costituito quasi sempre un alibi perche filosofia e letteratura non si guardassero 
direttamente in faccia, sicure e soddisfatte di potersi trovare facilmente d'accordo nel 
compito comune d'insegnare agli uomini la virtu. 
ltalo Calvino, 'Filosofia e letteratura'33 
Given the new understanding of the context which they provide, the works of Montemaggi, 
Treherne, Moevs, Honess and Kirkpatrick open the way for new questions concerning 
30 ParadiSO, translated with Introduction and commentary by Robin Kirkpatrick (London and New York: 
Penguin, 2007) 
p.337. 
31 Kirkpatrick, Paradiso, introduction, p.lxxiv. 
32 Giuseppe Mazzotta, Dante's Vision and the Circle of KnowledBe (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 1993), p. 12. 
33 Italo Calvi no, 'Filosofia e letteratura', In 5aBBi: 1945-1985, 2 vols (Milan: Mondadorl, 1995), I, 188-96 (p. 91). 
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virtue's significance within the Commedia. My research questions which address these 
new possibilities are the following: What differing concepts of virtue would have been 
available to a medieval writer? How was virtue represented in medieval cultural 
production and what connection did this have to the ethical, spiritual or literary aims of a 
particular work? What other aspects of ethical and theological thought is virtue connected 
to in the philosophical, theological and representational traditions? Building from the 
results of these questions, I will turn to the Commedia itself and ask, what relationship 
does Dante establish between virtue and questions of being and creation? How does Dante 
present ethical behaviour in the light of an idea of virtue? What role does virtue have in 
the relationship between man and God? How does Dante present the significance of virtue 
in relation to human development? How does Dante treat the relationship between virtue, 
language and human fulfilment? What principal images and modes does Dante use to talk 
about virtue and how do they inflect on the meaning of virtue itself? 
The methodology of this thesis will be to begin with a thorough re-exploration of virtue in 
the intellectual traditions before Dante and within the poet's contemporary environment. 
Importantly, however, this re-exploration will not be confined to only the theoretical 
definitions of virtue; while the first chapter is dedicated to a consideration of virtue as a 
philosophical and theological conceptual principle, the second chapter will turn to virtue 
as it was mediated in medieval representation. The rationale for this approach is to 
acknowledge that an issue of such central ethical importance is not only the subject matter 
of theoretical consideration, but is present in forms of more popular and wider-reaching 
communication. Because of this presence, the idea which a fourteenth-century poet might 
have of virtue could be influenced by many different factors and consequently the way the 
issue might appear in his own poem could be equally multiple. My aim is to reconstruct 
not only the intellectual but also the 'imaginative' context of Dantean virtue. Furthermore, 
this approach will enable me to explore the interrelation of philosophy and literature 
which 'traditionally meets in ethics'.34 How the Com media approaches virtue in a 
philosophical way and how it does so by literary means are both ultimately working 
towards the same end: the positive influence of human behaviour. My aim will be to 
explore how the poet employs the communicative and conceptual tools of both 
philosophical and theological thought, and the tools of literary, verbal and visual 
expression to transmit an idea of virtue which is both recognisable and highly original for 
his own contemporary audience. 
34 Calvino, p. 191. 
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Chapter One, 'Conceiving Virtue', by considering the conceptual ideas of virtue put 
forward by five thinkers from the philosophical and theological traditions prior to Dante, 
will build up a more thorough picture of the concept of virtue to which a medieval 
individual potentially had access. The aim of this chapter is not to identify direct sources 
for Dante's own ideas, or to establish obvious parallels. Instead it is to widen the sense of 
definition and expose the network of conceptual connections within which virtue finds its 
place. This chapter is undertaken in order to help us break the existing limited boundaries 
of the way virtue is read in the Commedia and thus enable us to understand more fully its 
workings. By considering the thought of Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Gregory the Great and 
Aquinas I will build up virtue as an idea within a developing and changing tradition. My 
aim is not to arrive at a final definition but rather to sensitise the reader to nuances 
surrounding virtue which transform depending on context. As has already been suggested, 
in the Com media the term virtu appears in widely differing contexts; this chapter aims to 
unveil some of the contextual meanings and related ideas to which Dante might be 
appealing. The chapter is structured around three questions which help us to get inside 
the different aspects relative to virtue and see how they are consistent or transform within 
different contexts. The questions - what is virtue? How is virtue acquired? And, what is the 
result of the attainment of virtue? - will reveal the Significant issues around virtue: what it 
is as an abstract concept, the physical and metaphysical significance of virtue, how it 
relates to human life and behaviour, and the relation of virtue to human happiness. The 
authors and questions 1 have selected also facilitate the tracing of a changing intellectual 
context from classical to Christian thought. The way Dante relates to classical thought has 
long been a topic of scholarship and, as we have seen, discussions of virtue in particular 
have been characterised by a predominant dependence on Aristotelian ethics. Instead, by 
tracing a more diverse tradition of virtue I will be able to highlight further understandings 
of virtue which allow for its recognition in the Commedia in different ways. 
Chapter Two, 'Representing Virtue', moves away from considering the idea of virtue per se 
and turns to look at how virtue was represented in other elements of cultural production 
such as sermons, devotional literature. visual art. and poetry from Dante's own historical 
context. Part of the originality of my approach stems from the fact that I am concerned not 
only with what virtue is but how it is communicated and the way in which this form of 
communication contributes to the concept of virtue itself and. in fact. seeks to bring about 
the development of virtue in a text's audience. The focus of this chapter will be upon the 
interaction of form. content and. to a certain extent. purpose. in certain texts which have 
virtue as a prominent theme. It is also concerned with establishing a theoretical basis for 
representation in the medieval period which focuses on the metaphysical and doctrinal 
Ruth Chester 
20 
significance of manifesting ideas and, in particular, the role of exempla. The range of texts 
is deliberately very broad, in order to explore the multitude of expressive forms in which 
the idea of virtue was mediated. As in Chapter One, my aim is not to identify direct sources 
for Dante's work, and so, rather than categorising texts based on genre or author, I have 
established four categories which instead focus upon the interrelation of representational 
form and the way the text is used. These categories are abstract thought, meditation, 
allegory and storytelling. Texts to be considered in this chapter include the sermons of 
Giordano da Pisa, the Lignum Vitae and Legenda Major of Bonaventure, lacopone da Todi's 
Laude, the Meditationes Vitae Christi and Tommaso da Celano's First Life of St Francis. In 
addition to the four categories the chapter will close with an analysis of two case studies 
which involve a combination of representational forms: Giotto's Arena Chapel frescoes 
and the poetry of the Stilnovo. In considering Giotto's work, I establish ways in which 
forms of representation can be read in relation to one another to produce the final 
meaning of a work. In the analysis of the Stilnovo I consider how different forms of 
representation come together to construct an idea of personal experience which holds 
deeper significance. The Stilnovo is particularly relevant, presenting as it does ways of 
conceiving and representing virtue which are directly connected to Dante. 
In order to clarify the shift from my analysis of Dante's context to reading the Commedia in 
the light of that environment, a central section entitled 'Transitions: From the Traditions 
to Dante' will bring together the issues from Chapters One and Two. Following this I will 
carry out an analysiS of Purgatorio XXV which utilises the new information and 
methodology which I have established. In the analysis of Chapters One and Two my aim is 
to establish a sense of context and tradition also in order to highlight Dante's own 
originality. While my initial analysis sensitises us to the multiple significances and 
manifestations of virtue, Dante's use of the term forges new meanings and manifestations. 
However, without this thorough initial contextual analysis, Dante's originality and subtlety 
would remain obscured. I intend to demonstrate that the significance of virtue must be 
looked for not only in instances where the term is used or in the forms we have come to 
expect, but instead be seen as vitally connected to other significant terms and images in 
Dante's thought: love, creation, free will, the body, trees and water to name some. The 
summary and analysis of Purgatorio XXV will fully identify what I have termed the virtu-
dynamic which is present in Dante's work. I will also at this point shift from the English 
'virtue' to the Italian virtu in order to make sure we are dealing directly with Dante's term, 
free from the connotations of the English form. The term virtu-dynamic seeks to recognise 
virtue as a living ethical and ontological principle which is manifested in the interactions 
and transformations we see in the Com media. For the poet, virtue is not a set of externally 
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imposed rules but a vivified and vivifying force which underpins the soul's movement to 
God in its own fulfilment. 
Chapter Three, 'Creative Virtu', considers how Dante presents the workings of virtu within 
the wider universe, particularly within the relation between the unity of God and the 
multiplicity of creation. Virtu appears as that which distinguishes and identifies individual 
creations and in doing so endows them with particular capabilites and thus 
responsibilities. I will first consider how Dante conceives virtu as working within the 
physics and metaphysics of the universe in Paradiso XXVlll and II. Within both, the 
relevance of the Incarnation and its relation to virtu becomes ever more apparent so that 
the experience and possibility of distinct being, becomes an experience of the possibility of 
Christ. Within this the pilgrim's progression and learning, and the way Beatrice 
communicates to him, are of paramount importance since he is put into the position of 
actively experiencing the ideas she presents to him conceptually. Moving from virtu and 
distinction in the universe, I turn to how Dante figures virtu in the Earthly Paradise where 
it appears again as an interaction point between the creative power of God and the created 
power of redeemed man. In this episode there is a particularly significant connection 
between the idea and the image through which it is expressed. Having established virtu as 
the distinguishing and transformative power in Dante's vision of the created universe, I 
turn to consider how he establishes virtu as a creative dynamic within his own created 
afterlife realm of Purgatory. While virtu creates distinction and possibility in the universe 
in general, it performs the same task in the souls of the poet's afterlife, being that which 
endows them with a new distinct body through which they can be redeemed and that 
which is an active force in their purgation process. This chapter focuses on virtu's role in 
creation, both in the poet's vision of the universe and the vision of his own created realms 
of the afterlife. 
Chapter Four, 'Interactive Virtu', focuses on virtu as an ontological and ethical interactive 
force which works between God and man, Creator and creature to draw one to the other. I 
will consider how virtu-interaction is presented at different stages throughout the 
progress through the afterlife. This will begin with an analysis of Limbo to consider a 
situation of failed interaction and its results. I will argue that the way Dante portrays the 
situation of the souls in his poetics directly manifests the nature of that failed interaction. 
In analysing Purgatorio X and XI, I will consider how Dante presents the way in which that 
interaction can be positively re-established. The primary issue at stake is the reordering of 
created hierarchy and a reopening of the way between human and divine virtu through 
human acts of humility. I will then look at two episodes in the Paradiso. The first, cantos XI 
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and XII, considers the role of the saint in the interaction of man and God. Dante casts the 
saints Francis and Dominic as providential figures who manifest their divinely appointed 
roles in ways which evidence their own divine source of being. Finally, I will consider 
canto XXI in which the nature of human-divine interaction is presented in its most perfect 
form, again specifically through an interaction of virtu. Furthermore, while all of these 
episodes unfold in the afterlife, Dante emphasises the connection of each to continuing 
temporal life, thus connecting his visions of time and eternity. Underlying all this analysis 
is reference to the metaphysical relations between God and Christ, Christ and man, and 
man and God. Christ-as-man is the necessary interactive nexus point through which man 
can positively interact with Christ-as-God. 
Chapter Five, 'The Becoming of a Virtuous Man', turns to one of the most prominent 
literary and conceptual features of the Com media: the figure of the pilgrim-poet. Virtu, we 
will come to see, is part of an ethics of character and personal development. By focusing 
his narrative through the experiences of an individual self, Dante is establishing the 
principal ethical mode of his narrative as a virtue-ethic. The experiences of the pilgrim-
poet are ethically and ontologically transformative, the very two factors to which virtu is 
most relevant. Furthermore, by focusing on the experiences of an individual, Dante locates 
that individual within the greater metaphysical and theological currents of his work as a 
whole. In order to demonstrate thiS, this chapter will be structured around the same three 
questions which were considered in Chapter One: What is virtu? How is virtu acquired? 
And what is the result of the attainment of virtu? Beginning with an analysis of Purgatorio 
XVII-XVIII and Paradiso I, I will consider the two different models of virtu Dante proposes 
as explained by his two guides, Virgil and Beatrice. I will then turn to consider Inferno II 
and Purgatorio XXX-XXXI to explore the role Dante gives to the figure of Beatrice in the 
pilgrim's development of virtu. Then, through a wider analysis, I will consider how Dante 
conceives the results of the attainment of virtu at different points of his journey. Finally I 
will consider the ways in which the pilgrim figure can be read as a representative of the 
human condition as a whole as it strives towards virtu. In the pilgrim's case, his 
development in virtu is a return to a perfected state reminiscent of prelapsarian Adam. 
Virtu is also Significant, however, to the poet's development as poet. The poet's ability to 
fulfil his potential to communicate (to fulfil his virtu) is dependent on the pilgrim's 
transformative experience of virtu in the narrative. 
In my Conclusion I will turn to the episode of the pilgrim's examination in the theological 
virtues which takes place in the Heaven of the Fixed Stars. By ending with this analysis I 
will demonstrate how an episode long recognised as a focal point of the virtues in the 
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Commedia, can be read in the light of the new methodology and issues I have established. 
In this way the episode not only reveals information about the theological virtues but 
shows how Dante conceives the ways man comes to a union with God through the action 
of virtu itself. I will also suggest some ways in which my research could be built upon and 
contribute to other issues within Dante studies. 
The result of my thesis will be to reveal an ethical, ontological and poetic dynamic which 
has not been funy recognised in Dante's Commedia before. The work will diversify and 
deepen our understanding of the notions of virtue available to a fourteenth-century writer 
and thus enable us to engage more fully with its presence in the Commedia. Instead of 
reading virtu either as a set of ethical and structural rules or as an abstract creative force, I 
shall instead consider how these two potential meanings are in fact inseparable in a text in 
which to be good is to be the fun expression of one's created being. They are further 
inseparable due to the representational nature of the text where ethics is not simply 
explained but manifested and where the interaction of man and God is conceived through 
the word. My analysis will seek to place Dante within the tradition of writing about virtue 
as both a metaphysical nexus and a vivified principle for human life. 
Ruth Chester 
1: Conceiving Virtue in the Theological and Philosophical 
Traditions 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will establish how western philosophical and theological traditions preceding 
Dante conceived and discussed virtue in order both to reveal the complexity of the concept 
which was available to the poet and to better situate his own original thought in relation 
to that tradition. Virtue is a term relevant to both the philosophical branches of 
metaphysics and ethics, but is a concept which interconnects and transcends both. It 
participates both in the questions of being common, broadly speaking, to metaphysics35 
(and in particular ontology) and questions of doing, the province of ethics.36 Both of these 
conceptual approaches will appear pressing to Dante; the movement and action of the 
Commedia is as much about the nature and act of being, or indeed becoming, as about 
doing. But such initial thoughts still leave the all-important question - what is virtue? -
unanswered. This chapter will explore the answer in more detail, but I suggest here that 
essential to understanding notions of the nature of virtue is also an understanding of the 
intellectual and conceptual context within which virtue makes sense. Virtue as an ethical 
and ontological term relies on a particular way of seeing the world and the human's place 
within it and therefore the conception of virtue forms part of an ideological network of 
interlocking ideas. Divorced from this network, the complexity and subtlety of virtue 
remains unexplored. 
While the chapter will look at the works of five important thinkers, its aim is to build up 
the complexity of the idea of virtue rather than comprehensively analysing the thoughts of 
particular contributors. With this in mind it will be structured around three questions: 
What is virtue? How is virtue attained? What is the result of the attainment of virtue? 
These questions bring together the principal issues which emerge in the various traditions 
around virtue and will enable me to form a progressive picture of the idea. By structuring 
lS Defined in contemporary philosophy as the study of ultimate reality, 'what really exists and what is it that 
distinguishes that and makes it possible'. See DW.Hamlyn, 'Metaphysics, History of, in The Oxford Companion 
to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 556-59 (p. 556). 
36 Defined in contemporary philosophy both as the more practical codifying of correct and Incorrect, moral 
and immoral behaviour, the more abstract consideration of the nature of morality itself, and the consideration 
of what constitutes the 'good life' for human beings. See Michael Slote, 'Moral Philosophy, Problems of, in The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 591-95. 
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around these questions I will be able to show the continuities, shifts and transformations 
within the tradition of writing and thinking about virtue while maintaining the integrity of 
each of the intellectual contributions. Focusing on these questions will also enable me to 
establish the intellectual contexts which shape the idea of virtue, revealing and 
acknowledging its complexity. By approaching my analysis in terms of these questions I 
seek to demonstrate the idea of virtue as part of a diverse living, changing and developing 
tradition with which Dante engages. 
The chapter will return to certain key preoccupations which appear in texts which 
consider virtue, preoccupations which demonstrate virtue's importance within 
philosophical and theological explorations, not only of positive and negative human 
behaviour, but of the human's relation to the universe and to being itself. In the texts 
under consideration, virtue's role has been to situate human behaviour with regard to that 
relation, which is why an understanding of how the intellectual context conceived those 
relations is so vital for a more complete understanding of virtue. A necessary component 
of the context within which virtue makes sense is the notion that human nature, behaviour 
and existence must be understood in relation to a final end and aim. This chapter will 
consider how conceptions of the human telos influence and change what virtue is, and 
significantly the role which virtue plays in attaining that telos. It will become clear that 
throughout the western tradition the final end of human existence, whatever it is, is 
unreachable without virtue. However, the relationship of virtue to telos is closer than 
simply way and end; it will become apparent that virtue is understood as a constituent 
aspect of that final end, that the relationship between virtue and telos is one of 
identification rather than simply causal. 
With the assumption of a telos, there is likewise the assumption of a specific form of 
human nature which is to find its fulfilment in its identified aim and end. Virtue is 
consistently related to the idea of human fulfilment and therefore defining what virtue is 
involves engaging with what it is to be a human being;37 engaging with the possibility that 
humans may attain to a kind of perfection in all facets of their dispositional nature. At the 
same time, changing notions of what constitutes human nature have a subsequent 
influence on the nature and definition of virtue. My analysis will show the way in which 
virtue is closely tied to central aspects ofthe human condition such as desire, free will and 
knowledge. By revealing these interconnections and putting forward a more thorough 
37 The etymological root of the Latin virtus, vir (man), consolidates this point Virtue Is about what it Is to be 
man. The same etymological logic cannot be applied to the most common Greek term for virtue arete, which 
has the more general sense of excellence, although the increased Latin specificity of meaning may Itself be 
enlightening for better understanding changing conceptions of virtue, and the shifting significance of humanity 
Within the cosmos. 
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picture of their significance I will be able to engage more fully with the dynamics which 
underpin Dante's own consideration of the human condition in the Commedia and begin to 
discuss virtue's place in the Commedia in previously unrecognised episodes and themes. 
Before turning to the analysis of the three central questions which this chapter will 
explore, I will present a brief account of the contemporary branch of philosophy called 
'virtue ethics'.38 Virtue ethics addresses the more practical and tangible relation of virtue 
to human behaviour. At this stage, virtue ethics is a useful term from contemporary 
philosophy that will enable the clarification of certain basic notions connected with the 
idea of virtue. 
To adopt a virtue ethic is above all to situate the centre of moral and ethical discourse 
within the individual person. Perhaps the most distinct alternative to a virtue ethic would 
be a deontological ethic in which what is right is understood in terms of duty and 
adherence to an imposed external law.39 In contrast, virtue ethics focuses on the 
individual, their personal moral state and development. A central notion of virtue ethics is 
that, whatever human nature may be, it is capable of development towards its excellence, 
when its excellence is understood as the fulfilment of that nature. As John Barton has 
suggested, a virtue ethic stresses 'the importance of moral formation and the development 
of the moral character over time'.40 The possibility of development suggests that what is 
right and wrong in terms of virtue ethics is identified through experience and subsequent 
reflection on that experience. Experience-based knowledge constructs 'a sense of which 
patterns of choice and activity are worthy of praise and condemnation and thus yields a 
picture of the virtues and vices'.41 For a virtue to be 'acquired' this experience must lead to 
the development of a 'fixed and stable moral disposition' that ensures the agent will 
always behave in a virtuous way. It is not sufficient that an agent does virtuous action, they 
must be virtuous. This is one of the vital distinguishing features of a virtue ethic; it 
38 For a good introduction to virtue ethics see: Peter Byrne, The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of 
Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory and its Relation to ReliOious Belie/(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); 
Alasdaire Mcintyre 'Virtue Ethics', In The Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Becker and Becker, 2nd edition (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), pp.1757-63, and Macintyre's seminal book After Virtue, 3rd edition (London: 
Duckworth, 2007); Jean Porter, 'Virtue Ethics' in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. by Robin 
Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 96-110. 
39 Deontological ethics has a distinct developed tradition of its own. It is often described as 'an ethics of duty' 
in which what is right is what is in accord with an imposed duty or law. The action has no integral rightness of 
its own; Its rightness is solely dependent on how far it adheres to that duty. Etymologically speaking, from Its 
Greek root (dean & looos) it Is the science of dOing, or of what one should do. The carrying out of the dutiful act 
adds no merit to the internal character of the agent; in fact the right or wrongness of the act is entirely 
Ind~pendent of the agent's personal moral state. Such factors make a deontological approach to ethics almost 
en~lrely opposed to a virtue ethic. See Roger Crisp, 'Deontological EthicS', In The Oxford Companion to 
PhIlosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.187-S8. 
40 John Barton 'Virtue In the Bible', Studies in Christian Ethics 12 (1999), 12-22 (p. 13). 
41 Byrne, p. 110. 
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addresses directly a person's being, what they are, and makes that the centre of ethical 
value.42 
Alongside this experience must go self-reflection, the analysis of one's own actions not 
only in order to better understand and develop oneself, but also to bring one's external 
actions into one's state of being. Reflection is not only based on the positive or negative 
outcomes of experience, but rather considers experience in relation to what the individual 
identifies as the fulfilment of their human nature, the important strand relating to virtue 
introduced earlier. More specifically, as has been suggested, virtue ethics assumes a telos 
to human nature: 'It is teleological in shaping human experience around the idea of an 
ultimate goal or end. [ ... ] A notion of what this end is provides the ultimate organising 
point around which moral thought coheres'.43 What is good is that which enables the 
human being to approach this telos. One of the focal points in the considerations of virtue 
will be the importance of the changing notions of human telos and how these then affect 
our understanding of virtue's nature and function. The most noble, indeed the most 
virtuous way of life, is that which in some way adheres to, prefigures or even manifests its 
telos. 
Not only is the human telos somehow prefigured in human virtue but (to varying degrees) 
virtue constitutes that telos. Virtue is the fulfilment of a thing's particular nature in the 
action most proper to itself. Thus if a thing's telos is to be fully itself, virtue is consitutive of 
that telos: 'The virtues are both partly constitutive of the supreme human good and to be 
possessed not only for their own sake as genuine excellences, but also for the sake of that 
good'.44 The traditions of thought to be addressed in this chapter adopt varying 
approaches to this concept, and the extent to which human virtue constitutes the human 
ultimate fulfilment will be questioned. 
It is important at this point to make a distinction between virtue in a more absolute, 
abstract sense, and the virtues. The virtues, those specific qualities considered to be good 
in the human character, can be understood as the ways in which virtue is activated in 
human action in more specific ways. They express more clearly changing social, 
intellectual and cultural attitudes to right and wrong behaviour and therefore do not 
necessarily seek to express an absolute statement about metaphysics or human nature. 
This thesis will focus upon understanding virtue in its more abstracted sense; however, 
there will be points at which the consideration of individual virtues will be necessary 
42 Barton, p. 12. 
43 Byrne, p. 108. 
44 MacIntyre, 'Virtue ethics', p. 1757. 
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either when they demonstrate a changing sense of what virtue itself and its nature and 
function actually are or when a particular thinker only develops their idea in terms of 
virtues. 
To build up a picture of virtue as it develops through the tradition, I have focused on five 
thinkers who have made significant contributions to the idea of virtue and whose 
contributions would have been relevant to Dante's own intellectual context. Beginning 
with the influential ideas of Plato and Aristotle, I shall touch on the distinct characteristics 
of the classical Greek heritage, in which, it has been suggested, virtue ethics was the whole 
sum of ethics itself.45 Both thinkers are as influential for their ontological approaches to 
virtue as for their practical ethics. In moving my analysis directly from Greek to early and 
medieval Christian thought I am both acknowledging a particularly strong influence of one 
upon the other and following a line of thought which considers virtue outside of its purely 
social relevance and instead locates it between ethics and ontology. I have selected three 
Christian thinkers who represent different periods of Christian thought, who themselves 
receive their intellectual background from different traditions, who have distinct ways of 
discussing their ideas, and who were all influential to the development of Christian 
thought.46 In considering how Augustine, Gregory the Great and Aquinas approach the 
question of virtue in their thought, I will trace both their development of existing notions 
and their novel contributions to the tradition. Augustine's work is significant to this thesis 
for several reasons.47 The idea he develops of virtue is connected with and understood 
through his own personal and intellectual experience. He develops the concept in relation 
and contrast to the classical past which so informed his early thought, gives it a central 
role within personal tensions and changes which accompanied his conversion, and finally 
locates it within the wider framework of Christian doctrine which he goes on to establish. 
This personal relevance of virtue, for Augustine, relocates it from the realm of intellectual 
exploration to that of immediate relevance for real life and salvation. I will look at three of 
45 On Aristotle's ethics see: Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley; London: 
University of California Press, 1980); Nancy Sherman (ed.), Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays (Lanham, MD and 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). On Plato see: Aryeh Kosman, 'Justice and Virtue: The Republic's Inquiry 
into Proper Difference', In The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. by Giovanni R.F. Ferrari 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 116-37. For a very brief introduction to Aristotle's 
relation to Dante see John A. Scott, 'Aristotle', in The Dante Encyclopedia, ed. by Richard Lansing (New York and 
London: Garland, 2000), pp. 61-65. For Plato In Dante see Robert M. Durling, 'Plato', In The Dante Encyclopedia, 
pp.703-704. 
46 On virtue In the Bible and in Christian thought generally see: John Haldane, 'From Law to Virtue and Back 
Again'in The Bible in Ethics: The Second Sheffield Colloquium, ed. by John W. Rogerson, Margaret Davies & M. 
Daniel Carroll R. (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 27 -40; see also John Barton. 
47 On Augustine see: James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits o/Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); G. Scott Davis, 'The Structure and Function of the Virtues In the Moral Theology of Augustine' in 
Congresso internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione VIII, 15-20 Settembre 1986 (Rome: 
Institutum Patristicum 'Augustinianum', 1987), pp. 9-18; Gerard O'Daly, Augustine City of God: A Reader's Guide 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); Gareth B. Matthews (ed.), The Augustinian Tradition (Berkeley: University of 
California Press,1999): Johannes Van Oort,Jerusalem and Babylon: A study into Augustine's City o/God and the 
Sources a/his Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: Brill, 1999). 
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Augustine's works which each approach and treat virtue in differing ways. De moribus 
ecclesiae catholicae is a more abstract treatise on virtue, addressing its essential nature to 
produce a radically different concept of virtue to its classical predecessors. The Confessions 
locates virtue within the process of spiritual and moral change, expressed through the 
personal experiences of Augustine himself, and particularly emphasises its role in 
directing the desire towards God. Finally De Civitate Dei situates virtue within the greater 
framework of Augustine's Christian doctrine to reveal its vital role in human salvation 
history. Gregory the Great's additions to the tradition on virtue are significant because of 
the wide influence of his principal text, Moralia in Job, during the Middle Ages.48 A work of 
biblical exegesis, it locates virtue directly within Gregory's understanding of man's fallen 
nature and his total dependence on God. Its language is tangible and urgent, concerned 
with man's practical existence on earth and how that experience, if used in the right way, 
is a journey towards the divine; he casts virtue as having a particular role in that journey. 
Thomas Aquinas, in his vast synthesis of Christian thought, the Summa Theologiae, brings 
together and seeks to harmonise the Aristotelian logical structure of the idea of virtue in 
the light of Christian thought. The bringing together of different understandings of virtue 
creates a voluminous definition, but one which is explored through direct and thorough 
discussion so that the ultimate result is a work of clarity and conviction. 
2. What is Virtue? 
As the idea of virtue passes through different intellectual and theological contexts the 
details of what the term means develop, becoming recontextualised and realigned 
according to the system ofthought which surrounds them. In some way the changes to the 
concept through the tradition are radical but in many ways it is consistent. This section 
will aim to reveal both changes and consistencies and explore something of the context 
which affects how virtue is conceived. 
From the classical Greek considerations of virtue in the works of Plato and Aristotle, 
through to the work of St Thomas Aquinas, virtue is defined as the perfection of a power, 
which perfection is attained through the fulfilment of the act proper to that power. A basic 
48 For an analysis of Gregory the Great and his work see: Carole Straw, Gregory the Great: Perfection in 
Imperfection (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): Charles Dagens, Saint Gregoire Ie Grand: culture 
et experience chretiennes (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1977): Kevin L. Hester, Eschatology and Pain in St 
Gregory the Great: The ChristoloBical Synthesis of Gregory's Morals on the Book ofJob (Bletchley, Milton Keynes 
and Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2007); Matthew Baasten, Pride According to Gregory the Great: A Study of 
the Moralia (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1986); Jean Lec\erq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study 
of Monastic Culture, trans. by Catharine Misrahl (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). A recent 
consideration of Gregory the Great's relation to and role within Dante's own work was presented In a paper by 
Vittorio Montemaggi, 'Dante and Gregory the Great', delivered at 'Reviewing Dante's Theology: A Workshop', 
hosted by the Leeds Centre for Dante Studies, 27th-28th March 2009. 
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definition of Plato's virtue as it appears in the Republic (written 370s BC) might be as 'a 
quality that an entity has that enables it to perform its function well'.49 Plato's emphasis is 
on function, on an entity having a particular role which it must fulfil, which role it is 
enabled to fulfil by its virtue. A much later definition by Aquinas in the Summa theologiae 
(written 1265-1274) enters into more complexity both raising and extending the same 
issues: 'virtus nominat quamdam potentiae perfectionem. Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio 
praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde 
potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum' (ST 1a2ae 
55,1).50 What the virtue of a particular entity is depends on an understanding of the 
potential of that entity, of the act by which that potential is most fulfilled, and the function 
that entity is carrying out or the end towards which that entity is aiming. Perfection is 
relative both to the capabilities of the entity and to the ultimate standard to which that 
entity could attain. Virtue is then that which constitutes all these aspects. It stands as both 
the act by which that entity is perfectly fulfilled and the state of fulfilment itself. Aquinas 
establishes that virtue is sometimes both object and activity of an entity: 'quando dicitur 
quod virtus est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro objecto virtutis' (ST 1a2ae 55,1). 
Virtue is relevant both to an entity's being and its act: 'unde cum duplex sit potentia, 
scilicet potentia ad esse, et potentia ad agere, utriusque potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur' 
(ST 1a2ae 55,2). Virtue, then, is both perfect being and perfect doing or rather the 
perfection of being in act 
When virtue is established as the perfect functioning and being of a thing, it also becomes 
related to the notion of good and thus becomes a statement of value. To be virtuous is to 
be perfect, fulfilled, according to a standard of goodness relative to the entity's potential 
and relative to the good which the entity is seeking to attain since 'omnis virtus dicatur in 
ordine ad bonum' (ST 1a2ae 57,1). Aquinas writes that 'virtus importat perfectionem 
potentiae [ ... ] Ultimum autem in quod unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit 
bonum, nam omne malum defectum quendem importat [ ... ]. Et propter hoc oportet quod 
virtus cujus libet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum' (ST 1a2ae 55,3). Virtue becomes a 
statement of value about its subject when it makes the subject good in relation to the good 
of which that subject is capable. But it is at this stage a statement of ontological rather than 
ethical goodness. 
This definition is applicable to any created thing. In turning to the particular case of 
human virtue, the issue becomes more complex and comes to depend on an understanding 
49 Kosman. p. 120. 
50 Aquinas. St Thomas. Summa Theologiae, ed. and trans. by W.D. Hughes. 61 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1968). XXIII. 
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of human nature and purpose. For Aristotle, writing in the Nicomachean Ethics (written 
c.3S0 Be), 'virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also 
which will cause him to perform his function well' (NE. Il.vi.3).51 The soul of man is made 
up of three parts - vegetative, sensitive and rational - each of which has its virtue, the 
functioning by which it is most perfect. But for man as a whole his function is 'the active 
exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity with the rational principle' (NE I.vii.14). Man 
acquires the disposition which is virtue when the faculties of the soul are trained and 
become fixed. Virtue is then 'a settled disposition of mind determining the choice of 
actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us' 
(NE II.vi.1S). Aristotle's understanding of virtue is as a fixed disposition which produces 
action; action, the fulfilment of potential, is the forum in which virtue is formed and 
evidenced. This idea of human virtue is in relation to the perceived potential and limits of 
human power and to the perceived end of human existence. In Aristotle's conception, 
human happiness is the main aim of human life, and this happiness for man he 
understands as 'active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or 
virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues in conformity with the best and 
most perfect among them' (NE I.vii.1S). The most perfect of the human virtues is the 
virtuous exercise of reason. Happiness for man is thus to fully and perfectly use reason 
and the enacting of his rational disposition within human society. 
While Aristotle emphasises the operational nature of virtue, for Plato virtue is also a form 
of psychic unity. Man's mind is tripartite, composed of reason, emotion and appetite, and 
virtue again is necessary in each part. Morality exists when each part fully fulfils its role 
but keeps to the boundaries allotted to it so that reason is the guiding principle (444d). In 
using the term cStKU, meaning morality or justice, Plato does not seem to be talking about 
exactly virtue. Later, however, this psychic unity which Plato calls a state of justice, 
Aristotle comes to call the whole of virtue itself (NE V.i.19). And so, as Porter suggests, 'the 
virtues are all fundamentally expressions of one quality'.52 In Plato's case this quality is 
psychic unity. Human virtue is the harmonious working of all the active principles within 
human nature which influence human action, reason, emotion and appetite which happens 
when each individually is in a state of virtue. In Plato's case, however, the virtue of the 
human psyche is a reflection oftheiorm of virtue itself. In his view of the universe there is 
a standard for existence which is beyond the physical and this provides a useful 
intellectual bridge between the conception of classical and Christian virtue. 
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1934). 
S2 Porter, p. 100. 
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Once human nature and existence is recontextualised within Christian thought the 
parameters and fulfilment of human nature shift entirely. Within this shift, while virtue is 
consistent in its essential definitions, it is at once entirely changed. Both Aristotle in his 
Ethics and Augustine in his early work De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae define virtue as that 
which gives perfection to the soul and therefore as man's greatest good for the attainment 
of his end. But while the end for Aristotle is happiness understood as the perfect use of 
reason and man's potential is limited to what is naturally within him, for Augustine these 
factors are radically different. The ultimate good for man no longer rests within the 
fulfilment of his own powers but instead in the attainment of his Creator God. What is 
most perfect for the human soul is therefore what draws man towards God and the soul is 
in a perfect state when it has attained God. Augustine identifies virtue as that which gives 
perfection to the soul and which is therefore man's chief good (DME 5.8).53 But it is man's 
chief good because it helps him to the object of his final happiness, God. Augustine 
conceives the way in which man moves towards God as 'eum sequimur diligendo' (DME 
11.18). Love becomes paramount in Augustine's thought, as the natural attraction which 
draws man to God, just as a creature is drawn to the source of its being. Because love is the 
mode through which the soul attains to God, then that which aids the soul in its attainment 
of God must be some form of love and it is as love that Augustine identifies virtue; it is in 
fact 'summum amorem dei' (DME 15.25), perfect love of God. Virtue remains the 
perfection of the soul but within the Christian context for the soul to be perfect it must be 
lovingly directed towards God. 
While virtue in the general sense is summus amor dei, Augustine also explains how the 
individual cardinal virtues are types of love. As in Plato, while the virtues may be 
distinguished, they are all expressions of a unified quality, and for Augustine this is love.54 
Namque illud quod quadripartite dicitur virtus, ex ipsius am oris varia quodam 
affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur. [ ... ] [S]ic etiam definire non dub item, ut 
temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, iustitia amor soli 
amato serviens et propterea recte dominans prudentia amor ea quibus adiuuatur 
ab eis quihus impe~itur sagaciter seligens. (DME 15.25) 
Further distinguished, they describe particular attitudes of the soul towards God. Having 
God as their object they have distinct forms: 
53 Augustine, De moribus Ecc1esiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum libr; duo, ed. by Johannes B. Bauer 
(Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1992). 
S4 Porter, p. 100. See also John P. Langan, 'Augustine on the Unity and Interconnection of the Virtues', The 
Harvard Theological Review 72:1-2 (1979),81-95. 
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Sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae 
sapientiae summaeque concordiae. Quare definire etiam sic licet, ut temperantiam 
dicamus esse amorem deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, 
fortitudinem amorem omnia propter deum facile perferentem, iustitiam amorem 
deo tantum servientem et ob hoc bene imperantem ceteris quae homini subiecta 
sunt, prudentiam amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adiuuetur in deum ab his 
quibus impediri potest. (DME 15.25) 
Virtue is the perfect ordering oflove towards God, focusing on God as the perfection of the 
human soul and thus regulating human action in relation to that perfection. Aquinas, 
following Augustine's idea, also identifies virtue with love, emphasising that perfectly 
ordered love is both the action in progress and in fulfilment of virtue (ST 1a2ae 55,2). To 
begin to talk about virtue as love introduces an entirely new way of conceiving the 
dynamic which virtue traces and a new way of understanding its role and manifestation in 
human life. 
With Christianity comes a different way of conceiving the universe and man's place within 
it. The tradition of seeing creation as an ontological hierarchy which is constantly held in 
existence by its source finds its roots in Plato's Timaeus. The original source of existence 
is characterised as superlatively Good and as creating the universe through the 
overflowing of its own perfection.55 The Supreme ground of being is both entirely 'self-
sufficient' in its perfection and at the same time overflowing with the creation of things 
outside itself. The world, as God's creation, is understood as perfect in its fullness and its 
completeness. All the created entities come together to form a perfect unbroken "'Great 
Chain of Being" composed of an immense or [ ... ] an infinite number of links ranging in 
hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existences [ ... ] through "every possible" 
grade up to the ens per!ect;ss;mum',S6 Each link in this chain participates in some way with 
the links either side of it, which is particular in the case of man. Man has a dual nature 
which means he can choose to orientate himself to either what is corporeal and lower or 
what is incorporeal or higher; the higher, that is ultimately God, is the best and ultimate 
object.s7 Within this context, Augustinian virtue, as the perfect love of God, is that by which 
man enters positively into the ontological interrelation necessitated by his state as a 
created being. In loving God (i.e. in being virtuous) man is perfectly fulfilling his created 
potential power. Furthermore virtue as perfect love of God, becomes entirely dependent 
55 The complex intel1ectual history of the Chain of Being can be found In Arthur O. Lovejoy's seminal work of 
that name; here there is only space and need to paraphrase his most illuminating and relevant points. Arthur 
O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. The William James Lectures Delivered at 
Harvard University, 1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1961). 
56 L' 59 ' oveJoy, p. . 
57 Lovejoy, p. 79. See also Augustine, Sancti Aurelii Augustini: De Civitate Dei 11.2. 
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for its existence on God himself who is its object. Human virtue dislocated from its 
ultimate object is no longer virtue. 
Gregory the Great goes even further in relating virtue to God by establishing it not as 
something produced within the soul itself but as something given to it by God. Virtue 
continues to be the perfection of the human mind, that by which it is raised up (Moralia 
2.49.76) but, in man's corrupted sinful state after the Fall, this perfection was no longer 
independently attainable, neither in being nor in action. Virtue, as the perfection of being 
in action, can therefore come only from the external perfect source of God. Thus virtue 
becomes a 'donum Spiriti' (Moralia 2.49.77), entirely dependent on God's grace.s8 As we 
shall come to see in the following sections of this chapter, by making virtue dependent, 
Gregory redraws the boundaries of what it is to be good for humankind. The independent 
use of reason as man's perfection is not only undermined but is also shown to be 
dangerous, holding within it the risk of spiritual pride. Gregory instead challenges man's 
ability to be perfect and the understanding of the way by which he is perfect. It is only in 
the sacrifice of self-sufficiency and the attainment of humility that virtue, the perfection of 
man, can come about. 
Aquinas stands between the entirely human-centric virtue of Aristotle and the God-
dependent virtue of Gregory. In the Summa Theologiae he espouses a definition of virtue 
attributed to Augustine which brings together the different aspects of human virtue 
considered so far: 'Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male 
utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur' (ST la2ae 55,4). Virtue sits between 
human potential and divine enactment, the nexus which draws man's nature up towards 
God and which is the fulfilment ofthe divine potential within man. Aquinas states (quoting 
Aristotle) that 'virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest' (ST 
la2ae 55,3). As we will come to see, he goes on to explore how the potential virtue of man 
himself is extended by his interaction with God. 
Virtue is not only a quality of created powers, or of humans but is also, within the 
Christian tradition, an attribute of God himself. Since virtue is the perfection of being 
through doing, which also expresses the end aim of the subject, in God it is totally 
recontextualised, 'cum Dei substantia sit eius actio' (ST la2ae 55,2). The being of God is 
the perfect fulfilment and existence of God. He is, as such, virtue itself. Virtue as one of the 
names of God expresses principally God as perfectly fulfilled being which empowers 
creation. As Durling and Martinez have pointed out, 'the term virtu (Latin virtus) had long 
58 Gregory the Great, Moralia in lob, ed. by Marc Adriaen, 3 volumes (Turnholt: Brepols, 1979-85). 
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been recognised as one of the names of God [ ... ] it has the force of power as exercised and 
thus a particular association with the doctrine of creation and the LogoS'.59 God's virtue is 
overtly creative and is thus the source of human existence.6o God as the exemplary form of 
virtue sets a new standard for human virtue to attain to; human virtue shifts from being 
autonomous to participative, from being perfect in itself to being a reflection of the 
perfection of Another. Thus to be virtuous is not only to take the ethical steps which foster 
the relationship of man and God, but for man to draw towards God in ontological 
similarity. 
God's virtue is also made distinct and individualised in the figure of Christ. Christ, in his 
metaphysical role as the Logos, is the creative principle of God, he through whom all is 
made Oohn 1.3-4). Augustine in the De moribus Ecc1esiae makes reference to this role of 
Christ, at the same time making use of the names for Christ from 1 Corinthians 1:24, 
'Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam': 
Dei filium, dei virtutem esse atque sapientiam, cumque virtus ad operationem, 
sapientia vera ad disciplinam pertinere intelligatur - unde in euangelico duo ipsa 
signantur, cum dicitur: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, nam hoc operationis atque 
virtutis est, deinde quod ad disciplinam uerique cognitionem attinet, et vita, inquit, 
erat lux hominum. (DME 16.27) 
Virtue as perfected being-doing when in reference to the Christ-Logos is the power of 
creative action; the world is made through the virtue of Christ. 
As well as being the creative principle, virtue in reference to Christ is also important to his 
role as Christ incarnate. In Christ, the believer finds 'the model of perfected virtue'.61 He is 
the exemplar of perfect virtue because he is the manifestation of the nature and enactment 
of the perfect relationship with God which the Christian must seek in order to attain 
salvation. His ontological unity with God, the unity in difference which is the Trinity, 
provides the model for the temporal community of the faithful. Once the believer has 
entered into this relationship through love of the incarnate Christ, according to Augustine, 
their actions are endowed with value. Christ informs the life of those who love him by 
returning their love with virtue (DME 16.27). So while virtue as love is the way to attain 
towards God, virtue as the perfection of their powers is the gift of God to those who love 
him. Furthermore, the believer is not only rewarded by their actions being made perfect 
59 Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez, Time and the Crystal: Studies in Dante's 'Rime Petrose' (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), p. 158. 
60 For virtue as the power with which God creates see Aquinas Summa The%giae 1a45 5 & 6. 
61 Haldane, p. 34. • 
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and valuable but is rewarded with Christ himself as virtue. The interrelation of virtue as 
being and doing is recontextualised by the ontological and ethical relationship of man to 
Christ; to do is to receive the being of Christ; to be is to take part in Christ's doing as the 
maker of the universe. 
In this first stage of defining virtue we have seen the concept transform from one 
grounded upon a human-centric understanding of human powers and human purpose to 
one which sees virtue as a focal point in the relationship between man and his Creator, 
indeed as an attribute of that Creator himself. Virtue is always the perfection of the 
potential being of a power in the act proper to itself. What changes is the sense of a man's 
potential, the sense of the acts proper to him, and the sense of the end towards which 
those acts are directed. The Christian tradition locates man's perfection ultimately in his 
relation to God. 
3. How is virtue acquired? 
This section will now consider the concept of virtue further by examining how the 
different writers and traditions under consideration discussed how virtue could be 
attained. The answer to the question of how virtue is acquired is again largely dependent 
on intellectual contexts which began to be apparent in section one. 
The acquisition of Aristotelian virtue - a good disposition which results in the good 
functioning of man (NE Il.vi.3) - is firmly fixed within human action. Based on the faculties 
of the human soul, Aristotle divides virtue into two types, intellectual and moral, each of 
which is produced differently: 'intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and 
increased by instruction and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or 
ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos)' (NE II.i.l). Aristotle's focus in the Ethics is 
primarily upon the moral virtues. While the capacity for moral virtue is naturally present 
within the human, it is only through practice and the development of a habit that the 
virtue comes to fruition (NE II.i.4). This habit is developed through repeated action (NE 
II.iv.3). Through continued good practice a fixed disposition towards virtuous activity is 
instilled in the active subject: 'we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing 
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts' (NE ll.i.4). This fixed disposition, the result of 
continued practice, may be termed the possession of a virtue.62 Because dispositions are 
62 Ar~stotle specifies virtue as a disposition, rather than an emotion or a capacity, for several reasons. First 
ar~um~ from a linguistic point he states that when discussing emotions we describe being 'moved by' whereas 
With virtues and vices we use being 'disposed' (1l.v.4). Also virtue Is connected to choice, whereas emotion is 
not In our contro\. Thus we can be justly praised or blamed for virtue or vice, but not for emotions. Virtue is 
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created through repeated actions, Aristotle emphasises that 'it is incumbent on us to 
control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of 
our dispositions' (NE I1.i.8). The standard for the rightness or wrongness of an action is 
established through social interaction and it is only within these interactions that virtue 
can be developed: 'It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that some of us 
become just and others unjust' (NE I1j.7). As there is seemingly no external standard for 
virtue in the Aristotelian system, the value of what is good or bad must be negotiated 
within the system itself.63 Virtue, as an unformed potentiality in the human soul, is 
qualified in its activity by the testing of interaction; what is good and bad is understood in 
terms of how actions affect other people. While the acquisition of virtue is an internal 
process, its field of action is social. 
Moral virtue, however, is relative both to acting and to feeling (NE III.i.l). In Book I1.ii.6, 
Aristotle states that 'moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by 
deficiency' of pain and pleasure (NE lI.iii.S). Pleasures and pains act on the emotional as 
well as the rational part of the human and Aristotle, like Plato, does not deny the 
motivating power of emotional stimuli. It is important, therefore, that the emotions, as 
well as the reason, are trained. The acquisition of virtue in the emotions is not the wiping 
out of the feelings attendant on pleasure and pain because feeling and emotions are a 
necessary and inescapable part of human nature; Aristotle absolutely denies that the 
virtues are states of continual non-feeling. Rather they are feeling at the right time and to 
the right degree (NE lI.iii.S); they are not the removal of pleasure and pain but the learning 
of how to respond to these in accordance with right principle and in such a way that 
promotes real human happiness: 'moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in 
relation to pleasures and pain' (NE IIjii.6). So not only is virtue developed in order to 
ensure the morally correct action in a given situation, it is also developed to train the 
emotions to respond correctly, to the right degree and to the right stimuli (NE ll.iii.3). 
Although Aristotle's emphasis is on the practical application of virtue in activity, this must 
go hand in hand with a proper way of feeling, which feeling is also the province of virtue.64 
It is important in the training of virtue, both in practice and in emotion, that virtue is 
tested; such a testing is the way in which virtue develops (NE lI.ii.8). The necessity of 
likewise not a capacity, as a capacity suggests something we Inherently have by nature, while virtue comes 
through a process of acquisition (lI.v.1-6). 
63 Martha Nussbaum has suggested that 'the acceptance of an anthropocentric conception of ethical truth 
increases the vulnerability of ethical trust and confidence in situations of upheaval [ ... ] a belief that the 
fundamental distinctions in the world of practice are human, backed by nothing more eternal or stable than 
human things, contributes to an agent's sense of ethical risk'. The Fragility a/Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), p. 238. 
64 For a fascinating study on Aristotle's treatment of action and feeling see Aryeh Kosman's essay 'Being 
Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics', In Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. by Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 103-16. 
Ruth Chester 
I rl"l"lC' 11l\\\\/mc:.l1'Y lIBRARY 
38 
testing in the formative process of virtue, as we shall see, finds profound echoes in the 
work of Augustine and Gregory the Great. 
What stands out in the process of the acquisition of virtue in Aristotle's thought is the 
interaction between external action and internal state of being. His is very much a virtue 
ethic, locating the value of an action within the moral state of the subject performing that 
action rather than within the action itself. A virtuous action is not a virtuous action unless 
it proceeds from a fixed dispositional character: 
acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they 
themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a certain state of 
mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must 
deliberately choose the act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must 
spring from a fixed disposition of character. (NE Il.iv.3; my italics) 
As we have seen, habitual actions create dispositions, but it is only when the disposition 
becomes permanent, and the subject could act in no other way, that they are truly 
virtuous. This is not, however, deterministic but instead dependent on the action being the 
free and willing choice of the subject. 
The development of virtue is the responsibility of the individual. As it is within their 
power to do or not do, this is how virtue gains its quality of being worthy of praise. 
Without the freedom of choice, an act has no value (NE III.i.l). Aristotle believes in the 
freedom of activity of the human subject, but activity can only take place within situations 
which humans can change: 'a man is the origin of his actions, and [ ... ] the province of 
deliberation is to discover actions within one's power to perform' (NE III.iii.1S). Choices 
are therefore made over aspects within human control, or more specifically, the means to 
reach a desired end; the end itself cannot be changed but the means can (NE III.iii.ll).65 
Once an end has been identified as desirable, this desire is fixed through the choices of 
action to lead the subject towards that end. The power and responsibility for reaching this 
end remain with the human subject. As activity is the province (and in some way the 
cause) of virtue, and choice and activity are witllin human control, then acquiring virtue is 
also the responsibility of the human subject: 
whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and 
choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice and 
6S See NE II1.1i.17 for Aristotle's discussion on the nature of choice. 
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voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means. 
Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. (NE IIl.v.1-2) 
The choice to act virtuously or not concerning the means to an end is within human power 
and is therefore worthy of praise or blame. A choice is the result of an internal process of 
deliberation and making the right choice in relation to a right end is dependent on the way 
in which the natural capacity for virtue has been developed. Virtue is not only a neutral, 
natural capacity when its fulfilment or failure becomes a thing of value in the judgement of 
human moral success. A person comes to be good or bad dependent on the extent to which 
they have freely worked towards the fulfilment of themselves in virtue. 
The attainment of human virtue for Aristotle, it appears, is entirely determined by the 
power and capacities of man's nature. This idea is also adopted but importantly 
recontextualised by Aquinas: 'virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res 
potest' CST 1a2ae 55,3). While Aquinas maintains much of Aristotle's intellectual structure, 
as I shall demonstrate, he makes significant developments. Like Aristotle, he locates 
human virtue in the intellect and the sensitive appetites, which are perfected by 
intellectual and moral virtue respectively. While the intellectual virtues are essential in 
perfecting the judgement so that action can be orientated towards the correct end, they 
are incomplete without the perfection of moral virtue which controls the distracting 
passions and gives both the ability to do right and the fixed desire which ensures that a 
thing will be done CST 1a2ae 61,1). The central factor is the virtue and perfection of the 
will since it is the source of human action: 'Subjectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur 
virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas vel aliqua potentia, secundum quod est mota a 
voluntate. Cujus ratio est quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae aliqualiter sunt 
rationales ad suos actus' CST 1a2ae 56,3). Intellectual virtue makes man capable of good 
activity, but does not ensure that good activity will be carried out. Instead, 'virtus quae 
perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit etiam bene uti hujusmodi speculativis 
habitibus' CST 1a2ae 57,1). Human virtue is dependent predominantly on the perfection of 
the will because it is the will which is attracted to an object and draws the action of the 
soul towards that object. What changes therefore in Aquinas's Christian understanding of 
virtue is the object of human virtue and the capacities and roles of the faculties which are 
perfected by it. While maintaining this two-part structure of intellect and will, Aquinas 
changes the boundaries by which those faculties are limited. With the coming of 
Christianity and its faith, humanity is no longer bound by its own capacities and instead 
has two ends to its nature, the perfection of reason and the attainment of God. For the 
attainment of the first end its natural powers, perfected in virtue, are sufficient. But the 
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attainment of the second requires interaction with the object, God himself, man's nature 
being insufficient on its own. Aquinas describes how man's powers are infused with a new 
order of activity and so a new form of virtue which aligns man's activity with his new end: 
the infused moral virtues and the theological virtues. The acquisition of both is dependent 
on interaction with God. 
The locus of this interaction Aquinas identifies as the will; when aiming towards a good 
beyond its natural capacity or immediate horizon, the will requires different and special 
virtues in order to be perfected beyond itself: 
Sed si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem 
volentis, sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod 
transcendit limites humanCE naturce, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum 
proximi, ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes qUCE ordinat 
affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in voluntate sicut in subjecto, ut 
caritas, justitia et huiusmodi. (ST la2CE 56,6). 
These types of special virtues fall into two categories, infused moral virtues and 
theological virtues, both of which emphasise the importance of divine interaction with 
human nature in order for that nature to be raised upwards. The doctrine of infused moral 
virtue suggests that once a person has been baptized, God infuses a kind of extension to 
the human moral virtues which allows them to live and act in the temporal world in 
conformity with the new spiritual life, whose aim is beyond that world. God infuses these 
moral virtues which are 'totally supernatural in form, a thoroughly new ordering of human 
activity, yet seated within the natural powers of the mind and will, from the conscious 
consent to God's revealed mysteries'.66 It has become apparent that positive interaction is 
vital; it is the willing and openness of man to God which makes this infusion happen and 
so the development of virtue which will draw man to God is a two-way process of human 
willingness and divine beneficence. The infused moral virtues act as a bridge between 
human and divine nature but their focus of activity remains temporal human life. Infused 
moral virtues enable temporal actions to be ordered towards an eternal end, guiding 
human interaction with the rest of creation in the light of divine revelation: 'Sed oportet 
quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum' 
(la2CE 63,3). The nature of virtue changes or is changed depending on the forum in which 
it exists and the end of the power of which it is the perfection. Thus, 
66 W.D. Hughes, 'Appendix 3' in St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo/ogice, XXIII, pp. 247-48. 
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Habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur. [ ... ] Et per hunc 
etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se 
habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae 
virtutes acquistae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas. 
CST la2CE 63,4) 
The doctrine of infused moral virtue as expressed by Aquinas emphasises that, in order for 
man to attain towards his supernatural end in God, the standard of his activity must be 
changed in a way which is beyond his natural capabilities. As the end is beyond human 
nature, so the virtues of the powers attaining to that end must come from a source beyond 
human nature; they must be infused directly by God. In fact, the definition of virtue which 
Aquinas adopts from Augustine's work is most aptly fitted to infused moral virtue: 'virtus 
est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine 
nobis operatur' CST la2ae 55,4). Infused moral virtue is the transformation of natural 
qualities when the end of those qualities changes from being the temporal world to the 
world of God. Aquinas's argument emphasises the continuity of human development in 
virtue; human virtue is not replaced or removed but transformed. 
By laying the foundation of an active spiritual life on earth, the infused moral virtues act as 
a step between moral and theological virtues. Aquinas suggests the necessity of these 
virtues before theological virtues can be acquired, otherwise the gap between capability 
and desired end remains too great: 
Cmnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus 
acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis 
praeexistentibus. [ ... ] Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur nobis a 
Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem. [ ... ] Unde 
oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii 
habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes theologicas sicut se 
habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum. CST la2re 
63,3) 
The theological virtues are totally infused, going beyond human nature, having their end 
only in God. The theological virtues differ from the infused moral virtues in that, while 
both attain towards the supernatural happiness, the infused moral virtues are concerned 
with directing man's interaction with the rest of creation. The theological virtues, on the 
other hand, are so called '[t]um quia habent Deum pro objecto, inquantum per eas recte 
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ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina 
revelatione in sacra Scriptura huiusmodi virtutes traduntur' (la2re 62.1). Aquinas, 
however, maintains the structure of the soul he has outlined in relation to moral virtue. As 
the source of human action is always either in the reason or in the will, then virtues which 
raise the human powers in accordance to their supranatural end must be likewise located 
in and inform these sources. Thus faith is a virtue of the intellect, and hope and charity of 
the will. By forming such an argument, Aquinas is validating the potential of human nature 
as it exists after the revelation of Christ. He is also recontextualising his definition of virtue 
as both the perfection through which one attains one's end and the state of attainment 
itself. 
Christian thought entails a new understanding of the capabilities and capacities of human 
nature and therefore a new understanding of how that nature can attain its perfection, 
virtue. Post-lap sari an human nature is flawed, having renounced its positive place in the 
ontological hierarchy by the sin of Adam. Human nature is unable to be good in itself; the 
best it can do is to follow divine law and so it is that the ethical model of the Old Testament 
is deontological; what is good and virtuous is that which is done in accordance with God's 
law: 'prius autem quam veniret fides sub lege custodiebamur conclusi' (Galatians 3:23). 
The emphasis is on following a command from above, and if the action is in accordance 
with that command it is good. The Old Testament seeks to guide human nature in its 
corrupted, lapsed state; in a state in which its internal corruption makes good 
independently initiated by man impossible because the human root of action is diseased. 
In contrast, the New Testament expresses an ethical view much closer to what we have 
understood so far as virtue ethics. It is concerned with transforming the internal moral 
character of the subject in the redeemed light of the revelation of Christ. Haldane neatly 
clarifies the shift in thinking as, '[i]nstead of asking what God has commanded it became 
common to wonder what Christ would do',67 With the advent of Christ, humanity has the 
possibility again to be onto logically whole and perfect, and the role of the Testament is to 
guide the way towards perfection. In such a situation internal perfection of the individual 
is not only possible but vital. Rather than a corrupt being following necessary, externally 
imposed laws to counteract that corruption, the human individual has the capacity for 
transformation, a return to the perfect prelapsarian being and his or her responsibility 
becomes to fulfil that potential through the dynamics of virtue. 
Christ as the locus for a Christian idea of virtue has already begun to be apparent in this 
survey so far. In Christ's Incarnation and Crucifixion, which redeems mankind, human 
67 Haldane. p. 30. 
Ruth Chester 
43 
nature is restored to its potential for salvation, its potential to be virtuous. Significantly in 
his incarnate form, Christ demonstrates how the new order of human nature is to be 
fulfilled in virtue. With the coming of Christ incarnate, God's grace, his 'unmerited love and 
favour',68 is brought visibly into the world. This visible offer of grace requires an active 
response on the part of the faithful in order for it to positively empower an individual's 
life: 'While unmerited grace has been extended through the righteousness of Christ, the 
believer is to demonstrate gratitude by means of a virtuous life'.69 Virtue as an expression 
of gratitude designates it in an inter-relational role in the interaction between man and 
God. In the New Testament, Christ's grace and virtue are presented as being given to 
humanity in response to their faith. In both Mark 5:30-34 and Luke 6:19, virtue is 
understood abstractly as the power of Christ, which emanates from him in response to the 
touch of a faithful follower. Christ's virtue then manifests itself in healing for the faithful 
woman in question. But Christ not only transmits ontological virtue but is the exemplum 
of ethical virtue. 
Christ, as well as being the visible manifestation of proffered grace, is also the exemplum 
of the virtuous life: 'He had become a man so that human beings could imitate his human 
life and could not dismiss his virtues as something beyond the realm of possibility'.'o The 
gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke present Jesus as 'teacher' and 'model' of morality. He is 
to be imitated both in practical life and in his total awareness of God.71 The Christian is 
required to imitate Christ and this imitation is described in terms of the Christian virtues 
of faith, hope and charity.72 The shift entailed by the change in the basis of virtue required 
this wholly new set of forms into which virtue was distinguished. In addition, Christ is 
associated with another virtue, entirely alien to classical virtue ethics: humility.73 It is 
Christ's humility which his followers are most required to manifest as it is this which 
asserts the proper hierarchy between God and his creation. Humility is what correctly 
places humankind within the ontological spectrum but, by being also the virtue of Christ, it 
is that through which the human can be raised above himself, to move from the 
individuated human state to participation in the being of God. 
Gregory the Great casts humility as the 'magistra [ ... ] omnium materque virtutum' 
(Moralia 23.13.24), guarding as it does against the root of all sin, pride. As humility 
68 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine,S vols (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press: 1971-1989), I (1971), p. 294. 
69 J.Daryl Charles, Virtue amidst Vice: The CataloB o/Virtues in 2 Peter 1 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997). p. 151. 
70 Pelikan, III (1978). p. 125. 
71 Bernard McGinn, The Presence 0/ God: A History o/Western Christian Mysticism, 2 vols (London: SCM, 1992-
1995) I (1992), p. 66. 
72 Pelikan, Ill, 23. 
73 'The humility of Christ was the nobility of his followers', Pelikan IJI, 125. 
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counteracts pride, it enters into a greater dynamic which plays out in Christian salvation 
history; while it is Adam's pride which condemns humanity in original sin, it is Christ's 
humility which removes the ultimate penalty of that sin and restores the potential of 
human nature. Christ, by manifesting, indeed debasing, himself by taking on human 
nature, '[i]nde quippe annuntiat aequitatem nostram, unde suscipere dignatus est 
infirmitatem nostram' (Maralia 24.2.4). The salvation and perfection which Christ 
achieves is through humility, demonstrating the way in which men after him can return to 
God: 
Ad hoc namquam unigenitus Dei Filius formam infirmitatis nostrae suscepit, ad 
hoc invisibilis, non solum uisibilis, sed etiam despectus apparuit, ad hoc 
contumeliarum Iudibria, irrisionum opprobia, passionum tormenta toleravit, ut 
superbum non esse hominem doceret humilis Deus. Quanta ergo humilitatis virtus 
est, propter quam solam ueraciter edocendam is qui sine aestimatione magnus est, 
usque ad passionem factus est paruus? (Moralia 34.23.54) 
Christ's humility bridges the gap between man and God, a gap which is both moral and 
perceptual: 'Videri autem debuit qui corrigebat, ut praebendo imitationis formam, 
anteactae malitiae mutaret uitam [ ... ] Iustus igitur atque inuisibilis Deus, apparuit similis 
nobis homo uisibilis, ut dum uidetur ex simili, curaret ex iusto' (Moralia 24.2.2). Gregory, 
in his concern to give practical, tangible advice, to reveal the everyday lessons which are 
present and applicable from Scripture, focuses strongly on the practical exemplum of the 
incarnate Christ. Christ's humility then is to be actively imitated. 
At the heart of the new Christian theology of the fulfilment of human nature and thus, of 
virtue, is the relationship between man and God. Pelikan aptly captures this change in 
conSidering the role of grace in man's perfection: 
Neither free will of itself nor instruction in the law and will of God would suffice to 
achieve righteousness, for free will was good only for Sinning unless man knew the 
law, and even after he knew it he still lacked a love for it and a delight in it; this 
came only through the love of God shed abroad.74 
Man comes to attain virtue not by the repetition of good actions directed only to the 
human sphere but by the renunciation of his self dependency and his submission to and 
love for God. It is no longer 'the repeated act which creates the disposition, but rather a 
74 Pelikan, I, 301. 
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logically prior relationship upon which the disposition, and whatever ensuing act, depend 
[ ... ] [an act] has no quality, virtuous or vicious, until we determine the relation ofthe agent 
to God'.7s While for Aristotle a virtuous disposition was attained through repeated good 
actions, now man's relation to God must be the centre of his disposition and only from this 
relationship can virtue, the fulfilment of potential being in good action, spring. 
Augustine explores the dynamics of this relationship and the steps by which virtue is 
attained within this new context by reference to his own personal experience. We 
remember that for Augustine virtue is perfect love afGod. The failure of virtue is therefore 
when love is directed away from God. The problems which Augustine recounts in the 
earlier books of the Confessions as he strives towards conversion are compounded by his 
inability to overcome physical desire, or more technically, first to order correctly his will 
and then bring his appetites under its control.'6 In sin, the will is disordered, confused in 
its apprehension of what is really good. Sin, which in Augustinian terms can be understood 
as love misdirected, has as its object things of the temporal world, taking them for real 
goods and thus finding satisfaction in the world alone." As such, the human soul who 
follows sin is submitting its power and will to something inferior to itself; inferior as the 
world is finite and the soul eternal. By submitting one's desires to the world, the soul gives 
up control of its own happiness, making it depend on that which must ultimately die. As 
Wetzel suggests, the soul is giving up the capacity to 'self-determine'.78 
The major difficulty in man's overcoming of sin is the reordering of the will both towards 
God, but also in submission to God. This is the tension Augustine is under; whether to 'give 
up' his own will or not: 'et hoc erat totum nolle, quod volebam, et velIe, quod vole bas. Sed 
ubi erat tam annoso tempore, et de quo imo altoque secreto evocatum est in momento 
liberum arbitrium meum, quo subderem cervicem leni iugo tuo, et umeros levi sarcinae 
tuae' (Cont 9.1.1).79 Once he does submit to God's will he discovers that his own was in 
thrall to concupiscible desire, and his new found submission is in fact freedom. The 
7S Davis, p. 12. 
76 It has already been suggested in the section on Plato. that the appetites require their own virtues In order to 
bring them into accord with reason. This notion will be taken up again later by Aquinas. 
77 Wetzel, pp. 63-67. 
78 Wetzel, p. 67. 
79 Wetzel has argued that Augustine in fact undergoes not a conflict of wills, as he has already fully 
Intellectually assented to God, sometime before he actually accepts him; Instead it Is his weakness of will 
which holds him back. To explain this, Wetzel uses the image of past and present self as being In disagreement: 
'Our present state of will [ ... ] Includes its past states In the form of habit and therefore the discrepancy 
between our past practices of willing and our present willingness for change can be expressed as volitional 
paralysis, or our experience being constrained from within'. Such a 'dualizing' of human will in terms of one's 
own past and present, supports the value of intense and continual self examination in order to understand and 
correctly value one's past and present desires in order to not be held In thrall by them. In addition, as It Is 
w~akn.ess of will which holds Augustine back, there appears a necessity for something which strengthens the 
WIll. Vlrt.U~ as a psychologically fortifying force has already appeared in Plato's work, and indeed will find its 





freedom Augustine discovers is the power to freely and perfectly love God, liberated from 
the destructive distractions of desire for contingent things. 
Because the object of virtue is spiritual, not material, eternal not temporal, it is through 
virtue that the soul progresses away from the desires of the world. Virtue fixes the vision, 
fixes the desires beyond the world while at the same time ordering and guiding the 
faculties of the soul to reach their desired object. Virtue for Augustine is therefore attained 
through a reunderstanding of the potential of man and human free will. Man has free will 
to choose or fail to choose God. Because the soul is naturally attracted towards God, as a 
being to the source of its existence, the only way in which the soul can be distanced from 
God is through its own choice; not even natural death can halt the trajectory because one 
only truly dies when one no longer loves God (DME 11.19). The will is truly freed when it 
has made that choice of God over the world. While every movement of the will is a kind of 
love, a state of virtue may be understood as a movement of the will correctly orientated 
towards God. Once this orientation is established, man can positively fulfil the activity 
perfected by virtue by correctly interacting with the temporal world. 
Augustine is concerned with the submission of both the will and the mind to God. In 
opposition to the intellectual autonomy of classical thought, he locates knowledge and 
truth only in God. Knowledge is no longer produced by intellectual enquiry but by a 
knowledge of God's will and a harmonising of one's own will with it: 'what is to be done, 
for Augustine, requires some form of access to what God wills'.sO G. Scott Davis has given 
an apposite description of the changing intellectual attitudes to virtue, highlighting 
Augustine's own development: 
The Aristotelian virtue, conceived as a craft, locates the epistemic power in the 
virtue itself, thus requiring only a two level structure of act and habit. Its function 
is to enable acts which [ ... ] craft a worthy life. [ ... ] Augustinian virtue [ ... ][shifts] 
the source of practical wisdom to God, changing the internal disposition from 
detached peace of mind to loving service and locating the telos of human life to an 
otherworldly end.s1 
In Augustine's concept the 'epistemic power' is with God. God alone is the source of true 
knowledge and man alone is unable to know; the human must give up his attempts to 
independently know before he is able to, in fact, know anything. Knowing is not only an 
intellectual activity but one directly related to will; once God's will is known, the will of the 
80 Davis, p. 14. 
81 Davis, p.17. 
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believer must be harmonised with it and thus one has the experience of true knowledge. 
Virtue for Augustine is a renouncing of the individual autonomous will to the supreme will 
of God. Indeed, Augustine elects to renounce his own search for knowledge in order to 
reach God: 'Non ero curiosus, ne seiungar a deo, nec cuius quam doctrina me ab eo 
separat' (DME 11.19). Only by a subjection of the mind to God by loving, can man really be 
united with him: 
Ergo cum etiam deus dignis animis notus non nisi per intelligentiam posit esse, 
cum tamen sit ipsa qua intelligitur mente praestantior, quippe creator eius atque 
auctor est, verendum erat ne animus humanus, eo quod inter invisibilia et 
intelligibilia numeratur, eiusdem se naturae arbitraretur esse, cuius est ipse qui 
creavit et sic ab eo superbia decideret, cui caritate iugendus est. Fit enim deo 
similis quantum datum est, dum illustrandum illi atque illuminandum se subicit. 
(DME12.20) 
In the giving up of self-sufficient knowing, intellectual pride is replaced by the humility 
which brings one towards God. 
The sacrifice of self-will and autonomous knowledge and action is central to Gregory the 
Great's consideration of how virtue is attained. Virtue for Gregory is a 'gift of the spirit' 
and is thus subject to being given and taken away by God. This appears very different 
from, for example, the Aristotelian approach, in which a virtue is attained when it is a 
permanent disposition. Instead for Gregory the giving and taking away of virtue is an 
interactive process between God's grace and man which aims to constantly remind man of 
his total dependency upon God: 'Unde fit ut aliquando se haec eadem gratia utiliter 
subtrahat et praesumenti menti, quantum in se infirmatur ostendat' (Moralia 2.48.78). The 
testing power of grace exists to always maintain this awareness in order to counteract 
human pride: 'sed nonnumquam, dum mens nostra tanti muneris plenitudine atque 
ubertate fulcitur si continua in his securitate perfruitur, a quo sibi haec sint obliuiscitur; 
seque a se habere putat quod numquam sibi abesse considerat' (Moralia 2.49.78). Human 
virtue may be a dangerous thing if the possessor attributes it to his own achievement and 
ceases to remember it as a gift. In contrast, the difficulties and sufferings of human life are 
just as much signs of grace, being the opportunity for man to turn more whole-heartedly 
to God: 'Saepe enim donum est gratiae quod iram deputat; et saepe divinae districtionis ira 
est quod gratiam putat. Nam plerumque gratiam aestimat dona virtutem, et tamen eisdem 
donis elatus corruit' (MoraUa 9.13.20). But this process oftemptation and suffering is itself 
the offer of an opportunity from God to man to curb his pride and advance in humility. Life 
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for the Christian is presented as a process of acquiring virtues through difficulty, hardship 
and suffering, and whose success is measured by the response of the individual to the 
testing grace offered them: 
Et quia per occultam gratiam ad amorem Dei temperata desuper mensura 
proficimus, quanto in nobis cotidie de Dei spiritu virtus crescit, tanto noster 
spiritus deficit. [ ... ] Tunc vero in Deo plene proficimus cum a nobis ipsis funditus 
defecerimus. Hae itaque crescentium mensurae virtutem, sancti viri vocibus 
grades dicuntur. (Moralia 22.20.46) 
This process originates and is activated in God, but continues depending on the response 
of the individual to the grace and opportunities for improvement offered them. The 
ultimate aim is the renunciation of self-will and the acquisition of humility. 
Gregory attaches the virtues to the faculty of reason, which in life is tied to the flesh. The 
dichotomy of flesh and spirit is ever-present in Gregory's thought, in which the former is 
negative in substance but which can be positive in terms of virtuous development being 
the battleground in which humans may overcome its temptation. The spirit itself is not 
free from the capacity to sin and its union with the flesh helps to restrain the spirit from 
the worst of sins: pride. But the general emphasis is that immaterial reason must fortify 
itself against the corruption of the flesh. Straw has argued that, 
Virtue is attained when reason is purified and liberated from the bonds of the 
flesh, so that the rational soul can remain hard, taut and disciplined within its 
citadel. For Gregory, spiritual reform will be directed at subjugating the flesh, for 
this will release the natural goodness of reason and re-establish its proper 
dominion over man's personality [ ... ].82 
While God dispenses the events in a person's life, the existence of human free will presents 
humankind with the possibility to respond to those events either in a way which uses 
reason and thus develops virtue, or which succumbs to the world and leads to vice. Human 
life is a period of education provided by God: 'By setting off virtue against temptation, the 
wondrous dispensation of God allows inward and outward, high and low, spirit and flesh, 
pride and despair to be balanced. [ ... ] Temptation checks spiritual excess and pride by 
making the soul humble; indeed weakness is the very "guardian of virtue'''.83 What is 
emerging, in fact, is not such a black and white picture of dependency and reward or flesh 
82 Straw, p. 136. 
83 Straw, p. 245. 
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versus spirit, but rather the notion of human life as an offer of a chance, in which the 
education and development of virtue is central if one wants to attain towards a positive 
end in God. Through testing circumstances virtues can be developed which strengthen the 
mind against the temptations of the flesh and the trials of temporal life, while at the same 
time the attachment of the spirit to the flesh maintains the spirit's consciousness of its 
own weakness and potential for sin. 
As in Aristotle, human life is seen as the testing ground in which virtue is developed. But 
while Aristotle's forum is purely human, Gregory sees human life as a dialogue between 
man and God, creature and Creator. This is one of the central differences in the 
conceptions of how virtue is attained. Virtue is necessarily tied to the faculties of human 
nature and the perfection of those faculties in action. What changes is the sense of the 
extent to which those faculties can be independently perfected. The development of 
Aristotelian virtue depends on the freely chosen actions of the individual and the extent to 
which those actions come to be a fixed disposition within the subject. Aquinas builds on 
the faculties which are perfected in virtue, the intellect and the will, and demonstrates 
how they are transformed by interaction with God, so that the scope of human action is 
reordered towards its new end. Augustine and Gregory both focus on the role of the will 
and establish a new sense of virtue in relation to it. Rather than becoming independently 
stronger in the attainment of virtue, the will must become stronger through weakness, 
committing itself to God as the only source of its perfection. In all thinkers there is a sense 
of the importance of the human temporal life as the period in which man can develop and 
work towards his ultimate end. Virtue is attained through the interactions of human life 
and is central to the human process of becoming. 
4. What is the result of the attainment of virtue? 
Virtue, we have come to see, is a factor which links man to the ultimate good of his 
existence. This is because it is both that through which man's nature is perfected through 
the action necessary to bring him to that good, and because virtue is a fundamental part of 
that good itself. What the more precise result of virtue is again depends on the contextual 
conception of that good. We shall, however, come to see certain recurring aspects; virtue 
negotiates the positive interaction of man with his temporal life, it is a state of stability and 
permanence, and it enables the fulfilment of man's being. 
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Aristotelian virtue is central in the thinker's conception for the achievement of the 
greatest human good, happiness. The nature of happiness as conceived by Aristotle, 
although it is bound within the limits of human temporal existence, encompasses results 
of virtue which will appear consistent throughout the tradition. At the opening of the 
Ethics, Aristotle identifies the Supreme Good as 'that at which all things aim' (NE l.ii.2) and 
states that the knowledge of this good serves to positively direct human action towards it, 
'like archers having a target to aim at' (NE 1.ii.2). In trying to come to a definition of 
absolute good, he identifies categories of things good in themselves, and things good as a 
means to get to a further good. The former is identified as the more valuable, and 
therefore the Supreme Good becomes that for which all other things are done. He quickly 
defines the Supreme Good as the good sought by politics, and shortly after identifies this 
Good as 'happiness', which he describes in these terms: 'happiness above all else appears 
to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as 
a means to something else' (NE I.vii.S). Happiness is entirely satisfying in itself and as such 
is the end of all action (NE I.vii.B). It has already become apparent that virtue is both not 
the ultimate end of human action and at once entirely integral and necessary to that end. 
Aristotle's conception captures this paradox. Happiness is defined by Aristotle as the 
'active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be 
several human excellences or virtues in conformity with the best and most perfect among 
them' (NE I.vii.iS). Although virtue is not the end of human activity in itself, it is defined as 
the standard by which the human soul functions in order to reach that end, previously 
identified as happiness. Happiness is in fact made dependent on virtue; to develop the 
analogy, we might describe virtue as the powerful bow without which the archer cannot 
strike their target. 
The result of virtue is to ensure man's achievement of their supreme good, but an essential 
part of this good itself is the fulfilment of man's nature. To be happy to one's full human 
potential is to be able to use one's unique power of reason to its fullest and freest degree, 
in conformity with virtue. Human fulfilment or happiness is therefore a fully activated 
state of being, in which virtue is the quality of being fully activated. To be virtuous is to be 
most fully human, the potential of human nature being most fully activated in its right and 
proper action. 
Because virtue is so tied to the workings of human nature itself and is the result of training 
and development over time, it contributes to a further demand in Aristotle's definition of 
human happiness. In his analysiS of what makes something 'good', Aristotle states that a 
necessary quality of the good is as something 'proper to its possessor and not easy to be 
Ruth Chester 
51 
taken away from him' (NE I.v.4). A true good is therefore under the control of the 
possessor themselves.84 In such a scheme, for example, material benefits cannot be the 
goods which constitute complete happiness (although they can add to it), as they can 
disappear with a change of fortune. If happiness is threatened by loss it cannot be real 
happiness. As a quality developed through the free actions of the individual rather than 
given, virtue is more likely to be something fixed in the character; once virtue has been 
'learned' it is unlikely to be 'un-learned'. Later in the Ethics Aristotle states that a virtuous 
character has a permanence, that virtue itself cannot be touched by changing fortune and 
that a virtuous person will more easily bear the changes of fortune, knowing that they 
have a permanent 'good' within themselves (NE. I.x.7-13). Virtue, focused purely towards 
the perfection of the immaterial self and keeping the free and full use of reason as its aim, 
distinguishes and protects man from the mutability of temporal life. 
Virtue as something which distinguishes the human soul within the temporal forum of 
human existence, and somehow protects it, is also a feature of Plato's idea of the result of 
virtue. In Plato's vision, however, virtue protects from the changeability of temporal life by 
directing the human psyche towards an eternal realm of existence: the world of form. 
Morality or justice, as we have seen, is what unifies the elements of the human psyche so 
that each respects and fulfils its role, and all can work harmoniously together towards the 
perfected use of the reason. The individual virtue of the reason itself is wisdom. Wisdom is 
directed to the pursuit of knowledge, 'to know reality as reality' (Republic 477b), and it 
thus attains towards knowledge of the form of the Good, Good as it really is, not only as a 
subjective application. Those whose psyches are free from the distracting desires of 
wayward emotions and appetites are able, through the wisdom of their perfected reason, 
to have some witness of forms. They are able to see beyond the physical temporality of the 
world to a reality more real, eternal, unchanging; this is to have knowledge (Republic 
4 7ge). As such they are able to value human events correctly, to see them in their 
smallness or their importance, in relation to that absolute reality. This knowledge or 
vision enables the possessor to orientate their action towards the correct good: 'The 
knowledge both of what each virtue is and how each exemplifies the single form of virtue 
[ ... ] is a knowledge of timeless forms in the light afforded by the form of the Good, that 
supreme good towards which every human life informed by the virtues moves in a 
rational progress'.85 Such is the power of the reasoning part of the psyche which, by its 
ability to 'see' beyond the physical, has the authority to correctly guide the person as a 
whole, without being distracted by specific good or bad, and rather able to see good or bad 
84Interesti?gly, Aristotle appears not to distinctly make 'eternal' one of the necessary qualities of the Supreme 
Good. In thIS he seems strikingly different from Christian thought, In which the 'eternity' of a state of Goodness 
/ blessedness Is part of its integral quality. 
85 Macintyre, 'Virtue Ethics', p. 1757. 
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for the whole. Loving desire follows from a knowledge of this Good which then compels 
the subject towards that Good; the motivating emotional power of eros compels the 
subject to find its own completion in union with the Good and, adopting the characteristics 
of a lover, to seek to possess the whole of the beloved object (Republic 474d-47Sc).86 
Knowledge in some sense ensures virtue as it identifies an absolute standard and end of 
human action towards which the subject will be compelled to strive by the loving desire 
for that end, which desire is manifested as virtue; that is as the desire of the whole self 
orientated towards the correct end.87 Virtue allows for and promotes the attainment of 
forms, of the real. Someone (in Plato's case, the philosopher) who is perfected in virtue 
and knowledge will make him or herself most like the form of absolute Good: 
someone whose mind really is fixed on reality has no time to cast his gaze 
downwards on to the affairs of men. [ ... ] His eyes are occupied with the sight of 
things which are organized, permanent and unchanging [ ... ] and he makes this 
realm the model for his behaviour, and assimilates himself to it as much as is 
feasible. (Republic SOOb-c) 
Someone with this perfection is guided by a standard which is more real, something that 
;s in a more profound way than time and the world. Virtues and virtue impact on human 
behaviour, moving its focus away from the contingent temporal happenings of the world 
and directing it towards the eternal unchanging world of form. While Plato has been 
distinguishing the roles and virtues of the tripartite psyche for the sake of clarity, in the 
realm of forms the different virtues are only different manifestations of the unified power, 
virtue itself. Plato is tracing a movement from multiplicity to unity and stressing the access 
to greater insight which this facilitates. 
Plato is also eager to stress the responsibility which comes with this increased insight. 
Those who, in their perfected virtue have a clearer vision of the true world of forms, have 
a responsibility to use that knowledge to influence and improve the actions of others. So it 
is that in Plato's metaphor of the cave, the philosopher who has walked outside into the 
light, must return to enlighten his fellows (519c-S20a). The reason advances towards a 
knowledge of the Good, while also using this knowledge to inform the activities of the 
86 Kahn, p. 589. 
87 There is discussion over the extent to which Plato (in contrast to his teacher Socrates) equates virtue with 
knowledge, but based on a reading of the Republic this cannot be accepted absolutely because of the influence 
he allows to the irrational desires; good or bad action Is not based solely on knowledge of what is good and 
bad, but also on the correct training of the irrational parts to respond to good or bad In accordance with 
reason. However, knowledge Is an essential attribute of virtue being the recognition of the Form of Absolute 
Good, and it Is through this path that one approaches a Platonic sense of telos. 
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other parts of the psyche, seeing clearly the standard towards which they aim; the true 
vision of the human telos in the form of the Good becomes the object towards which the 
virtues are directed, and as such the influence which they have on human behaviour 
orientates that behaviour towards the supreme form of Good. 
The result of Platonic virtue is the active directing of the unified mind towards a more real 
reality which enables a revaluing of temporal existence. Temporal life, its difficulties and 
challenges, comes to be seen in the light of the forms and therefore as not an end in itself 
but a means to an end. 
This unity of mind in virtue as a protection against the trials of the world is an image 
which recurs within Gregory's thought. In his eagerness to communicate through concrete 
expression, Gregory adopts recurring images to describe this action of virtue in the human 
soul. A common trope is virtue as a defence or protection of the inner self: 'Tota itaque 
virtute muniendus est aditus mentis ne quando earn insidiantes hostes penetrent foramina 
neglectae cogitationis' (Moralia 1.35.50). The virtues are conceived of as the 'army' which 
aids God in his wise ruling of the human mind (Moralia 20.5.12); an army which tempers 
passions and compels right conduct, (a psychological understanding of virtue which 
cannot help but recall similar descriptions in Plato's Republic). In another image the four 
cardinal virtues are described as the foundations ofa house, the metaphorical house of the 
mind. But Gregory uses the image of the house in order to talk about its foundations and 
re-emphasise his argument about the dependency of virtue; the only true foundation for 
the house of virtue is God. Once a stable state of virtue in the reason has been achieved, 
once God has been recognised as the true source and aim of all things, this provides a 
constant source of protection against the mutability and difficulties of the world, as those 
who have achieved this recognise the smallness of human affairs in comparison to the 
reality of God: 
Aliquando contingit ut qui solam caelestem patriam diligent. [ ... ] Cumque 
occupationes extrinsecus perstrepunt, intrinsecus in amore pacatissima quies 
tenetur; atque occupationum tumultus exterius perstrepentes dispensat interius 
praesidens iudex ratione et tranquillo moderamine ea quae circa se minus sunt 
tranquilla disponit [ ... ] quia exteriores curae si perverso amore non appetuntur, 
non confuso sed ordinato animo ministrari queunt. (Moralia 18.43.70) 
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Once virtue, the ability to direct actions towards their correct aim, God, is acquired, a 
person can live well in the world, orientating him or herself in such a way as to use the 
world but not be held captive by it. 
While the aim of the Christian believer is to return to God who exists beyond the world, he 
is nevertheless required to act within that world and those actions are to be taken into 
account. Virtue is a vital factor in negotiating this tension, being understood both as that 
which draws human beings towards God, that which orientates human desire towards 
God, and also that which fulfils and guides human interaction with each other in the light 
of that orientation. 
In Augustine's conception too, virtue balances humankind between the contingent and the 
eternal, between the world and God. As in Gregory's thought, temporal experience has a 
value as testing and strengthening the human's desire for God and, within this, virtue 
maintains the focus of the will upon God, maintaining the individual's place in the 
ontological hierarchy, protecting him or her from reading the attractions of the contingent 
world as goods in themselves. Talking specifically of virtues, Augustine explores their role 
in temporal life as being to work against the vices (DCD 19.4/19.10). Virtues use the 
challenges of the vices and the events and difficulties of temporal life to the benefit of their 
possessor in more firmly directing them towards their ultimate end. In Paradise, however, 
'virtutes, non contra alia vitia vel mala quaecumque certantes, sed habentes victoriae 
praemium aeternam pacem, quam nullus adversarius inquietet' (DCD 19.10). In 
Augustine's opinion, peace is the object of any conflict; those who fight for the right cause 
in a conflict are rewarded with this peace. Peace is therefore the aim and reward of 
temporal virtue, 'tunc est vera virtus quando et omnia bona quibus bene utitur et quidquid 
in bono usu bonorum et malorum facit, et se ipsam ad eum finem refert, ubi nobis talis et 
tanta pax erit qua melior et maior esse non possit' (DCD 19.10). In the overcoming of sin 
through the acquisition of virtue - the fulfilment of the self in focused love of God - human 
kind is returned to the potential of the prelapsarian state and moves towards the peace of 
beatitude. 
The true good of humanity does not rest in this temporal life, but in the eternal life after it 
(DCD 19.4). As such, the faithful who believe this will only see the temporal world in terms 
of something to be used in the easing of the journey towards eternal life; it may be used 
but not enjoyed for its own sake, an idea taken up with vehemence by Gregory. Someone 
who makes his or her happiness depend on the material goods of the world is building 
that happiness on very shaky foundations which can be easily swept away (DCD 19.4). 
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Instead, virtue is a worthwhile good because it is not tied to this world. A genuine virtue 
demonstrates the recognition that the Supreme Good is not of this temporal world and 
thereby directs all actions and good towards the end of peace in God. This genuine virtue 
is both directed at God, given by God and rewarded with God: 'Praemium virtutis erit ipse 
qui virtutem dedit eique se ipsum, quo melius et maius nihil posit esse, promisit' (DCD 
22.30). The role of virtue is essentially circular; given by God to draw humanity to himself, 
humanity then draws itself towards God through virtue, to finally be rewarded by God 
who is virtue itself. 
Virtue, then, is the unifying of desires to the desire for God. It is a state of psychic and 
volitional unity and thus a state of peace: 
et cum in virtute pacem amarem, in vitiositate autem odissem discordiam, in illa 
unitatem, in ista quondam divisionem notabam, inque ilIa unitate mens rationalis 
et natura veritatis ac summi boni mihi esse videbatur: in ista vero divisione 
inrationalis vitae nescio quam substantiam, et naturam summi mali. (Conf. 
4.15.24) 
The unity which Augustine feels is the unity of single, fulfilled desire. He is no longer torn 
by physical lust being in conflict with his spiritual and intellectual longings. All his action is 
now motivated and informed by his love of God: 'Per continentiam quippe colligimur et 
redigimur in unum, a quo in multa defluximus. Minus enim te amat qui tecum aliquid amat 
quod non propter te amat' (Con! 10.29.40). We disintegrate into multiplicity when our 
loves are misdirected and directed towards multiple things; we are unified when our love 
is all directed to the one true object, God, or when we love something for the sake of our 
love for God. In contrast physical lust and incontinence scatters the self amongst material 
things. Augustine sees the figure of Christ as that around whom all the mUltiple desires of 
the world can be unified; the figure who connects the multiplicity of humanity with its 
single ground of being, God: 'et me suscepit dextera tua in domino meo, mediatore filio 
hominis inter te unum et nos multos, in multis per multa' (Conf. 11.29.39). Christ the 
mediator is the one through whom multiple humanity can come to recognise the 
ontological unity which underpins its existence. 
This focusing around Christ is also a reiteration of virtue as the fulfilment of man's being. 
For man to love primarily the world is for him to love something which is less real than 
God who alone truly is. This is the movement of sin: 'Motusque voluntatis a te, qui es, ad id 
quod minus est, quia talis motus delictum atque peccatum est' (Con! 12.11.11). Instead, 
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Christ both unifies man's desires towards himself as a tangible figure, metaphysically 
makes possible the reconnection of man's desire with his ultimate end God, and 
demonstrates the way which that unity can be achieved. He is the fullness of being in 
perfect action which man's virtue enables him also to be. The man who loves Christ, that is 
who has virtue (perfect love of God), is rewarded with Christ's virtue, meaning that his 
human actions are given value in line with their eschatological scope. Once the believer 
has entered into a loving relationship with the incarnate Christ, according to Augustine, 
their actions are endowed with value. Christ informs the life of those who love him by 
returning their love with virtue: 'id est agendi efficacia et sobrietate contemplandi, quae 
dei virtus et dei sapientia id est dei filius, dilectoribus suis donat' (DME 16.27). The result 
of virtue is then the revaluing of human action, the connection of temporal activity to 
eternal context. 
Virtue is the medium through which man can connect or reconnect with God both in terms 
of ontological fulfilment and ethical action because it is an imitation of the being and doing 
of God. Aquinas establishes forms in virtue, man's progression through which is a journey 
towards achieving 'divinam similitudinem' (ST 1a2ae 61,S). Virtue is primarily a divine 
quality and its most perfect form is found in God, 'sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium 
rerum rationes' (ST 1a2re 61,5). The virtues are found in God in their most perfect state, or 
rather the states of God's existence are the exempla of virtue: 'Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina 
mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero conversio divinae intentionis ad 
seipsum. [ ... J Fortitudo autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; justitia vero Dei est observatione 
legis aeternae in suis operibus' (ST 1a2ae 61,5). So by the perfection of his or her powers 
through virtue, a human is participating in the nature of God. The different forms of virtue 
explain how humans may move towards this participation. At the opposite end to the 
exemplum form of virtue is the political form of virtue, that is, the virtue of man in his 
natural state as a political animal. Such is the virtue of Aristotle who saw human 
achievement as a complete end. Aquinas, however, moves on progressively from political 
virtue, which in the Christian context cannot be an end in itself. The Christian moves 
through two further forms of virtue: purifying, when still in development, and purified, 
when man has achieved a likeness with God as in the case of the blessed. The same virtue 
may take on different characteristics, produce different actions, depending on the state in 
which it exists. So for example in the form of a purifying virtue temperance 'vero relinquat, 
inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit', while in the purified state 
'temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat' (ST 1a2ae 61,5). These states of virtue negotiate 
the changing relations man has with the world as he moves towards God. Purifying virtue 
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sees the world the soul inhabits but judges and uses it in the light of the divine existence 
beyond it, while purified virtue expresses a state beyond temporal and physical influence. 
5. Conclusion 
In turning to the conclusion of this chapter, such a way of conceiving states of virtue 
serves to demonstrate more generally the connection which virtue makes between the 
human and God; that through developing in virtue, one is developing in 'likeness' to God. It 
is through developing not only individual virtues, but also the state in which that virtue 
exists within oneself, that one comes to move closer to God. Virtue that sees its end in 
human reason may be a good thing in its own right and a thing worth having for earthly 
human existence. However, once the perspective is changed and the end of existence is 
seen as being beyond human nature and existing in God, then the state in which virtue 
exists must be transformed, as must the internal state of the individual who possesses it. 
The actions which virtue produces are related to the motive from which it springs. Once 
human action is orientated towards God, the virtue of the power which is producing that 
action must be transformed in relation to the standard of the object it is trying to reach. In 
trying to reach God, it is God himself who must transform human virtue. Human life and 
the perfection of reason are conceived of as transitory, incomplete on their own. Life 
comes to be understood as a journey which is not simply moving towards a different 
physical place but which is in fact a transformation of being. This process of 
transformation is a return to the source of being itself; an assimilation into the nature of 
that Being in whom action and being are entirely in harmony. 
To acquire virtue in Christianity is not only to be a better human being but to bring about 
within oneself an ontological movement which draws one towards the nature of one's 
Creator. Virtue sits at a nexus point, being both that through which God creates and that 
through which humankind responds to the offer of salvation which is their created state. 
At the heart of this is the figure of Christ around whom the dynamics of virtue find their 
centre. By restoring human natural potential through his crucifixion and re-establishing 
positive intercourse between man and God, Christ makes virtue - the perfect functioning 
of human nature in the light of God - possible. In his incarnate form, he provides a sign 
towards the true end of human existence, God, and acts as a tangible object for virtue - the 
perfect love of God. In his incarnate action, Christ demonstrates the actions through which 
man can positively interact with the world while maintaining their perspective beyond 
that world and more importantly the state of mind from which man should look to God, 
humility. From this basis man can develop his own virtue in the light of his ontological 
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condition which is simultaneously created and therefore dependent, and created and 
therefore empowered. 
My analysis has revealed virtue to be a complex and nuanced dynamiC of being and doing. 
It is fundamentally the perfect expression in action of man's being, but the nature of being 
and action is dependent on the contextual understanding of man's nature and purpose. 
Virtue is that which guides human interaction both with other men and with the universe 
around them. It is the force through which man and God interact, being both the creative 
basis of existence and the standard for ethical actions by which man acknowledges his 
createdness. It is a form of unity: unity of the psyche, unity of the desires, and unity with 
God. Virtue is that through which man expresses himself most fully as man, whether he is 
understood as the supreme rational being or whether he is the creature who is seeking to 
return to his Creator. 
The complexity of the dynamics which underpin virtue has been largely neglected in Dante 
scholarship. Reading Dante in the light of the more subtle and complex idea which has 
been revealed in this chapter will bring to light more thoroughly the relational dynamiCS 
which are the foundations of the Com media's narrative of becoming. The journey to God 
which the Commedia narrates is one of simultaneous ethical and ontological 
transformation, the dynamic which is virtue itself. It is also one in which God comes down 
to help man as much as man ascends to reach God. While this idea of virtue is integral to 
the content of the Com media it is also relevant to how writer, protagonist and work are 
interconnected. If virtue is the fulfilment of man through his own proper action which 
should be an expression of his ontologically created state, then the act of personal 
fulfilment and creation which Dante describes in the Com media is ultimately one in which 
his own virtue is perfected and made manifest. 
Ruth Chester 
2. Representing Virtue in Medieval Devotional Literature, 
Sermons, Visual Art and Poetry 
1. Introduction 
Virtue as the object of philosophical and theological reflection has thus far revealed itself 
to be a complex and dynamic concept. The aim of this chapter is to move from theory to 
demonstrate instead how virtue is an active ethical and psychological principle present 
within the many and varied discourses of Dante's cultural setting. This is also a key shift in 
my discussion to consider texts from Dante's immediate historical context. Virtue 
essentially is not something that should remain abstract and objective and instead leads to 
an ethics of action and becoming, or personal responsibility and individual involvement. 
With this in mind we turn to a consideration of representations of virtue in cultural and 
artistic discourse in order to better appreciate its permeation of the medieval ethical 
system on many levels. This chapter will consider texts such as sermons, visual art, poetry 
and devotional literature. This variety of texts also acknowledges a variety of audiences in 
order to demonstrate that the question of virtue and its acquisition was pertinent to all 
levels of society. The value of considering such representations alongside more theoretical 
concepts is that it allows us to appreciate how virtue was actually conceived of as a 
working principle for human life. But most importantly we come to see that the principles 
of virtue are not merely expressed in 'what' is communicated but also manifested in the 
modes of communication themselves. It is in the communicative act that virtue comes into 
being. In the various discourses which will be considered, virtue is manifested firstly 
within the texts themselves and secondly within the mind of the recipient of those works. 
The way in which ideas about virtue are received then becomes a process of acquiring 
virtue itself; every act of reception is a re-manifestation of the original idea of virtue. The 
shift from idea to manifestation is one which every poet must make. But when the idea 
being manifested is one of such ethical relevance as virtue then its manifestation and 
communication become of primary importance and indeed relate to the formation of 
virtue within the audience itself. 
In order to appreciate the scope and variation of modes in which virtue is represented in 
medieval cultural discourse, I will explore a diverse range of texts from the thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries: the sermons of Giordano da Pisa (c.1255-1311), the 
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Meditationes Vitae Christi (written c. 1300), Legenda Major and Lignum Vitae by 
Bonaventure (1217-1274), Tommaso da Celano's Life of St Francis (c.1200-1256), the 
poetry of Iacopone da Todi (c.1230-1306), Giotto's Arena Chapel frescoes (completed c. 
1305) and the poetry of two major representative of the stilnovisti movement, Guido 
Guinizzelli and Dante himself. Rather than adopting a structure in this chapter based on 
genre, I will base my argument around four aspects of representation which I believe draw 
together the different ways in which virtue is manifested and re-manifested. These four 
aspects are, I recognise, by no means exhaustive or exclusive and indeed, while I have 
adopted them as structural categories for grouping texts, I am aware that the texts 
themselves go beyond and cross over these boundaries. But this itself makes a comment 
about the variety and subtlety of the medieval treatment of virtue as it constantly shifts 
between being a feature of the emotions and being one of the intellect, from the 
experience to the imagination, from the will to the judgement. The aspects I have chosen 
as categories by which to structure my argument are: abstract thought, meditation, 
storytelling and allegory. After considering the four aspects I will present two particular 
case studies which combine different representational forms to begin to understand how 
different forms interact and contribute to the meaning and interpretation of a single text. 
The first mode of representation I will consider, abstract thought, is the closest in stylistic 
format to the philosophical and theological approaches already considered. But it makes 
the important step from 'thinking' to 'doing' in so far as it encourages its audience in the 
intellectual practice of virtue. In this section I will focus on the sermons of Giordano da 
Pisa. 'Meditation' will consider the power of thought to manifest reality by involving its 
practitioners in a process of becoming the object of that thought through emotional 
engagement. This is particularly relevant for the tradition of imitatio Christi. Both abstract 
thought and meditation actively put into practice the idea that virtue is in fact a 
transformation from 'doing' to 'being' by the affective techniques they employ, although 
they aim to affect this transformation from the different perspectives of intellect and 
emotion. Under the category of meditation I will consider the Meditationes vitae Christi 
and the Legenda Major. 'Storytelling' will address the role of concrete narrative and 
characterisation in presenting a particular ethical message which becomes real and 
relevant for its audience by appealing to their own experience. I will look at this in relation 
to Tommaso da Celano's Life of St Francis and Giotto's fresco cycle ofthe Upper Basilica at 
Assisi. The section on 'allegory' will look more specifically at the recurring allegorical 
figures used to present virtue and consider the interactive relationship of concept and 
figure, looking at how each, in fact, 'creates' the other. This will be based around an 
analysis of the Lignum Vitae and the poetry of Iacopone. The two case studies which 
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consider the combining of representational forms will be Giotto's Arena Chapel frescoes 
and the poetry of the stilnovisti. These two radically different examples will again highlight 
the permeation of questions of virtue within different social and and cultural 
environments with different demands. 
The works selected for analysis in this chapter have been chosen to demonstrate two 
things. Firstly they demonstrate the sheer variety of discourses in the medieval context in 
which virtue is a relevant topic. Looking across the spectrum of cultural production from 
popular sermons to intimate religious texts, from elite poetry to vernacular laude, from 
words to images, we find virtue explored and expressed. This generic mix is central to our 
understanding of the rich formation of Dante's own text. Secondly the works have been 
selected not simply to demonstrate the variety of what we might call medium, but the 
variety of modes, methods and purposes of expression. Virtue is expressed in different 
ways to achieve different results in the recipient of those expressions which results are 
dependent on the way in which those expressions are engaged with. One work might 
engage intellectual consideration, while another instead appeals to the emotions to attain 
its desired effect. We need to consider the way in which what the author of the work is 
doing with the words on the page (or images on the wall) is related firstly to the message 
about virtue he wants to communicate and secondly to the way in which he wants his 
audience to absorb and we might say re-manifest that message. 
I would like to outline a central theoretical concept which will recur in this consideration 
of medieval art and literature and that is the relation between form and content. The 
meaning of any work comes not simply from what it says but also from the way in which it 
says it To appreciate the full richness of what a work is trying to communicate, we must 
consider not only the ideas expressed but the form in which they are expressed. Such a 
preoccupation may be more habitual to students of literature and visual art, where form is 
as primary in importance as content, but this preoccupation is equally important when we 
consider less obviously 'literary' texts: texts written with a religious and spiritual 
motivation. We will come to see, in fact, that it is in such texts that the interaction of form 
and content becomes most profound. For example, Franciscan literature manifests in its 
concrete, realistic style what Fleming has explained as 'the Franciscan conception of the 
religious life itself [which] was radically incarnational, seeking to re-establish in a flesh 
and blood world a vibrant realisation of the transcendent' .88 There is in Franciscan 
literature and art a perfect marrying of message, concept and mode of expression. A 
further specific example which will later be explored in more detail is the fresco cycle of 
88 John V. Fleming, An Introduction to Franciscan Literature (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977), p. 250. 
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the Arena Chapel in Padua, in which it is not simply their narrative or figural content 
which supplies the images with meaning, but rather their physical combination upon the 
walls which invites the reader to find meaning in the relationship between things, to 
appreciate the work as a unity rather than a composition of disparate messages, and to 
read their own place within the work's narrative. The relationship of form and content will 
. be a recurring preoccupation of the current chapter to acknowledge that the ultimate 
object of this study, the poetry of Dante, is an artistic creation acutely aware of both the 
'what' and 'how' of expression. 
2. Abstract Thought, Concrete Purpose 
Abstract thought here is taken to mean those techniques of medieval scholasticism, logical 
thinking and reasoned arguments, which were unafraid to draw on both the rhetorical 
devices and the philosophical conceptions of the Classical world and which rose to 
prominence in the medieval universities; such an approach is already familiar to us from 
our consideration of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. However, we will now turn to 
consider the genre of sermons, which are not primarily scholastic works but which instead 
have a practical aim, that of improving the moral and spiritual life of the faithful. Most 
surviving sermon literature comes from the Dominican milieu and is therefore 
characterised by the scholastic influences upon that Order's thought system. In turning to 
consider sermons we enter a different cultural milieu in which the ideas of the intellectual 
elite come to be transmitted down to the mass of the faithful. The audience would have 
been extensive, inclusive of people from different levels of society. We therefore encounter 
a medium of great cultural impact whose ideas about virtue would have had a great 
influence throughout that society.89 
The preaching of the mendicant religious orders represents a great opening of religious 
teaching to the masses. Communicating in the vernacular, mendicant preachers were able 
to spread reflections on Christianity in a way which, in its involvement of the populace, 
was unprecedented. Being forbidden from preaching doctrine, the privilege of which 
remained exclusively to ordained priests, the mendicants preached penance. Their focus 
was on the actions of their audience and they used their sermOns to interpret the lives of 
biblical figures in such a way that their audience could apply their lessons in their own 
daily existence. Daniel R. Lesnick has compellingly argued that the mendicant orders' real 
89 FO,r more detail on medieval preaching and the mendicant orders see: Daniel R. Lesnick, Preaching in 
MedIeval Florence: The Social World o/Franciscan and Dominican Spirituality (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1989); Una Bolzonl, La rete delle immagini: predicazione in volgare dalle origini a Bernardino do Siena 
(Turin: Einaudi, 2002). 
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impact was in giving their audiences 'the tools to work for their own salvation'.90 Salvation 
was no longer necessarily mediated through the Church and individuals were made aware 
of their own power and responsibility. By being endowed with the capability and 
authority to act, the faithful were compelled to act in order to save themselves.91 The 
responsibility of the preachers was then precisely to equip the faithful with the necessary 
'tools'. 
The Dominican preachers of whom we have record were formed in the studia and this 
formation is very evident in their surviving sermons. They employ and transmit scholastic 
terminology, concepts and argumentation style while at the same time simplifying them 
for the lay audience: the Dominicans had 'un forte impegno di divulgazione del sapere 
elaborato negJi studia [ ... ] si tratta di comunicare in volgare un ricco patrimonio di cultura 
scolastica'.92 Not only did they literally translate scholastic culture, they also broke it down 
into meaningful explanations; scholastic terms are employed but then carefully clarified. 
The most common structure of a sermon for Dominican preachers was the 'sermo 
modernus', a highly organised and structured form which has much in common with the 
articles of a scholastic summa, and which, through its format, guides the listener through 
an intellectual process of understanding.93 It is this intellectual process which becomes a 
re-manifestation of virtue in the minds ofthe listeners. 
Giordano da Pisa and the Development of Virtue 
A significant body of surviving medieval Dominican sermons is the transcribed preachings 
of Giordano da Pisa. Giordano was active in Florence from 1303 to 1307 and although it is 
too much to suppose that Dante came into direct contact with his work, we can perhaps 
surmise that the form of Giordano's sermons and their message about virtue would have 
been familiar to the Florentine poet, and perhaps characteristic of Dominican preaching as 
a whole. Both the form and the content of Giordano's sermons present a distinctly 
Dominican, we might say Thomistic, idea of virtue. Virtue is something we can reasonably 
understand, a rational truth which the educated mind will come to see as correct by 
following the logical arguments put before it. Giordano'S sermons engage his audience in 
an intellectual process of developing and accreting ideas. Lesnick has suggested that: 
Dominican preachers relied heavily on the rhetorical techniques of divisions, 
distinctions, and rationes as well as a rigid structure comprising thema, prothema, 
90 Lesnick, p. 37. 
91 Lesnick, p. 38. 
92 Bolzon!, p. 13. 
93 For details on the format and usage of the 'Sermo modern us' see Lesnick pp. 98-99. 
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introduction, divisione and clausio. These techniques and structure, even more 
than the explicitly stated themes of Dominican sermons, taught the popolo grasso 
the scholastics' mental habits of orderliness, logical clarity, structuration and 
control.94 
By adopting this style, Giordano builds into the very communicative fabric of his sermons 
the habits of rational choice and self control which are so central to the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic models of virtue. 
The Dominican preacher's message on virtue comes through the ever-important 
combination of content and form and a case study best demonstrates this. In a series of 
three sermons which Giordano gave on 30th November 1304 in Florence, he expounds the 
principal elements of Dominican virtue, a concept already familiar to us. He begins his 
argument with the fundamental point he aims to prove: 
Quelle case che da se sono vili e di poca vertude non possono adoperare cos a che 
sia di fructo quanta da loro, se non so no aiutate con vertu da piu nobile cosa e [ ... ] 
piu vertuosa [and so only] quando Ie nostre opere sono congiunte a Cristo [ ... ] per 
la vertu sua paterno ope rare opere di vertude nobili e degne.95 
Only through Christ's aid can man hope to do good works and give them value. There then 
begins the extended 'how to' section of the sermon which draws its inspiration from a 
biblical quote: 'Christo crucifixus sum crud' (Galatians 2:19). AnalysiS of the quote reveals 
three ways of creating the necessary relationship with Christ: 'Prima per associationem in 
cio che dice Christo, il secondo per unitionem in cio che dice cruciftxus sum, il terzo modo 
per compassionem in cio che dice cruei'. Once these initial subdivisions are made, 
associatione becomes the focus of the first sermon and is further clarified as 'cioe per farti 
simigliante a lui in virtude'.96 Giordano then lists the particular virtues which make one 
similar to Christ: purity, charity, humility and poverty. 
Giordano's treatment of each individual virtue is not the preoccupation of this current 
study, but the way in which he communicates them is of central importance. Dominican 
sermons, though exploiting the forms of abstract argumentation, draw much of their 
didactic power by appeals to examples. For instance, in sermon IV Giordano uses saints 
Andrew and John the Baptist as examples of purity. Given the Dominican's particular 
94 Lesnick, p. 177. 
~4~iordano da Pisa,Avventuale jiorentino 1304, ed. by Silvia Serventi (Bologna: II Mulino, 2006), Sermon IV, p. 
96 Giordano, p. 95. 
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reverence, in a later sermon Giordano uses the figure of the Virgin Mary to draw out an 
extended lesson on different virtues.97 Taking the biblical narrative of the Marriage at 
Cana, Giordano demonstrates how Mary's actions there make her the model of all virtues. 
He explains carefully what each individual virtue is and in what way Mary demonstrates it 
at this event. Indeed, the principal mode of biblical exegesis which Giordano employs in 
his sermons is moral. In his sermons there is a careful combination of theory and evidence 
which come together to build a powerful argument to convince the intellect of his listeners 
on the right thing to be and do. 
Giordano, adapting to the requirements of a listening audience, also builds up his 
arguments through repetition. Points are made, gone over, restated until we can imagine 
they become fixed in the minds of the audience. Along with this, each sermon ends with a 
summary to reinforce the ultimate point. For example in our initial case study: 
Avemo dunque veduto del primo membro, cioe come l'uomo si congiunge a Dio per 
associatione, cioe per assimigliarsi a llui, per farsi simile a llui in virtude, quando se 
vestito di quelle vertudi de Ie quali fu vestito Cristo, cioe di purita, di carita, 
d'umilitade, di povertade, de Ie quali Cristo pienamente era vestito.98 
The oft-repeated 'cioe' and the many subordinate clauses give further insistent 
clarification. These are messages intended to be heard and remembered; that they remain 
as an object of subsequent study is an anomaly. Every effort is made by Giordano to help 
his audience thoroughly internalise his message in one hearing. By following this 
internalisation of thought the listener can be said to be 'doing' those actions and habits of 
intellectual virtue which the Dominican ideal demands. As we saw in Chapter One, virtue 
is a combination of a state of mind and a habit of action which necessarily arises from that 
mental state; to think in a virtuous way is therefore already to be doing something 
virtuous. Thus the form, content and purpose contained within the sermons are working 
harmoniously together to manifest the message of virtue within the mind ofthe listener. 
While Giordano is concerned with clarity, this does not prevent him from presenting his 
audience with deep theological concepts for consideration. For example in hb explanation 
of the virtue of charity in sermon IV he tells us that 'Idio e amore e pero l'anima amorosa 
di Dio e del proximo e simile a Dio, anzi e quasi Idio'.99 That Giordano can present his 
audience with such a profound statement is a testament both to his own powers of 
97 Giordano, sermon XXXV, pp. 477-98. 
98 Giordano, sermon IV, p. 98. 
99 Giordano, sermon V, 96.97. 
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communication and to his expectations of his audience's ability for comprehension. It may 
suggest that such profound considerations were not entirely alien to general listening 
public. In terms of content this statement is perhaps the best example of the faithful being 
made aware of their own autonomous power to approach God. A similarly complex idea 
appears in sermon VI of the same day which continues the earlier argument. Now 
Giordano is considering how humankind joins with Christ 'per compassionem'. An 
individual can join 'per compassionem' firstly through imitating that compassion which 
Christ had for humanity in allowing himself to suffer crucifixion, but Giordano also 
accesses the more literal meaning of 'compassion' as 'feeling with', encouraging his 
audience to intensely focus upon the 'verita di pena' of Christ's death. This concentrated 
thought leads to literal 'feeling with': 'se tu pensassi la passione e la pena di Cristo, tutto ti 
trasformeresti in cio, in questa pena'.lOO It is perhaps Aristotle's ambiguous third book of 
De Anima that we have in mind when Giordano tells us that the philosophers say the soul 
becomes what it thinks.lol Giordano's appeal to the power of focused reflection (as 
testified to by the philosophers) is couched in scholastic terminology and replete with 
examples: 'Onde se l'anima pensa oro, tuta si meschia con oro e quasi e facta oro; se pensa 
di terra, si diventa terra, [ ... ] Onde pero se pensa di Dio, si e facta quasi Idio altresl'.lOZ But 
at the same time it is a distinctly Christian message: 
la meditatione e '1 pensiero de la pena e croce di Cristo si trasforma quasi in colui 
che a memoria la si riduce: quasi sente pena come Cristo e tutto t'a a mutare, tutto 
[ ... ] questa e quella meditatione la quale ti riscalderebbe, che ti darebbe cibo 
d'amore e di devocione e che ti trasformerebbe in Cristo. [ ... ] E questo e la propria 
incorporatione de la passione di Cristo, che se tormentato con lui in una medesima 
passione.103 
There is a shift from the quasi-scholastic arguments reminiscent of Aristotle to the quasi-
mystical language which we might come to associate with the Franciscans. To intensely 
focus upon the suffering of Christ is in some measure to incarnate him within one's own 
mind. Indeed, as we shall see, it is this emphasis on meditation and union with Christ 
which becomes a defining feature of Franciscan discourse. 
100 Giordano, sermon VI, p. 111. 
10~ Gior~ano, sermon VI, p. 110. Aristotle, De anima, lII.iii.iv. For example: 'Concerning that part of the soul [ ... ] 
wI.th whIch the soul knows and thinks, we have to consider what Is its distinguishin characteristic, and how 
thlOklng come~ ab~ut If it Is analogous to perceiving. it must be either a process in which the soul Is acted 
upon by what IS thinkable, or something else ofa similar kind. This part, then, must [ ... ] be receptive of the 
form of an object, I.e., must be potentially the same as Its object, although not identical with it' (IlI.iv). 
102 Giordano, sermon VI, p. 110. 
103 Giordano, sermon VI, pp. 115-16. 
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Giordano's sermons are lessons in organised thought. They build, they define, they clarify 
and, occasionally, they show glimpses of compelling feeling. The controlled and structured 
arguments which he presents encourage control and structuring of the self on the part of 
his audience.104 Such a format teaches virtue as a logical, perceivable necessity and trains 
its audience in the control of thought and actions which make up the Thomistic idea of 
virtue. Virtue is presented as something observable in others and a worthy and necessary 
object of acquisition; it is the rational and reasoned choice for the educated believer to 
approach their God. But beyond this it is also supporting the premise that to think virtue 
is, in fact, to do it when virtue is understood as the fulfilment of the human creature to be a 
rational, well-directed being. Dominican virtue is therefore not simply an object of cold 
rationality, which is intellectually distant from the subject, but rather it is an intellectual 
habit which is internalised through the practice of clear, rational thought, and inspired by 
the moral example of biblical figures. Although Giordano's initial message on human virtue 
is that it is ultimately dependent on Christ, he nevertheless intellectually empowers his 
audience to actively acquire their own virtue by internalising the structures of thought 
presented in his sermons. 
The Dominican and Franciscan orders may be seen as approaching the same points from 
different angles. Union with Christ and the living of a good, humble, spiritual life were 
surely the aim of both. But, 'while the Dominicans were teaching lessons about 
organisation and abstraction, the Franciscans were encouraging non-mediated experience 
and the greatest possible involvement with both events and image'.10S It is worth spending 
a little time outlining a valuable theoretical point, that of particularisation, as well as 
considering the more general features of Franciscan thought as these points are of 
particular relevance to our three subsequent categories of meditation, storytelling and 
allegory. 
3. Meditation 
As we have begun to see in Giordano's work, meditation is an intense focusing of thought 
and emotion which can bring about a transformation of the subject into the object they are 
focused upon. It is very much a feature of Franciscan thought and goes hand in hand with 
their emphasis upon the tangibility of experience. Alongside this is a focus upon the 
physically real over the dislocated abstract and this leads to a particular emphasis in 
Franciscan communication style upon the particularisation of ideas. It will become 
104 Lesnick, p. 95. 
lOS Lesnick, p. 145. 
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apparent that this approach has a direct impact on the representation of virtue in 
Franciscan texts. 
When we write, paint, or engage in any creative act we are making an idea real in terms of 
making it sensually accessible. We are transferring it from the immaterial world of 
thought into a solid forum in which it can communicate with external reality.106 The world 
is full of , big ideas', but ifthey remain on this abstract level, how are we ever to be affected 
by them? How are our human senses ever to be able to engage with them in the way in 
which humans can know things? The key is particularisation which I here understand as 
the transformation of a nebulous concept into a real, solid act of communication. This is 
something which the creative minds of the medieval period, and especially those 
individuals endowed with the role of representing the Church on earth, understood very 
well; communication with the unlettered faithful is one of the driving forces behind 
religious cultural production in the medieval period. The transformation of the idea into 
the image is an impulse both of the learner and the teacher. Eco has pointed out that 
'unsophisticated persons found it easy to convert their beliefs into images; and [ ... ] 
theologians and teachers themselves constructed images for those ideas which ordinary 
people could not grasp in their theoretical form'.107 The reaction of the individual to any 
particular instance of literary or artistic particularity is dependent on the education of that 
individual; the text or image may function simply as didactic and exemplary, showing and 
teaching correct behaviour, or it may inspire and induce more profound meditation on the 
images there presented and encourage metaphysical interpretation. But it will always 
engage. 
While the particularisation of an idea has an important practical role in the education of 
the faithful, medieval theologians were very conscious of the metaphysical realities which 
particularisation revealed. St Bonaventure was a writer acutely aware of the power of the 
image to direct the mind towards spiritual enlightenment. His style has been described as 
a unique combination of poetry and rhetoric mixed with a specific practical purpose, that 
of bringing the mind of his audience to God in a real and immediate way; only through this 
mode can the mind truly come to know God and thence to carry out spiritual and moral 
change. Bonav~Jlture uses the 'poetic image' both to lead the mind to God and also to 
manifest something real about the relationship of created things to God. Fleming suggests 
that 'Bonaventure [ ... ] was always a poet. [ ... ] For him the entire created order was a book 
106 For a study on the history of the manifestation of the Idea see Erwin Panofsky,ldea: A Concept in Art Theory, 
translated by Joseph I.S. Peake (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968). 
107 ~mb~rto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. by Hugh Bredin (New Haven and London: Yale 
Umverslty Press, 2002), p. 54. The use of images for communication with the faithful was officially authorised 
in 1025 by the Synod of Arras (Eco, p. 1S). 
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in which the poetic images led the mind, captivated by truth and beauty, to look beyond 
the visible to the divine exemplar'.108 Thus a particular instance of creation always at the 
same time reveals itself as created and as having a source of being beyond itself. 
We turn now to a most important instance of particularisation: the exemplum. Delcorno 
defines literary exempla as 'ogni tipo di narrazione e di immagine che serva ad illustrare 
un concetto morale'.109 They are the transmission of abstract concepts of morality into the 
active human sphere. The exemplar was the prime model of education in the Classical 
world, in which students were presented with the example of great figures of the past, 
offered to them for avoidance or for moral imitation. 
With the coming of Christianity, however, a vital new element is added to the concept: 
Brown points out that 'Christianity [ ... ] placed an exceptional weight on the joining points 
between God and men, and [ ... ] proposed as its central figure, the Exemplar of all 
exemplars, a being, Christ, in Whom human and divine had come to be joined',uo Christ is 
the manifestation of the ultimate exemplar of being, which is God Himself. The exemplar is 
the 'model of a thing or act' which is 'reflected or imitated' by an image.111 If God the 
Father is the exemplar then God the Son, is both exemplar and image: Fleming suggests 
that 'God is the exemplar or defining model both of the created cosmos and of the real but 
incorporeal world of moral beauty. Jesus Christ, the uncreated Word, is at once and 
uniquely exemplar and image. That is, He is the model by which the moral world defines 
itself and the image by which God expresses and knows Himself.112 In Christ is the 
ultimate particularisation of an idea and therefore in some way all subsequent 
particularisation of ideas partakes in that ultimate Incarnation of the Word made Flesh. 
The complexity of Christ's nature in the incarnation while unique also reveals the 
dynamics underpinning all moments of creative particularisation, Eco has explained this 
as follows: 'there was a puzzling identification of the sender (the divine Logos), the 
signifying message (words, logoi), the content (the divine message, Logos) - a web of 
identities and differences complicated by the fact that Christ, as Logos, insofar as he was 
the ensemble of all the divine archetypes was fundamentally polysemous',1l3 Any moment 
of artistic particularisation reveals the hand from whence it comes and somehow 
manifests the nature of that hand itself. As Christ is God's creative principle and the 
manifestation of God on earth, then all subordinate human creation is only ever a 
108 Fleming. p. 201. 
109 Carlo Delcorno. 'Dante e l'exemplum medievale', Lettere italiane 35 (1983),3-28. 
110 Pete~ Brown. 'The Saint as Exemplar in Late Antiquity', Representations 2 (1983),1-25 (p. 6). 
111 Flemmg, p. 202. 
112 Fleming, p. 202. 
113 Umberto Eeo, The Aesthetics o/Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), p. 145. 
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reflection of that greater creative act. Indeed, all particularisation becomes a form of 
incarnation and all spiritually informed particularisation must participate in the purpose 
of incarnation, to lead the mind to God. 
The message of Christ incarnate, however, is not only the metaphysical significance of the 
particularisation of the ultimate exemplum, God himself. It is how that exemplum acts 
within human life. In his essay on the figure of St Francis in Dante's own work, Auerbach 
considers the complex interaction of Christ as metaphysical principle and Christ the man: 
'The story of Christ is more than the parousia of the logos, more than the manifestation of 
the idea. In it the idea is subjected to the problematic character and desperate injustice of 
earthly happening'.114 The Incarnation of Christ is precisely the virtue dynamic we began 
to trace in the first chapter; it is how the eternal can and must act within the temporal, 
how the being of God can be revealed in the doing of man. Such a message ultimately 
validates human experience being not only that which brings man to God, but that through 
which God brought man to himself. 
Particularisation in medieval art and literature has been most connected with the rise of 
the Franciscan movement with its emphasis on the real and concrete. Perhaps one of the 
most important aspects of Franciscan thought is its impact on the literature of its time. In 
comparison, as John Fleming has pointed out, 'the impact of technical Thomistic thought 
on popular religion and its literary expression is insignificant'.us If we consider that on the 
publication of the Legenda Major it became a compulsory text for every Franciscan friary 
in Europe (at that time numbering nearly 1000) then the diffusion of the text becomes 
obvious.116 However, apart from the general presence of the texts, it seems fair to attribute 
the influence of Franciscan thought on contemporary literature not only to its physical 
accessibility, but to its conceptual accessibility as well. Franciscan faith and the literature 
which it produced were concerned with bringing the spiritual into real, physical, quotidian 
experience. The example of its founder was of one who had sought to re-enact Christ's 
ways and live a life strictly according to the gospels; a way of being which earned the 
reward of the literal re-enactment of Christ's life in Francis' flesh itself in the receipt of the 
stigmata. It is difficult to claim that Franciscanism was a direct cause of the artistic 
development towards realism which takes place in the medieval period, but it has been 
described as a 'conduit' through which this new realism could increase its reach.117 The 
rise of Franciscanism occurs contemporaneously with what Fleming has described as 'a 
114 Erich Auerbach, 'Historical Introduction: The Idea of Man in Literature', in Dante: Poet a/the Secular World, 
trans. by Ralph Manheim (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961), pp.1-Z3 (p.13). 
115 Fleming. p. 209. 
116 Fleming. p. 45. 
117 For a more extended discussion of this see Fleming, pp. 237-39. 
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general stylistic movement from abstract and lapidary forms to ones which are highly 
exemplified and kinetic'.1l8 
Franciscan texts are typified by their intense preoccupation with the physicality of 
whatever they are presenting. This may be the intimate, physical details of the life of 
Christ (Meditationes), the personification of abstract concepts (the poetry of lacopone da 
Todi), or the use of physical metaphors and images in order to communicate a journey of 
spiritual progress (Lignum Vitae). This 'particularisation' of the unseen manifests the 
'clear evangelical intent' of the Franciscan Order which, unlike earlier monastic orders, 
sought to bring the unseen things of God to the living populace.119 As such, Franciscan 
cultural production is not hostile to visual and verbal imagination, nor is it hostile to 
engaging with the popular world. Franciscan literature and art appears acutely aware that 
the popular world is full of sceptics and doubters and therefore employs 'a consistent 
appeal to felt experience, to the authority of ocular demonstration, and to what might be 
called eyewitness reporting' in order to get its message across.120 Also, as we have already 
seen, the particularisation of ideas and the intense relationship between form and content 
are of especial significance to Franciscan thought. 
Therefore, when we consider the representation of virtue in Franciscan literature, we 
have a great wealth of conceptual riches to bear in mind. If, as we have already seen, Christ 
is both the creative, metaphysical virtue of God and the incarnation of that virtue on earth, 
manifesting in his acts a mode of union with God to be imitated by the faithful through the 
actions of virtue, the Franciscan presentation of virtue takes this all into account in a very 
real way. There is intense focus upon the events of Christ's life and an interpretation of the 
virtues which they manifest. These virtues are then presented as a mode of progression 
towards God. The exact mode that this progression takes introduces us to the variety with 
which virtue is represented. 
We have already seen something of the theory of meditation in the work of Giordano da 
Pisa; the intense power of focused thought to transform the thinker into the object of that 
thought. This literal form of transformation was most connected with St Francis. Even the 
Dominican Giordano is quick to testify to this: 
questa e la ragione per la quale noi crediamo che 'I beato Francesco ricevesse Ie 
piaghe nel corpo suo, impero che tanto fu assiduo a meditare de la croce di Cristo e 
118 Fleming, p. 237. 
119 Fleming, p. 242. 
120 Fleming, p. 248. 
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si la incorporo per pensamento, che tramuto il corpo suo in quelle piaghe a senti 
dolore fortissimo pur per via e modo naturale.1Z1 
Because of the experiences and teachings of their saintly founder, Franciscan writers and 
preachers maintained the value of focusing on the experiences of the biblical and holy 
characters as a way to approach quite literally towards the image of God. Their texts 
appeal to the emotions, employ concrete narrative, constantly encourage their audience to 
see, to feel with the characters there presented and then to reflect back on their own lives 
and actions. As Lesnick says, St Francis 'put forth life experience as the core of his 
preaching'lZZ and encouraged his followers in the same. While the meditative texts here 
considered do extrapolate some advice for the daily moral lives of their audiences and 
indirectly suggest the value of practical action, they more overtly emphasise the value of 
reflection and emotional engagement with the exemplary lives of others as a way towards 
spiritual progress. 
Meditationes Vitae Christi 
Although no transcripts of Franciscan sermons survive from the 13th century, the 
Meditationes vitae Christi (c.1300) were most likely source material for Franciscan 
preachers and, therefore, have something to tell us not only about the focuses of 
Franciscan preaching but about the process of Franciscan worship in genera1.1Z3 The 
Meditationes was one of the most widely diffused and read works of its time and became a 
source for sermons, literature and visual art alike. It has much to tell us both about the 
principles of Franciscanism and in particular about the connection between form and 
content which creates such a distinctly Franciscan idea of virtue. 
The Meditationes were written ostensibly to be an object of study given by a Franciscan 
brother to a sister of the Poor Clares. Its particular combination of creative, intensely 
descriptive narrative, and guidance on how the reader should respond, make it a work of 
intimate, practical meditation in which the reader discovers both what should be learned 
and how the object of that learning can be achieved. 
It is an anti-intellectual work which self-avowedly makes its point through appeals to 
reality rather than clever use of language: 
121 Giordano. sermon VI. p. 112. 
122 Lesnick. p. 139. 
123 On the Meditationes as sermon source material and the lack of transcribed Franciscan sermons from the 
early medieval period see Lesnick. pp. 140-43. 
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Verumtamen judicans melius fore aliqua utcumque dicere, quam penitus tacere, 
experiar impotentiam mean, et familiariter tecum loquar, rudi et impolito 
sermone: tum ut melius possis, quae dicuntur, capere, tum ut non aurem, sed 
mentem studeas inde reficere. Non est enim in ornatis sermonibus, sed in Domini 
Jesu meditationibus insistendum. (Meditationes, Proemium)124 
Such is the main point of the Meditationes: that truth and salvation can only be attained 
through the constant meditation on Christ. To aid in this meditation the author deems 
himself entirely in the right to employ the powers of imagination to drive his points home: 
'ego vero ad majorem impressionem, ea sic, ac si ita fuissent, narrabo, prout contingere vel 
contigisse credi possunt, secundum quasdam imaginarias repraesentationes, quas animus 
diversimode percipit' (Proemium). What is important is not simply narrative truth but 
that the story brings the audience closer to Christ. Truth is located more in the experience 
and reception of the individual than in the factual historicity of the events themselves; the 
individual is the locus of moral transformation. 
This idea supports one of the text's central messages about virtue and combines again 
form and content in making its point. We are told in the text that the virtues 'per 
experientias cognoscimus, non per doctrinam' (caput XXXIX). The Meditationes is nothing 
if not a process of experiential learning in which the reader participates in the events of 
the story of Christ. So it is that it is written in the present tense, that it is filled with appeals 
to its reader to 'look', 'see', 'lift', 'carry', 'help', to actively take part in the events of the 
story as if she were there and as if she were actually experiencing them.US Such direct and 
emotional participation is a necessary part of the movement towards God. During the 
meditation on the Annunciation, the reader is to 'in his ergo meditare, in his delectare, et 
jucundaberis, et forte ostendet tibi Dominus ampliora' (caput IV). By opening oneself to 
active experience of God, one can spiritually progress. This kind of spiritual progress is 
also a progression in virtue. Throughout the text, the author guides his reader in how to 
react to the events witnessed: 'Attende hic et record are, quae tibi in principio supra dixi, 
ut discas omnibus, quae dicuntur et fiunt, te exhibere praesentem' (caput Ill). The feelings 
evoked by the text are feelings which the reader must actually experience and by 
experiencing them they are growing in virtues being guided in proper feeling. 
124 Quotations from Meditationes vitae Christi (Paris: Vives, 1868). 
125 The ~ext Is full o~ such calls to ~irect ~articipation. Here we might mention for example, the episode 
recou~tmg the commg of the MagI In whIch the reader Is told: 'In praesenti ero negotio sis praesens, et 
Co?splce bene singu\a quia, ut alias tibi dlxl, in hoc est tota vis harum meditatloneum' (caput IX). Or the 
pamful1y compelling scenes of the flagellation where the reader Is called to focus upon the humanity of Christ's 
beaten and bloody body (caput LXXVI). 
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By participating in the actions of characters within the text, the reader is also developing 
the virtues exemplified by those figures. For example, in the meditation on the Sermon on 
the Mount the reader is told to 'respicere coneris faciem eius [Christ's]. Conspice in 
discipulus, quomodo reverenter, humiliter, et cum tota mentis intentione aspiciunt eum. 
[ ... ] In hac autem consideratione jucunderis et tu, aspiciendo ac si videres eum loquentem, 
et approximando eis, si forte vocata fueris, et immorando Ibidem, ut Dominus tibi dabit' 
(caput XXI). The reader, encouraged to share in the experience of the disciples, is worthy 
to do so only by her own humility, her own intensity of concentration and belief. If this is 
sincere enough she may be admitted to further enlightenment. 
Through observation of the biblical events, the reader is shown how to apply the lessons 
observed to their actual lives. There is a very strong connection between meditation and 
action. So, from Mary's reaction at the Annunciation we are to learn the value of silence 
(caput IV); from her response to the flight into Egypt we can learn patience (caput XII); 
and from the actions of the boy Jesus in the temple we learn how to approach God (caput 
XIV). Although the focus of the text is emotional, there is a strong current of moral 
exegesis throughout. 
The focused meditation of the reader upon the life of Christ not only acts as a powerful and 
active form of moral teaching but is also conceived as bringing about spiritual 
transformation. This transformation is conceived around the figures of Mary and Christ. 
The text filters the reader's approach to Christ through the actions of Mary. It is by 
imitating her that we can truly approach him and the author puts into her mouth a speech 
overtly describing how man must act to receive divine virtue: 'Imo dico tibi, quod nullam 
gratiam, donum vel virtutem habui a Deo sine magno labore, continua oratione, ardenti 
desiderio, profunda devotione, multis lacrymis, et multa afflictione, dicendo, cogitando, 
semper placita sibi sictu sciebam et poteram' (caput lll). The imitation brings about not 
only moral Similarity to Mary but ontological fulfilment in the receipt of virtue and 
spiritual fruitfulness. We are exhorted to 'ipsa rumines bene, et delecteris in eis, toto 
affectu ea memoriae commendando, et opere adimplendo, quia devotissima sunt' (caput 
lll). Just as Mary's meditation upon God brought her virtue and enabled her to bear fruit in 
giving birth to Christ, so the believer, focusing on Mary and imitating her devotion, can 
give rise to similar spiritual fruit. 
While Mary is the exempla of the birth of Christ within humanity, the writer of the 
Meditationes describes full transformation as taking place through the believer'S 
contemplation of the virtues of Christ in whom virtues are found in their most perfect 
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form: 'Ubi enim virtutes excelsae paupertatis, eximiae humilitatis, profundae sapientiae, 
orationis, mansuetudinis, obedientiae, patientiae, caeterarumque virtutum exempla et 
doctrinam sic invenies, sicut in vita Domini virtutum?' (Proemium). The contemplation of 
these virtues, however, is necessarily not passive or academic, but an active emotional and 
interactive experience: 'Ad cuius virtutes imitandas et adipiscendas, ex frequenti 
meditatione cor accenditur et animatur' (Proemium). This intense and loving 
contemplation is what can lead to the transformation of the believer: 
Qui ergo in passione et cruce Domini gloriari desiderat, sedula cordis meditatione 
debet in ipsa persistere, cuius mysteria, et quae circa earn facta sunt, si toto forent 
perspecta intuita mentis, in novum, ut puto, statum adducerent meditantem. Nam 
profundo corde et totis viscerum medullis earn perscrutanti, multi adsunt passus 
inesperati, ex quibus novam compassionem, novum amorem, novas consolationes, 
et per consequens novum quem dam statum susciperet, quae sibi praesagium et 
participatio gloriae viderentur. (caput LXXIV) 
As we saw in Chapter One, through the redemption of Christ, the potential of human action 
to hold value is restored, and that action can be reconnected with God, the proper end of 
human existence. 
The Meditationes lays out the steps towards God which the believer must take, using also 
the figure of the exempla reader: St Cecelia. She is described as one who 'de vita Domini 
Jesu in Evangelio tradita, quaedem sibi devtiora praelegerat, in quibus meditabatur die ac 
nocte, corde puro et integro, attentione praecipua et ferventi, et cum plena circulatione 
reincipiens iterum et dulci ac suavi gustu ruminans, ea in arcano pectoris sui collocabat' 
(Proemium). Intense study is described as one of Cecelia's 'virtutum' (Proemium). This 
very study manifests the nature of Christian virtue itself. Virtue, we have seen, is 
conceived by some Christian thinkers as a focused and perfect love of God which directs all 
action towards that end. As such we are told in the Meditationes, 'anima autem aJiquam 
virtutem habere non potest, si Deum toto corde non diligat' (caput III). This intense 
focusing is precisely what the Meditationes teaches. While focusing upon perfect examples 
of virtue it at the same time teaches the focus of mind and de~ire towards God that is 
Christian virtue. Such focusing shares another feature with the result of virtue which is a 
separating from the things of the world: 'quod jugis meditatio vitae Domini Jesu roborat et 
stabilit mentem contra vana et caduca' (Proemium). By meditating upon the life of Christ 
one is not simply seeing exempla of virtue but one is re-enacting the perfectly focused 
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desire for God which is virtue itself. One is re-manifesting within one's own action of 
reading the idea of virtue manifested in the text. 
The Meditationes is a powerful combination of message and medium. It presents the figure 
of Christ and the events of his life as the greatest exemplum of virtue. At the same time it 
puts great emphasis on the necessity of experience, action and participation as the way for 
the believer to gain virtue. With this in mind, it adopts a style of writing which calls, 
through the process of meditation, for the absolute internalisation of events and images in 
such a way that they become part of the reader; in such a way that the reader is indeed 
experiencing what is on the page in front of her and is therefore going through the 
alignment of desire and the transformation of being which is the acquisition of virtue. 
While both employ the power of the mind and emotions to internally recreate what they 
receive, the works of Franciscan meditation differ greatly from the intellectual process 
encouraged by a Dominican sermon which encourages a distinctly Dominican, that is 
rational and scholastic, idea of virtue. Instead the Meditationes are about emotional, lived 
experience which makes real, indeed incarnates, the biblical story within its readers. 
Legenda Major 
While Christ's life must be the ultimate exemplum, the lives ofthe saints who followed him 
served as a further bridge between the human and divine. According to Fleming, the 
purpose of hagiographical texts is twofold: 'to demonstrate the sanctity of life of [the] 
subject and [ ... ] to give intelligible and whenever possible practical example to [ ... ] 
readers'.126 Hagiographies were an influential source for popular literature and visual art 
of the Middle Ages so the messages which they portray would have had great popular 
impact and familiarity. Realistic biography, in a modern sense, is not the aim of 
hagiography which instead seeks to provide a 'moral picture' which can 'incarnate an 
ideal'.127 Hagiographies are perhaps one of the best generic examples of the 
particularisation of the idea. The saints described in hagiographies, however, also have an 
important metaphysical role: in their actions and lives they reveal GOd.128 They are 
exempla and as such hark back to that ultimate divine exemplum. They are those who 
126 Fleming. p. 37. 
1~7 Regis Boyer, 'An Attempt to Define the Typology of Medieval Hagiography', in Hagiography and Medieval 
lIterature: A Symposium, edited by Hans Bekker-Nielsen et al. (Odense: Odense University Press, 1981), pp. 27-
36 (p. 30). 
~2;J~roSlav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 111, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 
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actively live God in the temporal world. The virtues which they, and indeed which all 
humans manifest, are 'representations of the perfections of God' .lZ9 
The saint as one who both brings God into the world and who has a more intimate 
relationship with the divine while in human life, is best exemplified here in the figure of St 
Francis of Assisi.130 I shall make reference to two of the best known of the lives of the saint, 
though with a different emphasis in each. Beginning with Bonaventure's Legenda Major 
(1263), I shall focus upon its meditational aspects, before turning to Tommaso da Celano's 
First Life of St Francis (1225-6) to explore the role of story telling. l3l 
The Legenda Major can be read as telling a journey; it is a journey of the life of its 
protagonist St Francis, but it is also a journey for the reader as he or she grows in 
understanding and spiritual development.13z The reader is both reading about a journey of 
spiritual progress and undergoing one himself, which fits the nature of the Legenda's 
audience; it was primarily a text for those already within the Franciscan order. Although 
the details of Bonaventure's text are largely derived from earlier biographies (principally 
Tommaso's text) the narrative which he gives is a consciously ordered and constructed 
one. It is as much a work of theology as it is of biography. 
As in the Meditationes, the events of the narrative (this time the life of St Francis) are 
interpreted for the edification of the reader and general lessons are drawn from the 
events. For example, from the illness with which Francis is afflicted that ultimately leads to 
his conversion, Bonaventure draws the lesson that physical suffering is beneficial: 'quia 
spirituali auditui dat intellectum inflicta vexatio' (Cap. 1.2).133 He does not simply recount 
events but tells us what they mean and how they are important. However, this 
interpretation also serves the further purpose of giving a typological interpretation of 
Francis' life. Although when Bonaventure wrote his biography in the 1260s Francis had 
been recognised as a saint for 20 years, Bonaventure's text was written to be definitive. 
Using his biography he not only presents the official version of the events of Francis's life, 
but, more importantly, defines what they mean, thus defining the tenets of a Franciscan 
129 Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy ofSt Bonaventure, translated by 1I1tyd Trethowan and F.J.Sheed (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1938), p. 425. 
130 On Dante and Franciscanism see Nick Havely, Dante and the Franciscans: Poverty and the Papacy in the 
'Commed/a' (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
131 On Dante and Bonaventure see Stephen Botterill, 'Bonaventure',ln The Dante Encyclopedia, ed. by. Richard 
Lansing (New York and London: Garland, 2000), pp. 120-21. 
132 St Fr?ncis of Assisi, Writings and Early Biographies: English Omnibus of the Sources for the Life ofSt Francis, 
translatIons by Raphael Brown let al]; with a research bibliography by R. Brown; edited by Marion A. Habig 
(London: S.P.C.K., 1979). Reference to the Legenda Major will be made to this edition and Included within the 
text 
133 Bonaventure, 'Opusculum XXIII, Legenda Sancti Franclscl',ln Opera Omnia: Opuscu/a varia, VIII (Claras 
Aquas: St Bonaventure College, 1898), pp. 504-64. 
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theology and reinforcing the figure of St Francis as a 'type' for Christ. One way in which 
Bonaventure reinforces Francis's saintliness is by the self-consciousness of his mission. 
Bonaventure tells us not only what he did but what he thought and ensures that his 
actions appear to have emerged from a conscious choice to imitate Christ: 'Ideoque magis 
omnibus quam sibi soli vivere praeelegit, illius provocatus exemplo, qui unus pro omnibus 
mori dignatus est' (Cap. IV.2). Bonaventure imposes an interpretation onto the events of 
Francis' life which emphasises the saint's predestined role and saintly acceptance of it. 
As well as interpreting the narrative's events, those events are structured in such a way as 
to present specific stages in the development of virtue, virtue being that which leads to 
spiritual enlightenment and purity. Again, virtue is both acknowledged in the content as a 
mode of progression,134 and manifested in the form as such. The Legenda Major is 
consciously structured to interpret each of the stages and events of Francis' life as 
demonstrating a different virtue. Between the initial four chapters, which detail Francis' 
childhood and conversion, and the final three, which recount his stigmata, death and 
canonization, are 'nine chapters on the virtues which are organized around themes'.135 The 
nine are also divided into three overarching categories of purgation, illumination and 
perfection. The virtues which Bonaventure praises in Francis are now those we might 
recognise as characteristically Franciscan: austerity, humility, poverty, piety, charity, 
prayer, understanding of Scripture and the Stigmata. As each chapter is told, the events 
which particularly demonstrate the virtue under consideration are highlighted and 
reinforced with a final summary. For example, 
Pro cui igitur a pauperibus Christi diffidentia omnis abscedat. Si enim paupertas 
Francisci adeo copiosae sufficientiae fuit, ut subvenientium sibi defectus tam mira 
virtute suppleret, quod nec cibus nec potus nec domus deeseet, cum pecuniae et 
artis et naturae facultas defecerat; multo magis ilIa merebitur, quae usitato divinae 
providentiae ordine communiter conceduntur. (Cap. VII.13) 
The reader is carefully led through the events of Francis' life and given clear indications of 
the lessons he should take from them, and is perhaps reassured in his own life difficulties. 
Thu:, his own understanding and his own virtue should grow. 
1~4 Cap. XI. .1: 'As tantam autem mentis serenitatem indeffessum orationis studium cun continua exercltatione 
Virtu tum virum Dei perduxerat, ut, quamvls non habuerit sacrarum litterarum peritiam per doctrlnam, 
aeternae tamen lucis irradiatus fulgoribus, Scriptururum profunda miro Intellectus scrutaretur acumine'. 
135 Ewert Cousins, 'Introduction', In Bonaventure, The Soul's Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St 
Francis (London: S.P.C.K, 1978), p. 43. 
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The last 'virtue' which Francis acquires, the Stigmata, is most distinctive in the story of the 
saint and represents the culmination of the 'journey' of his life. The Legenda Major traces 
Francis' movement towards perfect imitation of Christ in virtues. He undertakes this 
movement through love and it is love which joins him to Christ: 'Haec est, quae ipsum per 
devotionem sursum agebat in Deum, per compassionem transformabat in Christum' (Cap. 
VIII.l). On the reception of the stigmata, Francis becomes the 'image' of the exemplum 
Christ: 'Postquam igitur verus Christi am or in eandem imaginen transformavit amantem' 
(Cap. XIII.S). The stigmata, this perfect assimilation to Christ, are a visible sign of reward, a 
manifestation of the spiritual state of Francis, 'God's seal on his virtuous life'.136 Through 
his following of virtue, Francis has transformed himself into the perfect image of Christ 
and it is this image which the reader is invited to behold in the Legenda Major. From it she 
is called to meditate both on the practical events of Francis' life, but more importantly on 
their metaphysical significance. Although the Legenda Major is on a certain level a didactic 
text, calling its readers to meditate upon and imitate the actions of Francis, the extent to 
which it functions as a practical guide for virtue must be questioned. The figure of Francis 
is superlatively good and the assimilation to Christ which he is privileged to undergo is 
unique. Francis appears as a suprahuman exemplum; he is not a normal man who 
becomes better through good deeds but a predestined saint. The Legenda Major and its 
offshoot the Legenda Minor were texts written for use within the Franciscan Order and as 
such I think we can read them most readily as objects of spiritual and devotional 
reflection. We are not called so much to go out and imitate the virtues there presented but 
rather to meditate on their brilliance and be spiritually uplifted by their miraculous 
nature. The carefully constructed programme of development is to be internalised and 
that internalisation is the journey. 
In these two works of Franciscan meditation, virtue has emerged as something developed 
by the internalisation of exemplary stories through deep and engaged meditation. The 
intellectual distance of abstract study is far from these texts which instead invite the 
reader to follow and share in the events they contain, spurred on by desire and love. The 
Meditationes calls primarily for emotional engagement; through the sharing of the 
experiences of Christ, the reader comes closer to him. The reader of the Legenda Major 
accompanies St Francis on his journey of spiritual development and is simultaneously 
guided through their own development. Although I speak of 'sharing experiences' and 
'going on journeys' as if they were physical and real, what we must really recognise here is 
the overwhelming power of the text and the image. These are journeys and experiences of 
136 Cousins, 'Introduction', p. 45. 
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the mind and emotions which are able to have such profound effects because of the frame 
of mind in which they are studied and the language in which they are communicated. 
4. Storytelling 
Although we have considered the Meditationes vitae Christi and Bonaventure's Legenda 
Major as works of meditation, they equally share the characteristic Franciscan format of 
telling stories. I have chosen to focus on them as works of meditation because of their 
conscious use of techniques to very actively draw their readers into the events in terms of 
engagement, spiritual participation and development, and guided reading, all of which 
encourage the audience to take a very active emotional part in the story which in itself is 
the acquisition of virtue. But the very use of narrative alone makes a particular statement 
about communication and audience involvement. In using the term 'storytelling' I intend it 
as meaning a constructed text which narrates a progressive series of events grounded in 
reality and which has a strong emphasis on character. Unlike meditation, which seeks to 
bring the audience very actively into the events, storytelling relies more on objective 
example; the stories to be considered have a fable-like quality with a clear message about 
good and bad and with believable characters. Lesnick has argued that the Franciscans 'use 
a method of preaching based both in form and content on historical episodes, concrete 
experience and active narration [ ... ] concretions and the narrative mode [ ... ] have a 
greater impact on the emotions and the imagination'.137 To hear stories or to see a 
pictorial narrative is a much easier, more accessible way of absorbing ideas than to follow 
the arguments of abstract scholasticism. Stories based around the actions of an exemplary 
person are the principal teaching mode of the Bible, whose emphasis upon character is 
particularly important for our consideration of virtue; that is, of an ethical system based 
primarily on character development. The Bible is peopled with characters who, although 
they exist in very particular circumstances explicitly influenced by the divine, are 
nonetheless relatively real people with problems and flaws. This attitude to character is 
one taken up by Tommaso da Celano in his first Life of Saint Francis. 
Tommaso da Celano's First Life, as the first known hagiography of the saint, is eager to 
demonstrate Francis's sanctity and aims to show the divine influence within his life. It 
fulfils the dual purpose of hagiography mentioned earlier, to demonstrate the sanctity of 
the saint whose story is being told, and to act as an example to the reader.138 Although, as 
hagiography, it belongs to the same genre as the Legenda Major, it has certain features 
137 Lesnick, p. 95. 
138 Fleming. p. 37. 
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which make it a more concrete story. While the text may be far from Francis' actual life, it 
does not describe an overtly spiritual or unreal narrative, although it is a story in which 
the sanctifying characteristics of Francis are given predominance.139 It is a linear temporal 
narrative and although the events it recounts are selected, they are not artificially ordered, 
as in the Legenda, to give a specific spiritual message or to provide a guided pattern for 
spiritual progression. This temporal aspect of storytelling ought not to be passed over as it 
ensures that the events recounted exist within a history. Thus characters who exist within 
time can change and develop within it; their lives have a sense of moving towards an end 
point which may be some form of completion and fulfilment. The figure of Francis is 
presented as a man who develops through his life, beginning bad and ending good. He is 
described as profligate in his youth but '[t]acta est proinde super eum manus Domini, et 
immutatio dexterae Excelsi, ut per eum daretur peccatoribus fiducia in gratiam respirandi, 
et conversionis ad Deum omnibus fieret exemplum' (Book 1, chap. 1.2)140 This 
transformation is identified as the work of God, but nevertheless by presenting a 'hero' 
who is transformed, the audience is empowered to imagine their own transformation and 
follow Francis towards conversion. As an imperfect figure who becomes perfect, Francis 
acts as an encouraging exemplum; he is one who becomes virtuous and as such his 
transformation is imitable: 
et non minus exemplo quam verbo aedificans audientes, de toto corpore fecerat 
linguam. [ ... ] Assuduitas vero subiectionis fecerat earn voluntariam, et ex 
quotidiana inclinatione sui situm apprehenderat tantae virtutis, quoniam 
consuetudo saepe vertitur in naturam. (Book 2, chap.IV.97) 
This quasi-Aristotelian explanation of the acquisition of virtue is here theoretically and 
practically presented to Tommaso da Celano's audience for explicit imitation, by 
presenting the exemplum of a person who has already made this progression. 
As in the Legenda, Francis is presented as conscious of his exemplary purpose. After the 
Franciscan Order is authorised by the Pope, Francis and his companions discuss their 
purpose: 'qualiter in omni sanctitate et religione coram Altissimo ambularent: qualiter 
denique vita et mores ipsorum, per incrementa sanctarum virtutum, forent proximis ad 
exemplum' (Book 1, chap. XIV.34). But, importantly, Francis' perfection is not taken as a 
given thing; instead we see the process of him discovering how to be perfect. Within the 
narrative Francis works his way towards perfection, while beyond the narrative events 
139 Fleming, p. 38. 




the narratorial voice interprets and attributes his actions as exemplary: 'Omnibus quoque 
tribuebat normam vitae, ac salutis viam in omni gradu veraciter demonstrabat' (Book 1, 
chap. XV.37). Thus the figure of Francis is a believable character within the narrative who 
is not omniscient, who is not initially perfect and who changes during the story, while at 
the same time the narratorial voice tells the reader that he is an example we should be 
following. 
The narrator frequently extracts specific messages from the narrative events in order to 
put forward a particular moral message. For example, the persecution of Francis by his 
family and friends is interpreted as a general message on the value of tribulation: 
Sed quia melior est patiens arrogante, famulus Dei surdum iis omnibus se 
praestabat, et nulla fractus aut mutatus iniuria pro iis imnibus gratias Domino 
referebat In vanum namque iniquus persequitur ad honesta tendentem, quia 
quanto plus fuerit ille concussus, tanto fortius triumphabit. Generosum ani mum, 
ait quidam, dedecus efficit fortiorem. (Book 1, chap. V.ll) 
From the particular the general can be extrapolated but in such a way that the message 
remains more fixed in the mind, being attached to the case of a particular and real 
individual. 
Unlike the Legenda, Tommaso da Celano's Life provides us with a detailed account of 
Francis' appearance and character, interspersing physical details with edifying 
interpretation: 'Facundissimus homo, facie hilaris, vultu benignus, immunis ignaviae, 
insolentiae expers. [ ... ] [L]ingua placabilis, ignea et acuta, vox vehemens, dulcis, clara 
atque sonora' (Book 1, chap. XXIX.83). Here is a tangible picture of a real man with real 
motivations and actions; he is a concrete figure rather than a spiritual vehicle or 
superlatively good though distant saint. Stubblebine points of that '[t]o read this account is 
to experience St Francis at close hand and to realise the compelling strength of his 
devotion to poverty and humility on the path that Christ had trod' whereas '[s]ubsequent 
accounts increasingly distance us from the reality of the man, expunging as it were his 
reality in favour of his myth'.141 Tommaso's Francis is fundamentally real. 
The clear narrative and appeals to popular detail are also a notable feature of Giotto's 
frescoes of the Upper Basilica of St Francis in Assisi (completed c.1290-96), which portray 
the life of the saint. While being closely tied to Bonaventure's narrative, their intended 
141 James H. Stubblebine, Assisi and the Rise a/Vernacular Art (Cambridge: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 80. 
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audience goes beyond the boundaries of the Franciscan Order to reach the mass of 
pilgrims visiting the basilica at Assisi. Stubblebine has termed their visual language 
'vernacular'. They are 'intentionally designed in a popular vein, purposefully employing a 
vernacular language of gesture, expression, costume, and architectural ambience'.142 The 
scenes portrayed are familiar, naturalistic, believable, while at the same time establishing 
'visual evidence of the saint's miracles' and building 'visual symbols comparable to those 
long-established ones of early Christian saints'.143 Nature and iconography are combined 
to create a polysemous but realistic and popular narrative whose 'quality derives from and 
is dependent on the very absence of monumentality, that is, the timeless, the abstracted, 
that which is outside of accidental causality. In the Assisi images, it is this accidental, often 
trivial and amusing detail that entrances the spectator into the illusion of their reality'.144 
Tommaso da Celano's Life and the Assisi frescoes both provide a kind of mirror to the 
audience in which they see their own reality and therefore are shown how to act within it. 
Their real world is presented as one in which miracles can happen and the soul can be 
saved. The virtues which Francis possesses are not those of the meditative friar alone, but 
are those of the active person, working to better both himself and society. They are virtues 
which are represented in such a way as to make them attainable through following the 
example of a man who follows Christ. 
5. Allegory: 'imagination aids understanding' 
Virtue is a concept both abstract and complex; but it is also, as we have seen, a concept of 
great practical value. Consideration of the representation of virtue in narrative form has 
already demonstrated the ways in which virtue can be brought alive as an idea by being 
manifested in the figures of real people, their actions and the results of those actions. We 
must now turn to the use of allegory and symbol. 
Medieval allegory is a two-way process. In one sense, it is a habitual attitude of mind to 
read the world as containing different layers of meaning hidden below the superficial. Eco 
has suggested that '[t]he Medieval inhabited a world filled with references, reminders and 
overtones of Divinity, manifestations of God in things'.14s In such a world, everything 
means more than it seems, the simple leads to the complex. In the second sense, allegory is 
that created by man in order to represent metaphysical reality in a way which is 
accessible, which engages the human intellect and imagination: 'fables and symbols were 
142 Stubblebine, p. 88. 
143 Stubblebine, p. 88. 
144 Stubblebine, p. 91. 
14S Eco, Art and Beauty, p. 53. 
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able to articulate qualities that theory could not [ ... ] they could make intelligible those 
doctrines which proved irksome in their more abstract form'.146 By employing allegory in 
a work, a writer is choosing to engage the imagination of their audience in an active way; 
they are presenting a puzzle, a system that must be interpreted. At the same time, the 
choice of the superficial allegorical figure makes a comment back onto the more complex 
idea it conceals. Allegorical art expresses the medieval pleasure of deciphering and the 
revelation of meaning; it is both an aesthetic and intellectual process, which engages 
different faculties of the mind thus more completely involving the audience.147 
Although the focus here is allegorical representations of virtue, that is, representations 
which employ a figure or cohesive system of figures which has a meaning in its own right 
but which also reveals a more profound significance, within allegory we ought to highlight 
personification. This figural technique is used either literally to personify different virtues, 
that is, give them human form, or to talk about abstract virtue in such a way that human 
actions or feelings are attributed to virtue. By the high Middle Ages the personification of 
virtue had acquired great complexity. Different virtues acquired attributes in their 
personified forms which both made them immediately identifiable and often made a 
comment about the more abstract nature of the virtue itself. In such 'static 
representations', Katzenellenbogen writes, '[t]here is no dramatic tension. Only the virtues 
are represented. Distinguished by symbols, they become part of a sphere of illustration 
which no longer bears any relation to reality, and represent, within a significantly 
constructed linear framework, the moral qualities treated in the main theme'.148 Such 
representations of virtue appear in almost all the texts and images considered so far, not 
only in this chapter but in the preceding one as well. 
The consideration of allegory and personification brings us back to the idea of 
particularisation. At some point in the transfer of an abstract idea into the realm of reality, 
it must be attributed with something tangible, comprehensible. These tangible aspects are 
then employed to develop further the original idea until the figurations become an 
automatic way of understanding that particular abstraction. We learn to read and 
recognise the textual and visual images, accepting that those images not only represent 
something more abstract but that they themselves actually come to form the identity of 
that abstract. It then becomes normal to understand virtue in terms of 'growth' when it is 
so often figured as a tree; it becomes normal to talk of the battle between good and evil 
when virtues and vices are so often personified, clad in armour and ready to engage in 
146 Eco, Art and Beauty, p. 54. 
147 Eco,Artand Beauty, p. 61. 
148 ,Adolf Katzenellenbogen, Allegories o/the Virtues and Vices In Medieval Art: From Early Christian Times to the 
Thirteenth Century (New York: Norton, 1964), p.32. 
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battle. I am trying to suggest that the image creates the idea as much as the idea originally 
created the image. Let us now briefly consider three particular 'allegories' of virtue which 
greatly inform our imaginative conception of the idea. Rather than using one particular 
text to demonstrate this I shall draw on various examples to show the universality of these 
representations. 
The Psychomachia of Prudentius personifies the Virtues and Vices and has them engage in 
battle. The personification of moral concepts has its origins in Classical art and '[e]arly 
Christian poetry adapted the classical theme of the conflict of armed forces to the sphere 
of moral allegory, developed it further and endowed the opposing moral forces with the 
clearly defined features of personification speaking, acting and struggling with one 
another'.149 This 'dynamic representation' of virtue is the manifestation of an idea found in 
St Paul. Katzenellenbogen suggests that in the Psychomachia Prudentius 'develops the 
Pauline thought that the Christian must arm himself with spiritual weapons in order to 
face successfully the forces of evil'.lS0 The life of the Christian is a continual battle against 
evil in which his 'spiritual weapons' are the virtues. Thus, the personification of virtues as 
joining in the fight on the side of the Christian soul we can imagine works as a source of 
comfort, support and encouragement.1S1 In the frescoes and structure of the Arena Chapel, 
as we will come to see, the Christian soul is physically made to stand in the middle of one 
such moral battle field, flanked by the virtues and vices who prepare to fight for it. In a 
more individualised personification, in his First Life Tommaso da Celano describes St 
Francis in the language of secular romance, in which the saint is 'fortissimus miles Christi' 
(Book 1, caput XV.38) who sets out to woo and defend his 'Lady Poverty' .lS2 Francis is 
allegorically described in such a way as to reveal the spiritual battle which he carries out 
during his life, battling with his own spirit and the world in order to win the virtue which 
will bring him to God. 
Virtues have been personified as spiritual forces, both in the combative sense of the 
Psychomachia and in the sense of a constructing force. Since Plato, the human soul has 
been conceived as a kind of edifice. Gregory the Great describes it as a house; Giordano da 
Pisa calls it 'il tempio di Dio' (p. 472). Within this building that is the human soul, the 
virtues are those forces which build and support it, which metaphysical concept is 
transmitted into literary and pictorial figures. Katzenellenbogen lists several artistic 
instances in which the virtues are personified as active builders, constructing the symbolic 
149 Katzenellenbogen, p. vii. 
150 Katzenellenbogen, p. 1. 
ISl Katzenellenbogen, p. 18. 
1S2 See Susa~ J. Hubert, 'Theological and Polemical uses of Hagiography: A Consideration of Bonaventure's 
Legenda Major of St Francis', Comitatus: A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 29.1 (1998),47 -55. 
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city of God.1s3 As well as virtues personified as builders or supporters of an edifice, to 
acquire virtue itself is itself conceived of as 'to build', Again Tommaso da Celano's St 
Francis is the 'builder' of virtue within his own self and within others, which he constructs 
through the practice of difficult labours: 'ut sic in solido verae humilitatis fundari 
mererentur, ut felici dispositione in eis consurgeret omnium virtutum fabrica spiritalis' 
(Book 1, caput XV.38). From the building blocks of individual actions, the virtuous souls 
themselves come to build up the edifice of God: 'Revera super constantiae fundamentum 
charitatis nobilis structura surrexit, in qua vivi lapides, ex omnibus mundi partibus 
coacervati, aedificati sunt in habitaculum Spiritus Sancti' (Book 1, caput XV.38). The 
virtuous Christian souls who form the parts of a building are powerfully reminiscent of the 
Pauline image of the faithful who make up the 'body of Christ' in the form of the Church. 
The Franciscan composer of laude, Iacopone da Todi, exploring the nature of the vicious 
rather than the virtuous soul, conceives it as a 'casa fatta da demoni'.1s4 In considering the 
way the ethical make-up of the subject affects the literal structural form of the soul, 
Iacopone makes a particularly striking point. The vicious soul, rather than being destined 
for a hell external to itself, in Iacopone's conception already resembles hell itself: 'L'anema 
ch'e vizlosa / a l'onferno e arsemigliata'.155 This begs the question that if the vicious soul 
takes on the form of hell, then the virtuous soul, as its opposite, must logically take on the 
form of heaven. Iacopone's use of poetic simile here brings us back to the more abstract 
notion that the soul quite literally becomes what it thinks and does. The forms of 
behaviour and habit which it adopts have a direct influence on its structural existence; by 
its ethical choices it becomes either a house made of demons or a temple of God. 
Iacopone is particularly relevant in the use of allegory and image to convey the abstract. 
He is notable for the boldness with which he states foundational points of thought and 
doctrine and his transformation of them into real, dramatised events. For instance, in his 
poem Torno fo creato vertuoso' (lauda 3), Iacopone says that man was created in a state 
of virtue, from which he falls by the following of misdirected loves. Adam's sin is described 
as having 'deguasto l'ordene de l'Amore' (1.9) and because of this the virtues departed 
from the human soul. This literally figured abandonment is intended to manifest a 
conceptual reality; that the misdirecting of love, the turning of human desire away from 
God, is an abandonment of virtue, that is, love correctly directed to God as we saw in 
Chapter One. From this beginning, Jacopone then shifts to present a scene also used by the 
153 Katzenellenbogen, pp. 5 and 43. 
154 On Jacopone da Todi see George T. Peck, The Fool a/God: jacopone da Tod; (Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1980); Rosanna Bettarini, 'Jacopone da Todi e Ie laude', In Anto/ogia della poesia Italiana: Duecento, ed. 
by Cesare Segre e Carlo Ossola (Turin: Einaudi, 1999), pp. 278-83. 
155 Jacopone da Todi, Laude, ed. by Franco Mancini (Roma and Bari: Editor! Laterza, 2006). Lauda 59, lines 1-2, 
p. 172. All future reference to lacopone's poems will be made to this edition and Included in the text 
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writer of the Meditationes vitae Christi, a dialogue between the personified figures of 
different virtues who, by putting forward their points of view, serve to set out the 
doctrinally conceived impasse which humanity was led to by Adam's sin, raising the 
question of how such a sin can be overcome. Iacopone, by personifying the virtues, is able 
to make his point not only through the specific words which each say but by the 
(figurative) pOint of view from which they say them. Thus, the greater doctrinal dispute 
between the Justice of God and the Mercy of God is 'put into the mouths' of these figures. 
From this, the stages of the argument which lead up to the necessity of the Incarnation can 
be quite literally 'listened in upon'. Finally at the scene of the Annunciation, which 
lacopone recounts, the initial point of his poem, that man was created virtuous, is 
reasserted in relation to the Virgin. She is 'gratia plena, en vertute' (1.145); despite the 
fallen state of humankind she remains 'creata vertiiosa'. And again the connection of 
creation and virtue is reasserted when Mary asks how she, a virgin, can conceive a child, 
Gabriel tells her 'la vertu de Deo fara umbratura' (1.156). In this lacopone is directly citing 
the Bible (Luke 1.35). In this poem, which bases itself around narrative events which are 
most likely already familiar to his readers, Iacopone is able to express most profound 
concepts which surround virtue. lacopone is explicitly not a philosopher and is instead a 
Franciscan at his most anti-intellectual. Therefore what he is expressing in his poetry is 
not doctrinal argument, not an abstract debate on the nature of an idea which mayor may 
not be this way; instead he is building from the human experience described in the Bible 
and his own real emotional experiences of his personal conversion to God to inform his 
writings. 
While unafraid of profound concepts, lacopone is frequently formulaic in his treatment of 
virtue, often employing didactic lists of virtues versus vices and their respective effects. 
However, this is not to say that, in their direct simplicity, they do not make some more 
interesting comment on the nature of the moral category under discussion and by their 
figuration enrich their conceptual meaning. Indeed, the figural language which lacopone 
employs we find recurring in Dante's work itself and in both writers' work, the figures 
used make manifest (and therefore more comprehensible) the nature and purpose of 
virtue itself. For example, in the poem 'Amore contraffatto' (1auda 46), lacopone is 
advocating the need for the virtues to correctly direct love as love without virtue to guide 
it can never attain salvation: 'Amore contrafatto spogliato de vertute, / non po far Ie salute 
la 'v'e 10 vero amore' (11.1-2). He then lists the effects of seven individual virtues, using 
metaphors to reveal the underlying nature of each virtue. For example: 
Amor se fa lascivo senza la temperanza, 
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Nave senza nocclero rompe en tempestanza, 
. Cavallo senza freno curr'en pricipitanza; 
SI fa la falsa amanza senza vertute, annare. (11.3-6) 
While Charity 'e vita, c'onne atro amor e morto [ ... ] non po gustar tuo frutto chi fugg'el tuo 
guidare' (1l.27-30). Control, guidance, truth, life, love, all the aspects which make up the 
complex medieval concept of virtue are here figured in metaphorical language which 
perhaps itself goes into the formation of those concepts: for how can we really understand 
the intangible without the tangible? The invisible without the sensual? The intellectual 
without the experienced? 
The final form in which virtue is represented to be considered here is perhaps the most 
developed and it finds its roots in the Bible. This is virtue figured as images of natural 
fertility, in particular, flowering and fruiting trees. From the Garden of Eden, trees have 
alluded to a choice between good and evil, right and wrong. In Galatians, specific virtues 
are identified as 'fructus spiritus' (GaI.S:22). Christ himself is the beautiful 'flower of the 
root of Jesse' (lsa. 11:1). Proverbs and Psalms evoke repeatedly the spiritual fertility of the 
virtuous actions of the faithful and the joy that comes from the tree of life.156 In addition 
there is the exegetical tradition of identifying the Cross of Christ's crucifixion with the tree 
of life; this 'tree' gives eternal life to those who have faith in it. To follow Christ in actions 
of virtue is to be spiritually fertile. 
Tommaso da Celano's Francis, following Christ, is also figured as a source of spiritual 
fertility. He brings new life to the spiritual desert of his age: 
sicque factum est ut in brevi totius provinciae facies sit immutata et laetiori vultu 
appareret, ubique deposita pristina foeditate. Fugata est prior ariditas et seges in 
squalenti campo cito surrexit; coepit etiam inculta vinea germinare germen odoris 
Domini, et productis ex se floribus suavitatis, fructus honoris et honestatis pariter 
parturivit. Resonabat ubique gratiarum actio et vox laudis, ita ut multi, 
saecularibus curis abiectis, in vita et doctrina beatissimi patris Francisci, suimet 
reciperent notitiam et ad Creatoris amorem et reverentiam aspirarent. (Book 1, 
chap. XV.37) 
Francis is the 'farmer' of such fertility amongst the populace; 'agrum cordis ipsorum 
virtutum floribus exornabat' (Book 1, chap. XV.37). In another Franciscan text, lacopone 
156 For example see Psalm 1; Proverbs 11. 
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da Todi describes the incarnate body of Christ as perfect ground, fertile for virtue to grow: 
'0 terra senza tribulo ne spina, / germenata de onne bono frutto, / de vertute e de grazie sl 
t'e plena' (11.129-31). Christ's body is fecund with potential virtue. 
In a much more extended allegory which relates virtue with images of natural growth, 
Bonaventure's Lignum Vitae uses a combination of narrative, meditation and allegory to 
present the story of Christ in such a way that the reader can closely identify with and 
conform to Christ's Passion: 
Porro huiusmodi affectum et sensum is duntaxat apud se vivaciter experiri 
meretur [ ... ] laborem et dolorem amoremque crucifixi lesu tanta memoriae 
vivacitate, tanto intellectus acumine, tanta voluntatis caritate considerat, quod 
veraciter illud sponsae proferre potest eloquium: Fasciculus myrrhae dilectus 
meus mihi, inter ubera mea commorabitur. (Prologue, 1)157 
In order to appeal simultaneously to intellect, memory and will, Bonaventure moulds his 
narrative into an allegorical tree which the reader can intellectually and spiritually climb 
at the same time as actively creating it in their imagination. It is this imagination in the 
literal sense of forming mental images that we can recognise as a strong Franciscan 
current along with the desire to communicate since 'imaginatio iuvat intelligentiam' 
(Prologue, 2). 
On this allegorical tree, each fruit is an event in Christ's life which demonstrates a 
particular virtue. At the same time, Bonaventure emphasises that the unified source of 
these virtues is Christ himself; he is the single fruit whieh nourishes the others: 'Verum 
Hcet hie fructus unus sit et indivisus, quia tamen secundum eius multiplices status, 
dignitates, virtutes et opera multiformibus consolationibus devotas animas cibat' 
(Prologue, 4). As we saw in Chapter One, at the centre of value-holding action must be a 
particular relationship with Christ. Bonaventure figures this relationship in terms of 
natural fertility. While the narrative event gives each 'fruit' concrete reality, being a 
practical exemplum of behaviour from Christ's life, in their allegorical guise the fruits are 
figured as sensually tempting: 
[F]olium eius contra omne genus morbi medicamentum efficacissimum, tam 
preservans, quem reparans, pro eo quod verbum crucis virtus Dei est in salutem 
onmi credenti. Flos autem sit omnis coloris formositate decorus omnisque odoris 
151 Bonaventure, Decem Opuscu/a: Opuscu/um IJI, Lignum Vitae ed. PP. Collegil S. Bonaventurae (Claras Aquas: 
College of St Bonaventure College Press, 1926). 
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suavitate resperus, qui desiderantium anxia corda et reocillet et attrahat. Fructus 
tandem sit duodenus, habens in se omne delectamentum et omnis saporis 
suavitatem, qui sic domesticis Dei ad gustandum proponitur, ut semper eo 
satientur edentes, et tamen numquam fastidiant. (Prologue, 4; italics in original) 
The allegory reveals the spiritual benefits of meditating on the events of the life of Christ, 
which those events themselves may not so clearly have revealed, in a language which 
appeals to the most basic ways in which humans take in information: through the senses. 
As well as structuring Bonaventure's narrative, the allegory develops within it, dictating 
the reader's reaction to the recounted events, not only as if they were participating in the 
events but as if they were participating in the allegory that represents those events. Thus, 
when in the narrative Christ is pierced with the lance the reader is encouraged to apply his 
or her mouth to Christ's wound, 'ibi os appone, ut haurias aquas de fontibus Salvatoris. Hic 
enim estfons egrediens de media paradisi, qui, in quatuor divisus capita et in corda devota 
diffusus, fecundat et irrigat universam terram' (Fructus V III , 30; italics in original). 
Including the biblical quotation, Bonaventure appeals to multiple allegorical readings of 
the event. 
While the virtues are the allegorical fruits of the Lignum Vitae, the figure of Christ himself 
is allegorised as that very tree. He is its fruit, its flowers, its source. Christ 'fructus est qui 
de virginali utero traxit originem' (Prologue, 3); he is the 'flos ille pukherrimus de radice 
lesse, qui in incarnatione floruit, in passione defloruit, sic in resurrectione refloruit, ut 
omnium esset decor' (Fructus IX, 35). Finally, as we saw above, he is the fountain of 
spiritual fertility who waters the whole world. The identification of Virtue and Christ is by 
now conceptually familiar but the interaction of images which Bonaventure presents us 
with explores this interaction in a much more tangible way than heretofore. By 'eating' of 
the 'fruit' of virtue one is partaking in Christ himself. By studying the life of Christ, one is 
'feeding' oneself with the 'fruits' of virtue, quite literally nourishing the spirit. By climbing 
the tree of virtue, 'eating' the fruits on the way, one is ascending towards union with 
Christ. 
6. Case Study: Giotto's Arena Chapel Frescoes, a Combination of 
Representations 
In order to demonstrate the ways in which different modes of representing can come 
together to interact and have a particular effect and message to their audience, I will here 
briefly consider as a case study Giotto's fresco cycle of the Arena Chapel in Padua 
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(completed 1305).158 Works of art develop their own internal systems of meaning. A 
particular character or image or word can take their significance from the context 
surrounding them; the part takes its value from its relation to the whole. When we enter 
the enclosed space of the Arena Chapel it is precisely this which we must bear in mind. 
Giotto's fresco cycle brings together different modes of representations of virtue; it is a 
combination of allegory, meditation and story telling in which each facet takes its meaning 
from interaction with the other. 
Giotto's Paduan cycle incorporates different elements: scenes from the life of the Virgin 
and her parents, scenes from the life of Christ, an image of the Last Judgement, and 
individual allegories of a selection of virtues and vices. The narrative scenes obviously 
have a significance in themselves and can be read as simply recounting a well known 
story; the Last Judgement contains very familiar elements and in solitude has its own 
cohesive meaning; and, as we have seen, it is not unusual to see personifications of virtues 
and vices. However, the true power of the cycle comes from the interrelation of elements. 
With this in mind, let us consider the Chapel decoration's representation of virtue. 
The allegorical images of the virtues and vices are placed on the lowest level of the north 
and south sides of the chapel, immediately below the narrative scenes from the life of 
Christ. They therefore stand on the same level as the spectator, surrounding him or her, 'as 
if readying to do battle in a new arena'.159 Andrew Ladis has convincingly argued that 
these symbolic figures become a medium through which the narrative images above them 
are to be interpreted: 
Giotto's Virtues and Vices [ ... ] are an integral part of Giotto's scheme, because they 
bring to mind, define and themselves are characterized by figures who appear in 
the colour-filled, time-bound realm of the narrative. [ ... ] One perforce compares 
the Virtues and Vices to figures in the narrative [ ... ] but in the comparison one 
understands that they not only constitute difference classes of being but also 
represent different levels of reality and meaning,160 
Because perception of the narrative is filtered through the allegorical figures of moral 
concepts, the viewer is brought to engage with the stories presented by carrying out a 
form of exegesis. The literal story is there to be visually read; the allegorical interpretation 
158 On Dante and Giotto see Caron Cioffi. 'Giotto·. in The Dante Encyclopedia, ed. by. Richard Lansing (New York 
and London: Garland. 2000), p. 447. 
159 Andrew Ladis, Giotto's 0: Narrative, Figuration and Pictorial Ingenuity in the Arena Chapel (University Park, 
PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). p. 18. 
160 Ladis, p. 17. 
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is implicit in the narrative cycles in which images are paralleled to be read typologically; 
the depiction of the Last Judgement maintains the anagogical elements always present, 
making the viewer form the connection between the activities in the narrative and their 
eschatological outcome; and finally the Virtue and Vice figures constantly encourage the 
viewer to reflect on the moral messages of the narrative. These figures lead 'one to see the 
moral content of the narrative which then may be said to give concrete illustrations of 
certain ethical questions'.161 
I have already suggested that the viewer stands in the centre of the Chapel surrounded by 
the Virtues and Vices who stand in antithesis to each other, each facing its opposite. To 
follow the narrative the viewer must physically traverse the Chapel, following the stories 
step by step both horizontally and vertically. With the Virtues on one side and the Vices on 
the other, the viewer is physically led on a 'mental journey' through 'salvation history' 
which leads them finally to the outcome of that history in the Last Judgement.162 The 
lessons are very clear: to follow the path of the Vices is to arrive at the left-hand side of 
Christ and descend into Hell: to follow the path of Virtue enables one to sit at Christ's right 
hand and join the ranks of the elect. The viewer becomes actively engaged into the journey 
of the Chapel which is a journey of moral reflection, aided by the concrete stories 
recounted on the walls. The programme of images causes the past, present and future to 
collapse around the focal point of the viewer, forcing him to see himself within salvation 
history and likewise to actively place himselfwithin it. 
The internal parallels between the narrative images, and the parallels between the 
allegorical and narrative figures, are too numerous for full consideration here and such 
study has been carried out much more expertly elsewhere.163 But it is worth taking one 
example to demonstrate the internal harmony and meaning of the Chapel frescoes to 
exemplify a work of art which, like the Com media, 'introduces a unique internal typology 
that endows the narrative with a clear moral dimension legible through the specific action 
of specific figures in specific situations'.164 It has been convincingly argued by Derbes and 
Sardona that the Arena Chapel was commissioned by Enrico Scrovegni in an attempt to 
undo the sin of usury which his father and probably he himself had committed.165 The 
Chapel's original dedication to the Madonna della Carita perhaps bears witness to this. 
161 Ladis, p. 28. 
162 Giuseppe Basile, Giotto: The Arena Chapel Frescoes (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993), p. 14. 
163 For the paraJlels between the narrative scenes see Michel Alpatoff 'The Parallelism of Giotto's Paduan 
Fre~coes',Art Bulletin 29:3 (1947), 149-54; on the parallels between the narrative and allegorical figures see 
LadlS. 
164 Ladis, p. 50. 
165 See Anne Derbes and Michael Sardona, 'Barren Metal and the Fruitful Womb: The Programme of Giotto's 
Arena Chapel in Padua',Art Bulletin 80:2 (1998), 274-91. 
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Within the Chapel's fresco programme, charity features prominently both in narrative, 
figurative and allegorical ways. In one sense, charity is the driving message of the whole 
narrative programme. The two pivotal events, Mary's acceptance to be the mother of God 
which enabled Christ to become incarnate, and Christ's sacrifice on the Cross, were 
recognisable enactments of ultimate Charity, exempla of charitable acts. We also see a 
pictorial depiction of the more abstract nature of charity, what charity actually is, in the 
allegorical representation. The figure of 'karitas' in one hand extends her heart up towards 
the figure of Christ who eagerly receives it, and in the other extends a basket of fruit and 
flowers, laden with religious symbols, down to her neighbours. In addition, to reinforce 
the message of the chapel as a whole, she disparagingly tramples upon sacks of coin. 
Charity as love of God and neighbour is conceptually manifested in pictorial form, while 
acts of charity, both quotidian and epic, are played out in the narrative scenes. By pairing a 
virtue with a particular figure in the narrative the artist is making a specific moral 
comment and guiding the viewer as to what they should be looking for. Thus, when we 
come to look at the Last Judgement we see the final results of charity. Those who 
recognised the charity offered to them in Mary's acceptance and Christ's sacrifice are led 
towards heaven, including the usurious Enrico Scrovegni who offers up his chapel to the 
Madonna della Carita. She stands, as she does in almost all depictions of her in the Chapel, 
clothed in symbolic red, hand outstretched to receive Scrovegni's offering. Such parallel 
gestures as these, which re-enact in the narrative what has been figured in the allegory, 
are one of the main tokens of meaning within the fresco cycle's hermeneutic programme. 
Meaning in the Arena Chapel is formed through parallel, antithesis, comparison, reflection. 
The viewer is constantly pushed to shift between forms of interpretation, employing 
memory, intellect, jUdgement, imagination and indeed self-analysis to bring out meaning. 
By representing virtue both allegorically and as an active force within the narrative, Giotto 
brings an abstract concept to life while at the same time endowing a life's events with 
moral meaning. The Arena Chapel is fundamentally about the opposition of good and evil 
in salvation history. The virtues and vices stand facing their moral nemesis across the 
architectural space; in the narratives, virtue combats vice to bring about the salvation of 
mankind. 
7. Case Study: Stilnovo 
The poetry of the Stilnovo emerges from a rarefied and highly intellectual construction of 
the idea of human love and gives a poetic treatment of a concept of virtue which would 
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find an easy home within scholastic thought.166 But this poetry makes a link between the 
devotional texts considered thus far and the poetry of Dante's Com media to which we will 
soon turn. It is the immediate product of Dante's own circle and contains his own early 
poetic production. The way virtue is considered and represented in these texts is a 
presentation of Dante's own early poetic thoughts on the subject and ideas about how it 
could be represented. The aspect which the Stilnovo importantly adds to the question of 
virtue is that its attainment is made dependent on the experience of romantic love and 
that it is this love which connects man ultimately to God, that is, which fulfils his virtue. 
Furthermore, the Stilnovo poetry is a testament to the compulsion to write about this 
transforming experience, a compulsion which is certainly at home in reading the 
Com media. The poems are accounts of or inspired by personal meditative and 
transformative experiences, in which, by devotion to a beloved object, the lover comes to 
understand how she might lead him to God. Virtue comes to be represented through 
abstract consideration of the nature of virtue, personal storytelling, through meditative 
emotional engagement and through active allegories of virtue. 
The naturalness of the union between love and virtue is established as a principle of the 
stilnovo in the manifesto canzone 'AI cor gentil rempaira sempre amore' by Guido 
Guinizzelli (1235-1276),167 Here an abstract consideration ofthe nature of love and virtue 
is couched in nature-based metaphors, demonstrating the rightness of the combination of 
the virtuous heart and the sensation of love: 
Al cor gentil rimpaira sempre amore 
com'a la selva ausgello, J.lla verdura; 
ne fe' am or anti che gentile core, 
ne gentil core anti ch'amor, Natura. (1l.1-4) 
For love and the noble heart to be together is figured as part ofthe natural order of things. 
While the metaphor of the 'ausgello' compares love to an external object which enters into 
the heart, Guinizzelli's later metaphors reveal it to be closer to an internal potential: 
Foco d'amore in gentil cor s'aprende 
166 For a recent overview and bibliography on the poetry of the Stilnovo see: Luciano Rossi, 'Stilnovo', in 
Antologia della poesia italiana: Duecento, ed. by Cesare Segre e Carlo Ossola (Turin: Elnaudl, 1999), pp. 370·78; 
On Dante and the Stilnovo see: Teodolinda Barolinl, Dante's Poets: Text, Textuality and Truth in the 'Comedy' 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Barolinl, Dante and the Origins of Italian Literary Culture 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 23.101. 
167.0? Gui?izzelli see: Gianfranco Contini (ed.), Poeti del duecento, 2 vols (Milan: Ricciardi, 1960). Dante and 
GUln\zzelh see: Rinaldina Russell, 'Guinizzelli', In The Dante Encyclopedia, pp. 465.66. Citations of 'AI cor gentil' 
come from Antologia della poesia italiana: Duecento ed. by Cesare Segre and Carlo Ossola, pp. 385.88. 
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anti che'l solla facia gentil co sa. (11.11-14) 
Love is a potential, indeed a vertute of the soul waiting to be activated by the stella-
beloved, only after, however, being purified by the sun. Like virtue, love appears as both 
the potential for perfection and the perfection itself. The concept of love as a potential of 
the soul is taken up by Dante himself in 'Amor e '1 cor gentil son una cosa' which openly 
echoes Guinizzelli's earlier poem, but focuses on the love-virtue interaction personified by 
man's interaction with woman. Love that lies dormant in the noble heart of the man is 
awaiting activation by the sight of a worthy beloved: 'Bieltate appare in saggia donna pui, 
/ che piace a Ii occhi sl, che dentro al core / nasce un disio de la cos a piacente' (VN, 20, 
sonnet, 11.9-11). Both these poems employ the Aristotelian concepts of potential and act, 
but place them in tangible expressions. Love is the process by which the natural potential 
for perfection of a soul, virtue, is brought to that perfection; it is the act by which man is 
perfected. Love and virtue are gifts from God and through these man can return to him. 
Branca writes that 'L'amore e dunque il piu alto dei doni largiti da Dio al1'uomo, sintesi 
armonica di tutte Ie virtute e di tutte Ie capacita umane: e Dio 10 pone come un bene in 
potenza in ogni anima virtuosa che sia degna di questo dono altissimo e sappia usarne piu 
nobilmente, cio in ogni cor gentile'.168 The coming together of love and virtue is an 
interaction and the poetry of the stilnovo figures this ontological and ethical interaction 
through the relationship of male and female. 
Dante's canzone 'DogJia mi reca', while couching in its poetics a profound philosophical 
account of the nature of virtue, establishes an idea of the role of women in human love. 
Dante is here constructing a dialogue addressed to women and ostensibly about female 
beauty, to also make a comment on male virtue and the lack thereof. In addressing and 
indeed criticising women for the bestowal of their beauty on unworthy men, Dante is 
bringing his female and male audience directly into the situations he is considering, 
making them self-conscious, active participants; he is narrating their reality and holding it 
up as a mirror in which his audience can see the moral and metaphysical significances 
which underlie their human relationships. 
la belta ch' Amore in voi consente, 
a vertu solamente 
formata fu dal suo decreto antico, 
168 1 rimatori del Dolce Stil Novo, ed. by Vittorio Branca (Milan: Societa editrice Dante Alighierl, 1965), p. 6. 
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10 dieo a voi che siete innamorate 
che, se vertute a noi 
fu data, e belta a voi, 
e a costui di due potere un fare, 
voi non dovreste amare, 
rna coprir quanto di bilta v'e data, 
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poi che non c'e vertu, ch'era suo segno. (1l.7 -17)169 
Dante here also introduces the dynamic of beauty into the love-virtue interaction. Man, 
having distanced himself from virtue (love ultimately directed to God) is no longer to be 
granted the sight of female beauty as beauty joined to the un-virtuous man can only breed 
carnal desire, not love. The man without virtue has in fact forfeited his humanity and 
descended to the level of the beast as Dante suggests in the simile, 'Omo da se vertu fatto 
ha lontana; / omo no, mala bestia ch'om simiglia' (1l.22-23). The man without virtue 
cannot be improved by female beauty because he lacks the potential to move towards the 
ultimate good to which the union of beauty and virtue through love would lead him. The 
virtuous man, instead, would desire the beautiful woman primarily as she was 
demonstrative of a higher spiritual reality, or rather as a manifestation of the blessing of 
God on earth. 
What then is the role of physical beauty in the process of ethical and ontological 
transformation? As we have considered earlier, the role of the physical image is to draw 
the mind of the viewer towards the deeper reality which lies beneath it. The stilnovisti 
transpose this idea of metaphysical significance into the realm of romantic experience and 
by doing so validate that experience as spiritually transformative. In the case of a beautiful 
image, this image actively engages the desire of the viewer to want to see more and is thus 
a more effective and active revelation. Eco, citing William of Auvergne, writes that 
'sensuous beauty is that which pleases him who sees it [ ... ] interior beauty is that which 
gives pleasure to the soul which grasps it Hand entices the soul to love it .... 170 Sensual 
beauty has the role of drawing the desires towards the spiritual beauty beneath. But 
beauty itself is revealing of an ethical harmony and perfection underlying it; beauty is an 
169 Dante, Rime, ed. by Gianfranco Contini (Turin: Einaudl, 1995). 
170 Eco, Art and Beauty, p. 22. 
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expression of morality and morality is an expression of beauty.171 Beauty like virtue is an 
expression of ontological perfection.172 
Bearing this in mind, the beauty of a beloved lady, who has activated the virtuous love of a 
man, then serves to draw him towards a greater reality beyond the physical through his 
desire for her. By the revelation of her beauty she actualises the potential of the noble 
heart which, however noble it might be, without feeling love would remain static and 
unfulfilled. Branca points out that 'senza di lei la perfezione che sviluppa amore nelle 
anime resta potenziale ed oscura, senza di lei il dono di Dio e vano'.173 Again it is through 
interaction that virtue is brought about; in this case beauty, the presence of the attractive 
physical image, is what impels virtue's development. This construction makes romantic 
attachment integral to the development of virtue in the thinking of the stilnovisti. 
This presentation of the beloved woman as the manifestation of heaven for the lover on 
earth and the one through whom he can receive salvation is the resounding note of both 
Guinizzelli's 'AI cor gentil' and Dante's 'Donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore', the canzone 
which in Dante's own Puryatorio is identified as the exemplary work of the Stilnovo. Both 
poems include a supernatural dialogue either between the poet and God, or the angels and 
God, and both posit the beloved woman as a heavenly presence on earth. Dante's 
treatment, however, goes beyond that of Guinizzelli. While Guinizzelli excuses his 
apparently blasphemous adoration of his lady by claiming she '[t]enne d'angel sembianza / 
che fosse del Tuo regno' (1l.58-59), Dante instead has his God say that his lady is 
miraculous: 
'Diletti miei, or sofferite in pace 
che vostra spene sia quanto mi piace 
la Ve alcun che perder lei s'attende, 
e che dira nello inferno: 0 mal nati, 
io vidi la speranza de' beati'. (VN 19, canzone, 1l.24-28) 
The beauty which the lady possesses can in fact be read as a manifestation of the 
ontological and moral perfection of heaven, as her beauty demonstrates her as the perfect 
manifestation of God's creative virtue; a physical image which fully reveals God and an 
image which can return man to God through his desire for it. By fictionalising this 
heavenly dialogue Dante is not only exploring the metaphysical nuances which underlie 
171 Eco,Art and Beauty, p. 5. 
172 Eco, The Aesthetics a/Thomas Aquinas, p. 203. 
173 Branca, p. 6. 
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his romantic poetic encounter but also validating that encounter. His reference here to the 
overwhelming blessing of the vision of the lady which would show hope even to those in 
Hell is a prefiguration of the descent which his Beatrice will make in Inferno II. 
Love, virtue and the lady are established as the steps by which man returns to God. These 
spiritual steps are figured in the movements of these three figures personified in Dante's 
'Doglia mi reca'. 
Vertute, al suo fattor sempre sottana, 
lui obedisce e a lui acquista onore, 
donne, tanto che Amore 
la segna d'eccellente sua famiglia 
ne la beata corte: 
lietamente esce da Ie belle porte, 
a la sua donna torna; 
lieta va e soggiorna, 
lietamente ovra suo gran vassallaggio; 
per 10 corto vlaggio 
conserva, adorna, accresce cio che trova; 
Morte repugna s1 che lei non cura. 
D cara ancella e pura, 
colt'hai nel del misura; 
tu sol fai segnore, e quest'e prova 
che tu se' possession che sempre giova. (11.27-42) 
Virtue is the handmaiden of her Creator and is sent out into the world from her heavenly 
home to join with her lady. This allegorised journey holds within it the essential nature of 
virtue; it is a divine gift which comes from and ultimately returns to God; it is an eternal 
quality which has heaven as its 'measure' and aim and by its eternity is always a bringer of 
joy to its possessor. What is striking in Dante's description is the joy which underpins the 
whole dynamic of virtue as established by the repetition of 'lieta' and 'lietamente' three 
times at the opening of lines and the final verb of the citation 'giova'. By personifying and 
therefore endowing with emotion the quality of virtue, the poet captures the essence of 
the dynamic which makes virtue effective; it is what brings the joyful lover to the 
fulfilment of his lady, what brings the joyful creature to the joyful Creator. 
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While the poetry of the Stilnovo claims itself as the product of personal experience, it is 
also characterised by a careful objectification of that subjective experience so that, as 
Branca writes, 'l'ineffabile diventa intelleggibile'.174 The poets of the Stilnovo including 
Guinizzelli, Cavalcanti and Dante himself, are eager to explore, demonstrate and indeed 
construct the intricacies of their sentimental experience in order to produce a specific 
message about self-development and moral change; that, although seemingly 
contradictory, romantic love can be virtuous and therefore the most powerful vehicle by 
which man returns to God. Their originality of style emerges from their claimed originality 
of sentimental and ethical experience.17S At least for Guinizzelli and Dante, love is no 
longer the agonising, formulaic undertaking of the courtly love poets but is instead 
spiritually and poetically trans formative; indeed it is a quasi-religious experience in which 
the man's human virtue, that is potential to be directed towards God, is activated by the 
desire for a woman who is in herself not a distraction from God but rather a way towards 
him. The movement towards God through virtue love and beauty is characterised by joy. 
Virtue is represented as presented (or denied) in every human romantic encounter, 
bringing it directly into the forum of human experience. This rarefied treatment of love 
and virtue is possible because of the context of writers and readers who make up the 
Stilnovo; that is, they are one and the same. And yet, in the representative techniques 
which make the experience and result of love tangible - direct address, personification, 
personal testimony - there is a commitment to communication, clarification and, most 
importantly, vivification of the love-virtue dynamic. 
8. Conclusion 
Representations of virtue, as we have seen, are concerned with the tangibility and 
comprehensibility of the idea. The consideration of representations acknowledges that the 
meaning of a text comes not only from what it says but from how it says it and why it 
might say it that way. The transformation of abstracted Aristotelian virtue into the realm 
of an active process for self-improvement for his followers was part of Giordano da Pisa's 
Dominican preaching principles. Virtue was represented as a process of developing 
intellectual control in which the subject became master of him or herself by training in 
habits of thought and these lessons were vital to Giordano's listening audience's own 
spiritual welfare. In contrast, the works produced within the Franciscan environment, 
closely identifying virtue with the imitation of Christ, represented virtue in such a way 
that the subject was led to desire, empathise and to some extent actively become the 
174 Branca, p. 4. 
175 BaroHnl, Dante's Poets, p. 42. 
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virtuous events to which they bore witness. Through meditation, in which the subject 
becomes the object of thought, the emotions and will are engaged in such a way as to 
necessitate their participation. Virtue here is shown rather than taught. These texts work 
on the devoted, literate believer who seeks to further progress towards his or her God. 
Franciscan stories provided clear and concrete examples of virtue within a context which 
was realistic and recognisable to their more wide-reaching audience, and in this way were 
able to impress on that audience their own responsibility and autonomy of action to act in 
the here and now. The representation of virtue allegorically is both inspired by an abstract 
conceptual understanding of virtue while at the same time forming the language in which 
those concepts are expressed. There is a close interaction of concept and image in which 
the allegorical images chosen come themselves to conceptualise and form our idea of the 
abstract. At some point we become unable to conceive of the abstract without the 
allegorical. 
The two final case studies pave the way for the combination of genres and representations 
which make up the Commedia's own presentation of virtue. They place the audience at the 
centre of the artistic or literary experience and this experience itself is constructed in 
order to be one of moral transformation. The cohesive world of the Arena chapel, in which 
all elements must be read in relation to each other, is a useful model to prepare us for a 
way of reading the vast construct which is the Commedia. The poetry of the stilnovo 
validates the romantic experience in relation to virtue and gives voice to Dante's own early 
connection of personal transformation in virtue to a personal vision of God. With this in 
mind we can now turn to the Com media itself. 
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Transitions: From the Traditions to Dante 
From my analysis of the traditions of conceiving and representing virtue which 
contextualise Dante's work, I have identified a series of foundational aspects, the 
consideration of which will enable me to engage most fully with the significance of virtue 
in the Commedia. These aspects involve a synthesising of the issues relative to both 
conception and representation in order to demonstrate the essential interconnectedness 
of the two approaches within Dante's creative work. The focal idea is that virtue is a 
principle of interaction. It is the principle through which the divine and human interact 
when this interaction is understood as ontological: through virtue God creates, while 
virtue is also the potential for perfection within individualised human nature. The choice 
to fulfil his nature is man's response to the offer of creation and is an enactment of the 
ontological movement towards the divine. This movement is figured most tangibly in the 
tradition of imitatio Christi, in which the individual imitating Christ's virtues is developing 
in likeness to the divine. An understanding of virtue is dependent on an understanding of 
human nature, just as it is dependent on an understanding of the ontological interaction at 
the basis of human existence . 
. Virtue is also a principle of ethical interaction. It is that which determines man's active and 
positive interrelation between himself, God and the created world. How this interaction 
ought to take place was one of the principal concerns of texts both conceiving and 
representing virtue, being virtue's more practical aspect. This positive ethical interaction 
was dependent very much on a focusing of desire and attention upon the proper object of 
man's existence, God. This focused desire then ordered man's interactions within the 
created world. Virtue, being the form in which the mind and will are focused and 
compelled towards God, takes on a central role in man's ethical movement towards God 
and his distancing from the distracting desires and contingent changeability of the world. 
To enable man to see, judge and act correctly towards objects of desire is the principal role 
of ethical virtue. Texts in which virtue was represented were also concerned with the 
modes of interaction by which virtue could be learned and demonstrated. Virtue is learned 
through intellectual and emotional interactions which are frequently focused through 
interaction with, or exemplified by, another individual. Often this is Christ, the ultimate 
exemplum. Loving God, and the way that love could and ought to be expressed, appeared 
as part of the purpose of representative texts. They demonstrated how the relationship of 
God and man could be activated and formalised. Exemplary individuals reveal more 
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clearly their relationship to God and thus reveal the divine hand working behind human 
action. Virtue in representational texts appeared as a principle of interaction, which those 
texts were concerned both to consider conceptually and represent as a practical ethical 
guide. 
Essential to this ethical guidance is the establishment of the individual person as the locus 
of virtue. Virtue is a character-based ethics being concerned with how a person's character 
is both expressed and formed by the actions he or she personally undertakes and the 
'stato d'anima' in which he or she undertakes them. Because the development of virtue is 
concerned with the moral and ontological transformation of the individual, his or her 
personal experiences come to playa central role as that through which, by a combination 
of action and self-reflection, the individual comes to develop. This factor contributes to the 
tradition of presenting the development of virtue through the experiences of an individual 
character. This practical, representational aspect is also significant to the metaphysical 
currents which underpin notions of virtue. From an ontological point of view, divine virtue 
creates man as a unique individual with his own capacities as well as his own 
responsibility to work towards his salvation through self-fulfilment. Underlying this is the 
necessity for the individual's personal interaction with their Creator. The individual and 
his experiences are thus both a significant metaphysical expression and a tangible ethical 
model in virtue-based texts. 
There is a conceptual linking point for all of the above issues. which will underpin my 
subsequent analysis, and which really demonstrates the importance of reading virtue as a 
union of idea and expression, of ontology and ethics. Because virtue exists at the nexus of 
human and divine nature, of being and doing, of form and content, its most profound 
exemplum in Christian thought is Christ who is himself both definition and representation; 
Christ who both is virtue and demonstrates virtue. Christ stands as a communicative 
bridge at the meeting point of the inexpressible idea of God and the necessary expression 
of humanity, bringing about the positive relationship of one with the other. Placing Christ 
at the centre of an understanding of virtue validates, indeed necessitates, an 
'incarnational' reading of the Commedia. I mean here not simply a focus upon the 
Commedia's treatment of the Incarnation or even of the figure of Christ, but rather an 
analysis of the mechanics of incarnating the idea of virtue, how the word becomes flesh. 
Christ is incarnated virtue; the Commedia is likewise an incarnation of virtue both human 




My analysis of virtue in the Com media will build from the ideas on virtue which have been 
revealed in these first two chapters. I will argue that the poem presents a much more 
complex understanding and usage of virtue than has thus far been explored in scholarship. 
It is a usage which finds significant echoes in the conceptual and representational texts 
considered so far; without the consideration of these text such echoes would not have 
become fully evident. The Commedia presents virtue's ontological and ethical aspects as 
essentially connected, suggesting that the actions of human life are what enable man to 
enter into the ontological dialogue which takes him towards his God. Virtue is not simply a 
structuring principle of the terraces of Purgatory or the heavenly spheres, but is 
fundamental to the poem's treatment of human existence, salvation and creation. Dante 
uses virtue to refer to the power of all things, including man, and to refer to the creative 
power of God. By doing so he places human nature within an order of existence; human 
action can then be shown to participate in that order. Man is not isolated or autonomous 
but is constantly interacting with God and the world around him. These interactions are 
not only considered abstractly but are manifested and demonstrated in the interactions 
which make up the Commedia's narrative drama. I suggested in my introduction that the 
English word virtue, and our contemporary understanding of its meaning, narrowed our 
expectations of how Dante actually uses the term. So, in my analysis of the Com media, I 
will maintain the Italian virtu in order to highlight the freshness and maintain the 
complexity of the concept I have established; to acknowledge that Dante's use of virtu is 
distinct and that the multiplicity of interconnected contexts in which he employs the term 
is highly original. To help further in the analysis of Dante's complex construction of the 
nature, role and results of virtu, I will develop the term 'virtu-dynamic' in order to 
highlight Dante's idea of virtu as one which is active and interactive, a living principle and 
a principle of living. What I have termed the virtu-dynamic in the Commedia is that 
through which, I suggest, Dante fundamentally connects ethics and ontology; human 
behaviour is and ought to be an expression of man's ontological condition. This ontological 
condition is one of being created through virtu. The created condition of the human 
individual is linked, through the virtu-dynamic, to the createdness of the whole universe, 
so that the human must be read within that universal order. Man's positive ethical 
fulfilment becomes an expression of his position within that order. Through the virtu-
dynamic, human action and desire is ordered in relation to man's desire for a return to the 
source of that existential order, God. Through the development of his own virtu, which has 
God as the ultimate goal of actions and desires, he comes to value and use the world 
correctly. However, because his action and existence are connected by Dante through the 
virtu-dynamic to the being of God himself, human action and desire are interactive. The 
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virtu-dynamic suggests that God reaches down to man as much as man reaches up to God; 
this interaction takes place through creation and revelation. 
Purgatorio XXV 
As we will come to see, if we focus upon actual uses of the term virtu in the poem, the 
Commedia itself necessitates a reading which connects the ontological and the ethical, 
which sees human creation and action as constantly related to its Creator. This becomes 
apparent in turning to one of the many episodes in the poem in which the term virtu 
appears frequently: Purgatorio XXV.176 In beginning with a brief case study focused on this 
canto, the complexity of the Com media's presentation of virtu will begin to be apparent 
and this analysis will help establish the methodology of the final three chapters of this 
thesis. In Purgatorio XXV the term is used respectively to denote distinct but fully 
interconnected ideas in the canto's presentation of the formation of the human being. 
Statius's response to the pilgrim's question posed at the start of the canto, how can souls 
which have no need of food be thin?, covers the human soul's formation and then 
reformation in the realms of the afterlife. His argument, then, is very much concerned with 
the question of representation; within the narrative of the text he provides the explanation 
for the appearance of the souls but we might also read his discourse as relevant to the 
poet's own process of recreation and representation. The poet reforms and manifests the 
soul into the virtual substance of his poetry. 
This canto includes seven uses ofthe term virtu. The fact that the term is so frequent here, 
in a discourse on the generation and creation of the human soul, implies that it is for the 
poet a central force within these events. Patrick Gardner in his analysis of this canto has 
pointed out that virtu is not 'a material part of [ ... ] substance, but is properly called a 
motion'.177 As will become apparent, virtu is a dynamic principle within this passage which 
expresses active change and interaction. What we will come to see as significant are the 
changing nuances of the word which conceive a precise process of the interactions 
relevant to human creation, both in life and the afterlife. 
176 For readings of Purgatorio XXV see: Patrick Meredith Gardner, 'Dante and the Suffering Soul' (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2009); SergiO Cristaldi, 'Potenza e atto della poesia', in Esperimenti 
danteschi: Purgatorio, ed. by Gian Carlo Alessio, Benedetta Quadrio et al. (Genoa and Milan: Marietti, 2010), pp. 
253-71; Ernesto Travl, '1\ tema del corpo nella Divina Commedia',ln II corpo in scena, ed. by Virgilio Melchiorre 
and Annamaria C.ascetta (~i1an: Universita cattolica, 1983), pp. 197-223. The question of how Dante conceives 
the bo~y-soul unton, a tOpiC often considered in relation to this passage, Is not the Immediate concern of my 
analYSIS. For an up to date bibliography on this Issue see Manuele Gragnolatl, Experiencing the Afterlife and 
Marc Cogan, The Design in the Wax. 
177 Gardner, p.147. 
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The first three uses of the word in Purgatorio XXV characterize virtu as an informing 
power, that which actively shapes the limbs and then the soul of the new foetus. This 
'virtute informativa' (41) or 'virtute attiva' (52) is 'virtu ch'e dal cor del generante' (59). 
Informing virtu originates with the father's blood which, on being transferred to the 
mother's womb, begins to form the body and primitive soul of the new baby. It is virtu 
which makes and forms and is at this stage a feature of the natural, generative process; 
what Singleton terms the 'process of becoming'.178 However, in the shift from describing 
the natural generation of the human to describing the divine 'breathing in' of the rational, 
human soul, Statius again uses the term 'vertu' to mean the power of the soul, only this 
time it is in reference to the supranatural power which makes up the soul that is brought 
into being directly by God: 
[ ... ] s1 tosto come al feto 
l'articular del cerebro e perfetto, 
10 Motor primo a lui si volge, lieto 
sovra tant'arte di natura, e spira 
spirito novo, di vertu repleto, 
che cio che trova attivo quivi tira 
in sua sustanzia, e fassi un'alma sola, 
che vive e sente e Sf in se rigira. (Purg. XXV.68-75) 
The implied meaning of virtu then has shifted from a materially based power to the 
informing power of God which endows the soul with consciousness. This giving on the 
part of God is characterised as joyful: at the centre of the soul's creation is an act of loving 
joy. In the metaphysical and linguistic interaction expressed by 'spira', 'tira' and 'rigira', 
giving, drawing in and self-reflecting in a circular pattern, the new God-given spirit draws 
the primitive soul into its own substance to the extent that it finds that soul responsive, 
'attivo'. In this way the passage casts the coming into being of the human soul as a positive 
interaction on both sides and this coincides with the point at which the soul becomes self-
conscious. Divine virtu makes of the primitive soul a single soul, but also jOins itself with 
that soul making the moment of creation of the human soul a moment of blending, of 
union of human and divine virtu, possible because of willing interaction on both sides. 
Such a reading is backed up by the next instance of the term in the canto, as Statius moves 
on to how the soul moves out of the physical body and into the aerial one: Ie in virtute / ne 
porta seco e I'umano e divino' (BO-B1). The soul's virtute is what contain its humanity and 
178 Singleton, Journey to Beatrice, p. 45. 
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divinity and is that through which it reinstantiates itself in an airy body of the afterlife. 
The virtu informativa now shows itself to be a supra-physical quality which not only 
informs matter but reforms the immaterial soul: 'la virtu formativa raggia intorno / cos} e 
quanto ne Ie membre vive' (89-90). Thus, in fact, what Dante the pilgrim can see in his 
journey through the realms of the afterlife is the very virtu of the souls and their 
createdness. Virtu is no longer simply an attribute, a positive characteristic, but instead 
that which manifests the soul's very existence, both forming it in the temporal life and 
reforming it in the eternal, and manifesting the divine-human relationship which is at its 
origin. It is the very substance of the soul's ontological dependency and individuality, its 
relationship as creature to Creator. 
The final instance of virtu in canto XXV throws into perspective its intensely complex 
meaning at this point and shifts from virtu as a principle of ontological interaction, to virtu 
as a principle of ethical interaction. Following a dialogue acutely concerned with the 
moment of human individual creation which joins man and God, the final appearance of 
the term 'virtute' is in reference to the specific virtu of chastity. The souls of the lustful, 
singing their exempla, sing of 'donne [ ... ] e mariti che fuor casti, / come virtute e 
matrimonio imponne' (133-35). It is unimaginable that in the dialogue in the Commedia 
most acutely focused upon the physical union of man and woman and upon human 
generation, that this emphasis is not retrospective and does not invite us to reinterpret 
our understanding of virtu here, in the light of the way virtu has been presented in the 
canto thus far. Virtu is the souls' very existence as created by God, which has endowed 
them with the potential for perfection. This is what virtu imposes on the souls; the 
responsibility to fulfil potential. The virtu of chastity is concerned with the non-wasting of 
human generative power and with the recognition of the combined generation and 
creation that takes place at human conception and the consequent formation of the human 
soul. It is the moment at which the human creature is given the potential to come into 
dialogue with God, the moment at which the relationship between human and divine virtu 
is activated. This instance of the term virtu relates specifically to man's relationship to and 
interaction with the world and the way that interaction must be carried out, while its 
context serves to demonstrate the intrinsic interconnectedness of ontology and ethics in 
the poet's treatment of virtu. These are notions which appeared in the conceptual and 
representational traditions. Here Dante, by layering different issues surrounding virtu 
together, demonstrates their fundamental interconnectedness in his thinking, as well as 
vivifying the issues within the dramatic context. 
This canto and its immediate context suggest two more points about Dante's thinking on 
virtu which further demonstrate the scope and relevance of the idea in the Commedia. 
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Firstly, canto XXV stands between two cantos concerned with Dante as a poet and his 
poetic development. As canto XXV considers the generation and creation of the human 
soul, so cantos XXIV and XXVI consider the generation of Dante as a poet. In canto XXV, the 
verb 'spira' is the action by which divine virtu, impelled by God's joy, enters into the 
developing soul and makes it human and self-conscious, indeed makes it into a 'fante' (61), 
a speaking being. In canto XXIV, 'spira' is the action of love entering into the poet and 
making him speak: 'I' mi son un che, quando / Amor mi spira, noto, e a quel modo / ch'e' 
ditta dentro vo significando' (52-54). We find here parallel motivations and actions. Just as 
'love' breathes into the individual poet the power to speak, the power to express himself 
as human, so God breathes the same power into the new soul. The interaction of love, virtu 
and expression, we will see, continues to be central in Dante's thinking. Secondly, canto 
XXV, in certain aspects of its imagery, recalls the Incarnation of Christ. The concern of the 
canto overall, the incarnation of the soul, is itself a recalling of this exemplum of 
incarnation. Furthermore, in the simile, which Statius uses to aid the pilgrim's 
understanding of how the soul's nature transforms, he employs the image of grape juice 
turning into wine through the action of the sun. If we consider the image in detail, it is the 
sun itself which becomes the new substance, wine, when it joins with the juices of the 
grape: 'guarda il calor del sol che si fa vino, / giunto a l'omor che de la vite cola' (77-78). 
The image conveys how the immaterial heat of the sun, a symbol for the divine, transforms 
its substance without losing its nature to become a manifested being. Just as in the 
Incarnation, God, joining with matter, does not lose his proper nature but rather forms a 
new one. Furthermore, as Christian Moevs has argued, images of the rainbow in the 
Commedia, such as that which appears in lines 91-93, make a striking allusion to the 
Incarnation itself.179 Immaterial light, shining through water and not destroying it but 
transforming it into a visible manifestation of its invisible nature, recalls very much the 
action of the divine spirit working on perfect matter to produce the visible manifestation 
of God himself, Christ. Thus we find two images in this canto concerned with the 
manifestation of virtu, which recall the ultimate manifestation of divine virtu, the 
Incarnation of Christ. 
My analysis thus far has demonstrated that, conceptually speaking, the Commedia 
establishes virtu as the central force behind human creation by God and as that which 
manifests the result of that relationship both in the temporal and after life. Virtu is 
revealed to be that which becomes physical, which becomes incarnate in the afterlife, and 
it is this incarnation itself which is worked upon in the soul's punishment or movement 
towards God. Furthermore, this conceptual presentation of virtu, having itself a strong 
179 Christi~n Moevs, 'Rainbows and Incarnation In Dante', paper delivered at 'Reviewing Dante's Theology: A 
Workshop, hosted by the Leeds Centre for Dante Studies, 27th-28th March 2009. 
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emphasis on manifestation, is framed by and expressed through images representing the 
manifestation of the invisible. The Commedia's poetry itself becomes the visible 
manifestation of the inspiration of love, just as Christ became the visible manifestation of 
God's love for man. It is precisely virtu which stands at the meeting point of power and 
manifestation, of inspiration and expression, of generation and creation, in the Com media's 
conceptual and figurative economy. The notion of virtu apparent in Pur9atorio XXV both 
significantly recalls and develops from issues which appeared in Chapters One and Two. 
In the light of these insights I will now turn to consider three aspects of the Commedia in 
which the poet's vivification of virtu is explored and developed. The first will build upon 
my analysis of Pur9atorio XXV and consider what role the poet establishes for virtu in the 
acts of creation and incarnation, manifestation and perfection. This will consider how he 
conceives the role virtu plays in the creation of the universe, its role in the re-
manifestation and perfection of the souls, and the relation ofthe Incarnation to both ofthe 
above aspects. The following chapter will turn to the question of interaction between man, 
God and the created world, to question how the poet represents different forms and 
outcomes of the human-divine virtu interaction which correspond to different degrees of 
the soul's perfection. Finally, I will consider what role Dante allots to virtu in his own 
development, both as the figure of the pilgrim and as the figure of the poet. 
Ruth Chester 
3. Creative Virtu: Virtu's Role in the Formation of the 
Universe and the Perfection of Man in the Commedia 
1. Introduction 
As we have seen, virtue, in the conceptual and representational traditions, is intimately 
connected to creation. Firstly, in the theological traditions originating in the Bible and 
reiterated by Augustine and Aquinas, virtue is the creative principle of God activated 
through the agency of the Logos. This agent himself is the 'virtute dei'. Virtue stands 
conceptually at the very root cause of creation itself. Secondly, virtue plays a vital part in 
the workings of that created universe. Each created thing, including man, has its own 
proper virtue to fulfil and act on. We will come to see in the Com media that it is in the 
fulfilment of virtu that a created thing locates itself within the great order of being. 
Thirdly, in Christian thought the fulfilment of human virtue was made entirely dependent 
upon an individual's relationship to God and so through virtue the creature comes to be 
conscious of its relationship with its Creator. Fourthly, it became apparent that virtue is 
what guides man's interaction with the created world; in focusing man's love upon God, 
virtue orders man's actions in the world towards their supranatural end. In 
representational terms, virtue is frequently figured through physical, created things; one 
might recall the allegorical tree of Bonaventure's Lignum Vitae or the personified exempla 
of virtue in the hagiographical tradition. The metaphysical nature of virtue came to be 
expressed and explored through physical examples. 
In the Commedia, Dante continues to use, and significantly develops, the relation between 
virtu and creation. Within the creative poem he uses the ideas of creation and desire found 
in the tradition but considers them through a portrayal of material creation; virtu is 
explored in relation to the cosmos, the natural world and the human individual. By 
exploring the metaphysical through the physical, the poet constructs virtu as a force which 
is common to all elements of creation and presents creation as all part of a universal plan. 
The Com media suggests that ifthe creature gazes with sufficient and correct intention into 
creation, then the Creator becomes literally visible. By focusing on the presence of virtu in 
creation, the poet is stressing the possibilities offered by createdness itself. By being 
created, man enters into an order of creation; an order which facilitates a positive 
relationship between creation and its Creator and provides the opportunity for 
communication ofthe one with the other. In their physical state, humans can only perceive 
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the metaphysical through the physical. The physical, therefore, becomes a channel for 
understanding; this channel, however, is offered to humankind in its own creation. 
My analysis of creative virtu in the Com media will span not only how the poet presents 
virtu in relation to universal and natural creation, but also the role he allots to virtu in the 
recreation of the souls in his own created afterlife. By identifying virtu both as that which 
individualises creation in the 'real' world and as that which reforms the soul in the next, 
Dante is drawing a parallel between the possibilities offered by reformation in Purgatory, 
and the possibilities for salvation offered by created, instantiated existence itself. The 
interactions by which God aids man in his own perfection in Purgatory become a parallel 
to the interactions that are part of creation and which God offers to man in temporal life. 
What emerges is a sense of the possibilities offered by temporal existence and the power 
and responsibility man has to respond to them. 
I will begin my analysis with a consideration of how Dante presents virtu's role in 
universal creation through an analysis of the cantos of the Primo Mobile and Paradiso II. 
Here Dante casts virtu as the individualising principle within creation, which is then 
proper to each created entity; thus creation is simultaneously united by a common ground 
and individualised into distinct natures. Paradiso II explores how the pilgrim can come to 
understand this simultaneous unity and multiplicity by placing his own embodied 
existence within the order of the universe. This discourse is fundamentally underpinned 
by questions of Incarnation. I will then turn to the Earthly Paradise which, I will argue, 
Dante presents as the most perfect expression of natural creation, being in direct contact 
with the source of its existence. I will suggest that the poet constructs the perfectly 
balanced natural state found in Eden as analogous to the state of the reformed soul who 
has arrived there. The discussion will then move to consider the role Dante allots to virtu 
within the formation and punishment of the souls in Purgatory, focusing specifically on 
Puroatorio III and XXIII. Here virtu becomes the dynamic of recreation through which 
divine will offers and facilitates the opportunity for the purgating souls to perfect 
themselves specifically through an understanding and imitation of the incarnate Christ. In 
this respect, creation, manifestation, incarnation and revelation become closely connected 
in Dante's thought. 
2. Creation through Virtu 
As became apparent in Chapter One, Christian thought conceives creation as a hierarchy of 
being which has its source and ground in God. Divine virtu is God's power exercised to 
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bring this creation into being. Virtu is also proper to every created being as the power it 
has to perfect its own nature. In Dante's work, virtu is emphasised as that which makes 
distinction and individuality in the universe. Virtu is that by which a being is endowed 
with its distinct nature within the cosmos and it is simultaneously the power a being has 
to be distinctly itself through the active perfection of its own nature; it is the interactive 
force by which an individual is generated and it is also the power through which that 
individual expresses and fulfils his individuality. Once in the human sphere, however, 
along with distinct nature comes the idea that to fulfil human nature is to develop in 
'likeness to God'. Virtu is then at once that through which God creates and the quality by 
which man fulfils himself in order to onto logically move towards the complete being of 
God. This dynamic is apparent both in Dante's consideration of creation and the 
generation of distinction in the universe, and within the concept of his own realms of the 
afterlife in which virtu is that which reforms the souls, enabling them to carry out their 
fulfilment. Dante expresses this fulfilment as taking place through a necessary interaction 
with and imitation of Christ. Individuality is central to Dante's thought; as Barolini has 
pointed out, 'Dante's view of the universe requires the many, in the same way that his 
incarnational poetics with its trademark investment in the irreducible historicity of the 
individual is dependent on multiplicity'.180 Underpinning both Dante's conception of the 
universe and the existence of the individual is a dynamic of virtu. My analysis will explore 
how the universal creation is related to the individual, how each is located in relation to 
the other. It will become apparent that the Incarnation acts as the event through which 
this relationship can be both understood and brought to fruition. 
At the heart of Dante's idea of creation is unity in distinction.18l Creation as a process 
which involved all three persons of the Trinity is an idea which appears not least in the 
works of Augustine and Aquinas. 'Virtus creandi', according to Aquinas, is common to all 
three persons, but occurs in an order ofprecendence: 
Unde Creatorem esse attribuitur Patri, ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. 
De Filio autem dicitur per quem omnia facta sunt, inquantum habet eamdem 
virtu tern, sed ab alio, nam haec praepositio 'per' solet denotare causam mediam, 
sive principium de principio. Sed Spiritu Sancto, qui habet eamdem virtutem ab 
180 Teodolinda Barolini, The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992), p.173. 
181 For useful considerations of creation In Dante see: Piero Boitani's 'The Poetry and Poetics of the Creation', 
in Dante's 'Commedia': Theology as Poetry, ed. by Vittorio Montemaggl and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame,IN: 
Unive~s!ty of N0t:e, Dame Press, 2010), pp. 95·130; also Moevs' chapter on creation in The Metaphysics o{ 
Dante s Commedw, pp. 107·46; Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, Medieval Cultural Tradition In Dante's 'Comedy' 
(Ithaca, N.~: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp.133·73; also see Attilio Mel10ne entry, 'Creazione', in 
Enclclopedla dantesca. 6 vols (Rome: Istituto della Encic10pedia italiana, 1970·1976), II (1970), pp. 251.53. 
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utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet et vivificet quae sunt creata a Patre 
per Filium. (ST 1a,46,6) 
At the centre of creation is an interaction between three persons who are essentially one. 
Each has a distinct function but a unified end. Dante explores this idea himself in the 
Com media, transforming this theoretical interaction into living poetics. So at the opening 
of Paradiso X, the order of the universe is made by Trinitarian interaction: 'Guardando nel 
suo Figlio con l'Amore / che l'uno e l'altro etternalmente spira, / 10 primo e ineffabiIe 
Valore' (Par. X.1-3). However, in Paradiso XIII all of created existence comes from the 
loving interaction of the three persons: 'non e se non splendor di quella idea / che 
partorisce, amando, iI nostro Sire' (53-54). At the centre of creation then is a relationship, 
the perfect expression of distinction in unity. And the mode of that relationship - loving, 
looking - brings into being that through which the relationship itself is revealed: creation. 
The act of creation is relational but within that relationship the three persons have distinct 
roles and it is that of the second person, the Logos, which is of particular relevance here. 
Pelikan has suggested that in medieval thought '[t]he function of the Logos was to be "the 
simple and the multiple and most principal reason of all things .... 182 In Dante's conception 
of the universe, both physically and metaphysically, the initiator of distinction in that 
universe is the Primo Mobile or, as Moevs expresses it, 'the nexus between pure being and 
the differentiation of being into identity'.183 The Primo Mobile performs the function of 
transmitting and distinguishing the pure being which exists in God into the created 
universe. It is simultaneously the start and end point of existence, bringing identity into 
being and acting as the final goal of the world's nature as Dante expresses it in Paradiso 
XXVII: 
La natura del mondo, che quieta 
iI mezzo e tutto l'altro intorno move, 
quinci comincia come da sua meta. (Par. XXVI 1.106-08) 
The Primo Mobile is the source and aim of distinct being, but it itself exists within a 
physical relationship which recalls the metaphysical relationship at the centre of aLsolute 
creation: 'questo delo non ha altro dove / che la mente divina, in che s'accende / i'amor 
che 'I volge e la virtu ch'ei piove' (Par. XXVII.I09-11: my italics). While in the earlier 
descriptions of creation, the principal actors were Valore, Fig/io and Amore, and Sire, Idea 
and Amore, we now have Mente Divina, Virtu and Amor. Dante's description of the action of 
182 Pelikan, III, 102. Pelikan Is here quoting Florus of Lyon's text 'Against John Scotus Erigena', 4. 
183 Moevs, p. 33. 
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the Primo Mobile emphasises the simultaneous unity and distinction of its elements. Both 
virtu and amor exist nowhere but in the divine mind and yet both act independently, arnor 
turning the fastest-moving sphere and virtu as that which is rained down. The image of 
rain, the unity of water separated into individual drops, figures the cascade of divine virtu 
distinguished into individualised virtu by the action of the Primo Mobile. As that which 
distinguishes the virtu which originates in the oneness of the divine mind into the 
mUltiplicity of creation, the action of Dante's Primo Mobile recalls the action of the second 
person of the Trinity: that which makes the simple mUltiple and grounds all created 
existence. At the same time, however, it is virtu itself which has taken the position of the 
Figlio-ldea within the creation interaction and it is that which is manifested into existence 
by the Primo Mobile's movement. 
In Christian thought the Logos has another purpose beyond being the agent of creation: to 
return mankind from the mUltiple to the simple unity of God through revelation. Again 
Pelikan explains the nexus of significance around the Logos in early Christian thought: 
Creation, revelation both general and special, and redemption could all be ascribed 
to the Logos; the presupposition for each of these activities was the transcendence 
of God, who 'cannot be contained, and is not found in a place [ ... ] but his Logos 
through whom he made all things, being his power and his wisdom [virtute et 
sapientia] was the agent through whom God had dealt with mankind, achieving his 
purpose of creation and revealing his Will'.184 
The Logos, the virtute et sapientia Dei, is both the agent of creation and the sign by which 
God reveals himself to mankind. The Logos fulfils the necessity of the particular in 
communicating with human perceptual capabilities. Without the created universe or the 
incarnate Christ, God could be neither conceived nor approached, his transcendence being 
beyond human perception. In his action as the second person of the Trinity, the Logos 
makes and in making reveals the generous action of God in creation; as the incarnate 
second person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, God 'deals directly with mankind', revealing the 
way in which man can return to God both in terms of redeemed nature and temporal 
action. While it has become evident that virtu is the creative principle of God, and thus 
identified with (the action ot) the second person of the Trinity, a further identification 
between virtu and Christ can be made when we consider that it is by an imitation of the 
temporal virtu of Christ that man can return to God. Man's ability to imitate Christ, 
however, is dependent on his individualised existence in the first place. Through this 
184 Pelikan, I, 188. Pelikan Is here quoting Theophilus of Antioch, 'To Autolycus', 2.22. 
Ruth Chester 
114 
individualised existence and the virtu which creates him and the virtu with which he is 
endowed by nature, man can work to perfect that virtu and return to God. 
As we have begun to see, in Dante's conception the Primo Mobile is the initiator of 
distinction in the universe, the ground of which is, however, unified, and its role is 
frequently expressed alongside images of incarnation. Dante establishes an understanding 
of the Incarnation as a parallel process to an understanding of the cosmic metaphysics of 
unity and distinction in the universe. The incarnate Christ is the means by which man can 
perceptually and conceptually approach the transcendent oneness of God through an 
element of distinct creation. Lombardi has suggested that Christ makes 'the text of 
humankind meaningful and the text of God intelligible'.lBs As we will come to see, in 
Paradiso II Dante casts the Incarnation as that which both facilitates and initiates 
mankind's desire to understand the nature of God in Trinity and thus seeks to understand 
how creation can be both One and many. 
Paradiso II presents a further description of the actions of the heavens in the bringing into 
being of creation which establishes the Primo mobile as the source and maintainer of 
created existence.186 The passage is again marked by a simultaneous unity and distinction 
between the relationships of the upper heavens: 
Dentro daI del de la divina pace 
si gira un corpo ne la cui virtute 
I'esser di tutto suo contento giace. 
Lo ciel seguente, c'ha tante vedute, 
quell'esser parte per diverse essenze, 
da lui distratte e da lui contenute. (Par. II.112-l7) 
This time, rather than the metaphysical, divine agents of creation, the focus is upon the 
physical agency and interaction of the heavens. The 'ciel de la divina pace', the Empyrean, 
holds within it the revolving Primo Mobile. The shift from unified oneness into distinction 
is matched by a shift from stillness to movement, from one of complete, fulfilled 
autonomous being, to substance moved by desire to return to that being (Par. 
185 Elena Lombardi, The Syntax of Desire: Language and Love in Augustine, the Modistae, and Dante (Toronto 
and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2007), p. 43. 
186 o~ ~aradiso II and the questions raised by the canto see: Bruno Nardi, 'La dottrina delle macchle lunar!', in 
Sagg~ dlfilosofi~ dantes~a (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967), pp. 3-39; Michelangelo Picone, 'Canto II', In Lectura 
dantls turicensls: ParadIso, ed. by Georges Guntert and Michelangelo Picone (Florence: Cesatl, 2002), pp. 35-52; 
~or more r~cent and metaphysically focused readings of the passages see Teodolinda Barolinl's chapter 
Problems In Paradise: The Mimesis of Time and the Paradox of piu e meno'.ln The Undivine Comedy, pp. 166-
93; and Moevs, pp.111-19. 
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XXVII.l08).187 As with all created elements of the universe, the Primo Mobile has its own 
particular virtu, the perfected action by which it most fulfils itself. Its virtu is clearly 
unique: to hold in existence everything which exists below it within the universe. The role 
of the heaven of the fixed stars further distinguishes being within the universe while at the 
same time that being remains entirely contained within the Primo Mobile and 
consequently within the Empyrean or, metaphysically speaking, the mente divina. Thus the 
distinction of the universe is simultaneously one with the divine mind because of the 
particular nature and virtu ofthe Primo Mobile. 
The explanation of the making ofthe created universe which Beatrice gives in Paradiso II, 
however, stems directly and significantly from a misapprehension on the part of the 
pilgrim concerning this difficult idea of unity and mUltiplicity. In trying to understand the 
cause of moonspots, the pilgrim has relied, quite naturally, on the evidence of his senses 
and arrived at a physical explanation of the phenomenon; the spots are made by 'i corpi 
rari e densi' (60). But the ability of the pilgrim's senses to provide correct information is 
undermined by Beatrice who points out that in this case 'dietro ai sensi / vedi che la 
ragione ha corte l'ali' (56-57). Instead, as Barolini has suggested, while the pilgrim 
understands moonspots as purely a 'material phenomenon', 'Beatrice repudiates this 
derivation of difference from a physical cause, assigning to it instead a metaphysical 
existence [ ... ] arguing that all difference must have an ontological basis'.188 Beatrice's 
correction of the pilgrim's mistake is to bring him to recognise that distinction is at the 
most fundamental level of existence, occurring simultaneously with the first bringing into 
being of an entity. What such a recognition reveals is the variety of virtu in the universe; 
the basic component of ontological distinction. 
The term virtu appears six times in this canto in relation to different active subjects. The 
mistake behind Dante's physical explanation of moonspots is that it would reduce the 
variety of virtu in the universe: 'Se raro e denso cia facesser tanto, / una sola virtu sarebbe 
in tutti' (67-68). Instead, created being is distinguished into different combinations of 
divine informing power and material substance, so that, 'Virtu diversa fa diversa lega / col 
prezioso corpo ch'ella avviva' (139-40). It is 'la virtu mista' (143) that the pilgrim sees in 
the variety of light aud dark of the stars. Paradiso II is an exploration of the nature of 
distinction and unity in the universe which argues for the necessary individuality of every 
created being and the role which they fulfil, from the Primo Mobile to the 'beati motor' 
(129) to the human body itself. That by which created beings are distinguished is their 
187 On movement as an expression of desire, see Uno Pertile, La Punta del disio: Semantica del desiderio nella 
'Com media , (Fiesole: Cadmo, 2005), pp. 178·79. 
188 Barolinl, The Un divine Comedy, p. 178. 
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virtu, their proper action in the fulfilment of their existence. If this multiplicity of virtu is 
denied then the order of the universe breaks down and individuality is fundamentally 
undermined. It is vital that this individuality does not disappear when we take into 
account one of the other great questions of the Paradiso which Barolini identifies, 'how can 
the universe be one and yet receive God's light in differing degrees'?189 If every individual 
creation was the same in terms of virtu then there would be no differentiation in the 
degree to which each entity participated in divine being. Instead, as Moevs, paraphrasing 
Aquinas, points out, 'each distinction of finite form (essence) reflects a diverse 
participation in Being and hence degree ofperfection'.19o Creation is conceived as an order 
in which individual creatures have their own distinct virtu which locates them within that 
order. At the same time virtu itself is essentially unitary, originating in the unified power 
of God. Each entity has a degree of potential according to their nature and is empowered 
by that nature to fulfil themselves, but their existence itself comes through the virtu of 
God. Variety of virtu is a variety of degrees of relation to God who is Virtu itself. 
How one can come to understand the simultaneous ontological unity and distinction ofthe 
universe is expressed not only in the content of the canto's discourse but by the forms in 
which that discourse is enacted. Hollander has pointed out that Beatrice's discourse with 
the pilgrim is carried out in a 'thoroughly Scholastic manner' in which she asks for his own 
opinion, only then to reveal its falsity through intellectual proofs which 'reform with light' 
his intellect (109-10).191 Furthermore, Beatrice's communicative style, with its emphasis 
on clarity, explication and example, which seeks to actively reform her audience's intellect, 
is reminiscent of the preaching styles of the Dominicans. Apart from its argumentational 
style, however, the discourse is significant for the relation it enacts between the physical 
and the metaphysical as ways of understanding. As we have begun to see, Beatrice's 
discourse aims to lead the pilgrim from seeing the physical to perceiving the metaphysical. 
While the pilgrim works from the perspective of one standing on earth looking up and 
seeing the physical universe, Beatrice shifts the perspective to one having a perception of 
the workings of the Empyrean, Primo Mobile and Heaven ofthe Fixed Stars. Only from this 
perspective, which is raised above the physical universe, can the explanation for that 
universe be found: only in the universe's ontological foundation and source. However, the 
pilgrim's process of understanding is necessarily tied to his own bodily experience. It is 
that experience which opens the question of unity and distinction in the canto as a whole. 
The question of this interrelation is already made present in the canto's opening images: 
first in the 'piccioletta barca' which crosses the furrows of the sea before they join again in 
189 Barolini, The Un divine Comedy, p. 172. 
190 Moevs, p. 110. 
191 Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (ed. and trans), Paradiso (New York: Doubleday, 2007). Note to canto 
II vv. 61·63. p. 51. 
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smooth unity (13-15), one might say, before the individualised images, which the poem 
has produced, disappear; and secondly in the body of the pilgrim which is received into 
the heaven of the Moon 'com'acqua recepe / raggio di luce permanendo unita' (35-36). It is 
the unimaginability of this second state which inspires 'il disio / di veder quella essenza in 
che si vede / come nostra natura e Dio s'unio' (40-42). The physical experiences of the 
pilgrim's own body become the essential link by which the reader - it is 'nostra natura' 
that Dante is considering - comes to desire to understand the Incarnation.192 By framing 
the desire in this way, Dante is reiterating the theological role of the incarnate Logos as the 
conceptual conduit by which man comes to desire and perceive God. But here it is the 
pilgrim's own experience which arouses and enables understanding. The pilgrim's body 
also becomes an active conceptual figure in Beatrice's description of the experiment by 
which the pilgrim must imagine placing himself between three candles and a mirror to 
observe the candles' consistent brightness,193 While it is an intellectual game which 
Beatrice is outlining, it is physically grounded, appealing to human sense-dependency. But 
while the pilgrim's sense-dependency had previously led his reason astray, now instead, 
guided by the well-directed sensual information of Beatrice, the pilgrim's understanding is 
instead cleared of doubts. 
The final significant inclusion of the body motif in this canto is perhaps the most striking. 
In describing the distinct virtu which is dispersed through the heavens by the workings of 
the spheres, Beatrice compares this to the action of the soul within the body: 
E come l'alma dentro a vostra polve 
per differenti membra e conformate 
a diverse potenze si risolve, 
cosl l'intelligenza sua bontate 
multiplicata per Ie stelle spiega, 
girando se sovra sua unitate. (Par.II.133-38) 
Just as celestial virtu diversa forms different combinations each with their own nature and 
purpose, so 'vita in voi, si lega' (141). Virtu and vita are thus identified one with the other. 
By this comparison, the poet is casting virtu as the vivifying force of the universe since, as 
Ghisalberti points out, in medieval thought, 'senza l'anima, il corpo sarebbe privo di 
192 See Picone, 'Canto II', especially pp. 36-39, for a thorough consideration of the significance of the pilgrim's 
body in this canto. 
19,3 D~a~ing on the work of John Kleiner, Moevs' analysiS of this passage adds a very valuable aspect: that the 
pIlgrim s,body is placed at the centre of a crucifix and that the experiment presumes the transparency of that 
body, ThIS then becomes the moment at which man stops seeing himself as only distinguished and instead sees 
the b,od~ as 'the self-manifestation, In the world, of the ground of all being' (p.llS), For a fuller bibliography on 
the slgmficance of this experiment see Hollander's commentary to lines 94.105. 
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vita'.194 The parallel is concluded with the wayan individual's nature is revealed: 'la virtu 
mista per 10 corpo luce / come letizia per pupilla viva' (143-44). In this stunning parallel of 
celestial light and human joy as signs of an individual's virtu, Dante is placing human 
nature within the order of the universe.195 While the pilgrim's isolated, earthbound view-
point had clouded his understanding of creation, once actively and consciously placed 
within the created order, man reveals this order within himself. The human body and its 
potential in virtu is placed within the virtu-dynamic of the created universe and it enters 
into the responsibility for fulfilment which a place in the created order necessitates. The 
body reveals within itselfthe potential of that order. 
Beatrice's discourse is famously obscure, but on closer inspection is one which engages 
the faculties of the pilgrim in the most active way. Starting with misleading physical 
evidence it reverses the perspective from earth to heaven, from effect to cause, then places 
the pilgrim directly within the process of understanding. Importantly, and perhaps 
reminiscent of aspects of the representational traditions, Beatrice is interpreting the 
pilgrim's experiences for him, enabling him to understand their deeper significance. 
Through the analogy of the body, his own body, the pilgrim is led from objective 
questioning to active involvement and engagement, until finally the pilgrim can come to 
realise that he has already enacted the answer to his question on entering the heaven of 
the Moon. In a way, Paradiso II is the most fundamental expression of virtu personified as 
we came to see it in the representational tradition. Here virtu is no longer a concept that 
must be personified externally in order to be understood. Instead the body, any body, is 
revealed to hold within it virtu as the distinguishing and vivifying factor ofthe universe. It 
is an image of personification made more essential; virtu is not only personified but made 
the ground of individual personhood itself. The ethical imperative which the images of 
personified virtu sought to demonstrate is here transformed and the virtu of persons 
becomes the fulfilment of human being itself as it exists within the order of the universe. 
194 Alessandro Ghisalberti, 'n pensiero medievale di fronte al corpo',ln II corpo in scena, pp. 55-68 (p. 59). 
195 Ghisalberti in his essay points out the centrality of man In the universe as developed In Christian thought: 
'Punto di convergenza di tutte Ie creature,l'uomo risulta 1a creatura piu rappresentativa dell'universo [ ... J In 
chi ave cristina la dottrina dell'uomo microcosmo: il corpo, prodotto dallaborotorlo della natura per 
Bonaventura raccoglie Ie aspirazioni dell'universo sensibilie a perfezlonl ulterior\. Per 1a sua Inclinazione 
naturale a Informare un corpo,l'anima 51 carica della responsibilita globale dl rendere possibile il ritorno 
deU'intera creazione a Dio', p. 64. While the tradition of man as a microcosm does seem to be one Dante Is 
appealing to here, he does not work by simple analogy but focuses on the revelation inherent In the human 
body's existence and the interactive role it plays within understanding the created order. 
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3. The Fulfilment of Human Nature 
Virtu is that which expresses a being's individuality in the universe, endowing it with its 
own potential for fulfilment. Paradiso II expresses this potential in relation to the human 
in cosmological terms, in which the virtu of the individualised body is made analogous to 
the virtu-order of the universe. Pur9atorio XXVIII, I intend to argue, is also based around 
an analogy of human virtu in which the spiritual condition ofthe souls who have arrived in 
the Earthly Paradise can be read through the physical space they inhabit.196 While in 
Paradiso II the analogy is between the cosmos and the body, the natural images of 
Pur9atorio XXVlII locate human nature in relation to the natural world. This setting is 
directly tied to the lessons which the soul arrived in Eden has learned: its correct relation 
to created existence. 
In Pur9atorio XXVIII forms ofthe word virtu appear three times in the space of twenty-one 
lines (109-29), each time associated with the power of plants and water to form and 
generate life. The environmental condition in which the Earthly Paradise exists is carefully 
explained by Matelda. Terrestrial weather and conditions do not apply here where "1 
turbar che sotto da se fanno / l'essalazion de l'acqua e de la terra' (97-98) do not reach. 
The mountain was formed to rise above terrestrial disturbance in order to free man from 
its effects: 'Perche [ ... ] a l'uomo non facesse alcuna guerra, / questo monte saUo verso '1 
del tanto, / e libero n'e' (100-02). Eden is an isolated and protected place which, while 
having the physical, natural characteristics of Earth, is not influenced by their negative 
effects. The only atmospheric movement comes directly from the movement of the first 
sphere, the Primo Mobile: 
Or perche in circuito tutto quanta 
l'aere si volge con la prima volta, 
[ ... ] 
in questa altezza ch'e tutta disciolta 
ne l'aere vivo, tal moto percuote, 
e fa sonar la selva perch' e folta. (Purg. XXVIII. 1 03-08) 
196 ~or letture of Purgatorio XXVlIl see: Antonio Enzo Quaglio, Canto XXVIII del Purgatorio: Lectura dantis 
sca"ger~. (Florence: Le Monnier, 1966); Bernard Konig. 'Canto XXVIII', In Lectura dantis turicensis: Purgatorio. 
ed. by Gun.t~rt and Picone (Florence: F. Cesati. 2001). pp. 435-45; Olga Sedakova. '1\ paradiso terrestre e II dono 
della poeSla ,In Esperimenti danteschi: Purgatorio. pp. 273-94; see also Singleton 'Part Two: Return to Eden', in 
Journey to Beatrice. 
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This dynamic is essential in coming to understand the Earthly Paradise as the most perfect 
example of a created natural place. Dante establishes a direct connection between the 
movement of the Primo Mobile and the movement of the natural elements of Eden; the 
wind from the Primo Mobile makes the dense trees rustle. But in this natural image of 
wind in the trees, Dante is able to express a moment of ontological revelation. The pilgrim 
has been overtly surprised by the sounds of the forest and it is this surprise which leads to 
Matelda's explanation (85-87). The wind in the trees, the sensual noise it makes, arouses 
the desire of the pilgrim to understand its origin. At this point material creation is related 
back to its ontological origin: the physical has revealed the metaphysical. Matelda's 
explanation shifts between reference both to physical elements (plants, seeds, earth) and 
their ontological nature - their virtu - so again we see the physical and the metaphysical 
coexistentially: 
[ ... ] la percossa pianta tanto puote 
che de la sua virtute l'aura impregna 
e quella poi, girando, intorno scuote; 
e l'altra terra, secondo ch'e degna 
per se e per suo ciel, concepe e figlia 
di diverse virtu diverse legna. (XXVIII. 1 09-14) 
Virtu is first figured as the 'formative power' present in seeds which are scattered in the 
winds which originate in the Primo Mobile. It is this virtu which 'l'aura impregna' and 
which then fertilises the terrestrial and Edenic soil. This soil itself is in a perfect state, 
ready to properly receive and bring to fruition that which it receives: 'E sapere dei che la 
campagna santa / dove tu se' d'ogne semenza e piena' (118-19). The combination of virtu 
moved by the Primo Mobile and the perfectly potential ground, free from terrestrial 
disturbance, enables the fullness of being (119) of the nature found there. Given the 
understanding of the Primo Mobile which has been established in the chapter thus far, as 
the point at which the oneness of being becomes the multiplicity of created existence, in its 
direct relation to the Primo Mobile, the Earthly Paradise contains an analogous enacting of 
this dispersion of being in the seeds and plants. Here it is precisely virtu which is 
dispersed and which 'impregnates' the air thus enabling fruition. In Paradiso II the 
workings of virtu were initially described in the abstract line 'Virtu diverse fa diversa lega' 
(139); this line is closely paralled in Purgatorio XXVIII, 'di diverse virtu diverse legna' 
(114). Virtu is the essence of the differentiation of nature of the trees of Eden. The cosmic 
dynamics of Paradiso II are within the natural manifestation ofthe Earthly Paradise. 
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In the Edenic context, perfectly situated and protected, the resulting manifested being is at 
its fullest natural potential. If it is the direct and immediate motion of the Primo Mobile 
which causes the distribution of seeds 'di diverse virtu' in Eden, and the Primo Mobile is 
the point of 'embodying' contact between God and his creation, then the scattered seeds-
virtu in Eden which descend down to Earth are manifestations and moments of God's 
generous creation. It is divine love which moves the Primo Mobile and facilitates the 
dispersion of creation. Here in the Garden of Eden is this love most visible and most felt; it 
is undisturbed and undistracted by earthly physicality figured as terrestrial weather. At 
the same time divine virtu finds the ground most ready and well disposed to receive it and 
reveal it; it is 'campagna santa' (118). 
But just as an analogy was formed in the discourse of Paradiso II between the cosmos and 
the human body, so here there is an implicit analogy between the Earthly Paradise and the 
human soul who has arrived there. The natural surroundings in which the events of the 
Com media take place often invite interpretation as being an externalisation or 
manifestation of the state of the human souls within them. The dark wood in which the 
pilgrim finds himself lost in Inferno I manifests his own confused and tormented spiritual 
state. The trees of the wood of the suicides in Inferno XIII are themselves the 
manifestations of the soul's negation of their human existence. Their human nature is 
entirely removed and the order of being turned upside down as Pier della Vigna's words, 
which appeal to the order of created beings, suggest: 'Uomini fummo, e or siam fatti sterpi' 
(37). When we come to the Earthly Paradise, therefore, there is a precedent for the natural 
space to represent a condition of human being. And in Eden this is particularly significant. 
Matelda identifies this place as that made specifically by God, for man: 
Lo sommo Ben, che solo esso a se pi ace, 
fe l'uom buono e a bene, e questo loco 
diede per arr' a lui d'etterna pace. (91-93) 
There are two significant aspects of this description. First, man is created good and to do 
good by God. This is a reiteration of the combination of being and doing which defines 
virtu. Man in Eden is at his most virtuous, in a perfect state of both potential and act. And 
second, in his state of goodness man is given this place for eternal peace. Peace, as we saw 
in the intellectual context, was conceived as the reward ofvirtue.197 We have already seen 
how the physical description of Eden states it as being above the disturbances of temporal 
existence and in direct contact with the source of creation. This situation was established 
to liberate man from those disturbances (102). In considering the concept of virtue in 
197 This was most evident In Augustine's De civitate Dei 19.10. 
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Chapter One, it became apparent that, in Christian thought, virtue was tied to a liberation 
from man's distracting desire for the earth, and was a focusing of his desire towards the 
source of his existence, God. This focused desire then led to a proper use of temporal 
existence on man's part. Creation was no longer distracting or disturbing but instead a 
forum through which man could come to see God. Eden then, is a place which manifests 
and facilitates this perfection of human virtu. Man is created here fully good and free from 
the potential corruption of that good. Eden itself fully reveals the source from which it 
comes. The interactions of Eden are directly between God and man. So it is that in Paradiso 
I, Beatrice is able to tell the pilgrim that, 
Molto e licito la, che qui non Ieee 
a Ie nostre virtu, merce del loco 
fatto per proprio de l'umana spece. (Par. 1.55-57) 
In this space, man's virtu can be fully perfected and his sight towards God can be 
unclouded. This spiritual clarity is manifested in the actions of the pilgrim who in Eden 
can look directly at the sun (Par. 1.54 ). 
The souls who have newly arrived at the Earthly Paradise, having passed through 
Purgatory, are restored to the pre lap sari an state. The soul which has come to Eden has 
been reborn, wiped clean and restored to its state of pure potential for perfection: pure 
potential for ethical and ontological virtu. This purified potential is significant, being the 
state in which nature can come to fully reveal God within itself. In an image which overtly 
recalls the terra of Eden as campagna santa, in Paradiso XIII the only two moments of 
perfect human creation are described: 
Pero se 'I caldo amor la chiara vista 
de la prima virtu dispone e segna, 
tutta la perfezion quivi s'acquista. 
Cos1 fu fatta gia la terra degna 
di tutta l'animal perfezlone; 
cos1 fu fatta la Vergine pregna. (Par. Xlll.79-84) 
We find another trinity of agents - ca/do amor, chiara vista and prima virtu - coming 
together to imprint individualised identity upon matter. Only in Adam and Christ is the 
creative virtu of God fully and properly manifested. Only in the Edenic space can such a 
perfection of disposition be regained by the human souls who arrive in it. 
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The Edenic space enacts a reconnection of human and divine. In Matelda's explanation of 
the rivers of Eden again the physical is revealed to have a grounding in the metaphysical: 
L'acqua che vedi [00'] 
esce di fontana salda e certa 
che tanto dal voler di Dio riprende 
quant'ella versa. (Purg. XXVlll.121-26) 
As the purged souls pass through the rivers they manifest their physical and spiritual 
reconnection with the will of God. The role of virtu in this is to remove the illusion of 
difference which sin has created: 
Da questa parte con virtu discende 
che toglie altrui memoria del peccato; 
da l'altra d'ogne ben fatto la rende. (Purg. XXVlII.127-29) 
The virtu of Lethe is to restore unity to difference which parallels the action of virtu in the 
universe. As in the rain image of Paradiso XXVIll, Dante's image of water captures virtu as 
simultaneously one and many. In the following two chapters it will become apparent that 
the image of water is frequently used by Dante to express the virtu-dynamic, being a forum 
for interaction and non-interaction which leads to ontological and ethical transformation. 
While still in the Earthly Paradise at the summit of Purgatory, the interaction of 'virtu' and 
'impregna', alongside the connection of the Primo Mobile and Eden, can also not help but 
recall images of Incarnation. As the Primo Mobile is the nexus between God and creation, 
so Christ is the visible 'bridge or union' between God and humankind,198 In this sense 
Christ and the Primo Mobile fulfil parallel roles; through the Primo Mobile God transmits 
his immaterial being into material creation; through Christ that creation - and specifically 
man - becomes aware of God's immaterial being. Blown by the Primo Mobile, the air of 
Eden is ready and disposed to be again impregnated by divine virtu; and so Christian souls 
on Earth and in Purgatory are prepared to receive God through having already received 
Christ. The soul arrived in Eden has returned to the perfect ontological disposition shared 
by the figures of Adam and Christ They are ready to demonstrate that 'there is no intrinsic 
limitation to human perfection: when matter is most suitably disposed to receive the 
human form, the result is divinity incarnate'.199 The purged soul has gone through the 
198 Moevs, p. 34. 
199 Moevs, p. 83. 
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purgation process, undertaking the imitation of Christ; it has become like the 'campagna 
santa' of Eden ready to be 'impregnated' by divine virtu, and is now ready to manifest itself 
as a created being with the potential for divinity. 
4. Virtu and the Poetry of Manifestation 
The Earthly Paradise marks the end point in terms of a soul's change and development; 
after this awaits the changeless, eternal perfection of Paradise. But before this point is 
reached in the poem, the ontological significance of virtu is apparent not only in the 
physical and metaphysical cosmos which the poet theoretically constructs, but also in the 
way the souls are formed in the afterlife environment he himself has constructed. In the 
intellectual tradition surrounding virtue, there is a distinct emphasiS upon the value of 
temporal human life as the offer of an opportunity for man to fulfil himself. In the Christian 
context this fulfilment is dependent on the formation and maintenance of a positive 
relationship with God. Human virtue is perfectly to love God and order all activity towards 
that end. We also saw, however, that human life itself is founded on an act of virtue - the 
creative virtue of God. One of our principal considerations is therefore to consider how 
these two forms of virtue interact. Man and the Universe are created by the divine virtue 
of God, and in Dante's conception, as we shall further see, it is also this virtu which forms 
the airy bodies of the spirits in the realms of the afterlife. In Dante's conception, virtu is 
creative both in temporal life and the life hereafter. This idea is most overt in the 
Purgatorio, which is itself significant: Purgatorio, the realm of perfecting, relies on the 
dynamic interactions between God and the soul to fulfil its purpose. Virtu here is given, 
demonstrated and fulfilled on both an ethical and an ontological level. It acts as a principle 
of ontological perfection, providing the soul with a body in which to perfect itself, while at 
the same time, as we shall see, it informs the punishments those soul-bodies undergo and 
thus establishes the punishment's connection to the source of being to which the souls are 
returning by the will of God. If we again think back to the intellectual context, in order to 
attain towards God (the attainment of which is impossible for unaided human nature), 
man requires a reordering of his virtue and a consequent elevation of the scope of his 
action to bring his capacities into relation with his new end aim.ZOO Purgatorio, as Cogan 
points out, is marked by the achievement of the Beatitudes which acknowledge the new 
order of activity which the souls have acquired.201 I suggest that Dante stages this as 
occurring through an interaction of virtu, not only in terms of the exempla of virtuous 
actions on the terraces, but as an ontological interaction which brings into being the soul-
200 This was particularly evident in Aquinas, ST 1a2ae 62 and 63. 
201 Cogan, p. 124. 
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bodies in Purgatorio and facilitates their purgation and perfection. By a repetition of the 
'coming into being' of a soul, Dante further establishes his idea of Purgatory as the offer of 
a 'new life' with the same challenges and ontological possibilities as temporal existence. As 
in both Paradiso II and Purgatorio XXVlJl, the instantiation of virtu as the learning and 
development forum of the souls is couched within Incarnation references. Again, man's 
existence and perfection is read through the action of Christ-Logos and Christ-man. The 
Incarnation remains significant as the agent through which God's creative virtu and his 
revelation come to be both recognised and understood; as Pelikan suggested earlier, 
through the Incarnation, God deals with mankind. 
Before the central discourse of Purgatorio XXV, the role of virtu in the formation and 
perfection of the souls has already been introduced and explored in the poem, again in 
contexts which link it directly to the Incarnation as a conduit for understanding. Canto 1II 
of Purgator;o sees the Pilgrim and Virgil at the base of the mountain, seeking out the path 
by which to ascend.202 The specific instance of the use of the word virtu in this canto is 
framed by a dialogue concerning the nature of the souls and the relevance of the 
Incarnation. The fact that Virgil is the principal speaker adds yet further Significance to the 
dialogue. Following an opening in which the narrator emphasises his loving dependence 
upon Virgil as his guide (4-6) comes a scene which stresses the pilgrim's continuing 
corporeality as opposed to Virgil's lack of body (16-30). Such scenes are a recurring motif 
of the early cantos of Purgatorio, but it is nevertheless important to ask - why does it also 
appear here? Attention is drawn specifically not simply to the pilgrim's body but to the 
absent, dead body of Virgil (25-27). He, like the other airy bodies of the afterlife and 
furthermore, like the heavens themselves, blocks no light And it is in the creation of these 
bodies that virtu's role is central. Virgil tells the pilgrim that, 
A sofferir tormenti, caldi e geli 
simili corpi la Virtu dispone 
che, come fa, non vuol ch'a noi si sveJi. (Purg.III.31-33) 
Virtu here is the active subject which plays a role in both the re-formation and the 
reformation of the souls in the afterlife, with the particular scope of disposing them to 
punishment. The speaker, Virgil, here reveals his own bias, however, only conceiving of 
the suffering of the souls and unknowing of the reSUlting joy of their remanifestation 
which characterises the souls higher up in Purgatory and in Paradise. In the following 
lines, he carries out a reflection on his own tragic ignorance: 
202 For re~dlngs of ~urgatorio III see: Carlo ~inl, 'L'Antipurgatorio e II mondo capovolto',ln Esperimenti 
danteschf. Purgatorlo, pp. 41-52; Georges Guntert, 'Canto m', in Lectura dant;s tur;cens;s: Purgator;o,pp. 43-57. 
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Matto e che spera che nostra ragione 
possa trascorrer la infinita via 
che tiene una sustanza in tre persone. 
State contenti, umana gente, al quia; 
che se potuto aveste veder tutto, 
mestier non era parturir Maria. (Purg. 1Il.34-39) 
The Trinity is by implication the agent behind the virtu which disposes the souls, but 
knowledge of its actions is absolutely impossible without the Incarnation; it is impossible, 
that is, without the One becoming the many. The mystery which the birth of Christ implies 
for understanding is one of both accepting the limits of human knowledge while 
simultaneously transcending them.203 Virgil, from his limited perspective, cannot conceive 
and therefore cannot fully express the possibilities which arise from accepting one's limits. 
While complete knowledge is proper only to God, some knowledge of the workings of the 
Trinity, and thus of the informing virtu which originates with it, is possible for those in a 
state of conscious incarnation because they have the possibility to see distinct being as an 
individual instantiation of ontological unity. Thus the emphasiS upon the pilgrim's body 
begins to show its particular relevance here. By contrast, Virgil and the other Limbo 
dwellers, to whom he later refers, are eternally excluded from understanding the full value 
of incarnation, failing as they did to recognise themselves as created and thus incarnated 
in life, failing to seek answers within their own existence; theirs is a misunderstanding of 
human virtu. Christian virtu, that which underpins the Com media, seeks its fulfilment not 
only within the human sphere, but in the positive interaction of man with his Creator. As 
we have seen, the process of understanding which the pilgrim undergoes in Paradiso is 
primarily the coming to perceive how the many are necessarily grounded in the One and 
that individuality within that oneness is the responsibility to return to unity. The return to 
unity is the desire which orders the movement of virtu in the universe. By contrast, the 
Pagans, of whom Virgil is one, are condemned to 'disiar [ ... J sanza frutto' (Purg. 111.40). 
Lombardi considers a significant understanding of disio in relation to the feeling of the 
Limbo dwellers who Virgil represents; their desire is understood 'as mourning, which 
refers mainly to the regret of something or somebody that does not exist anymore and is 
lost forever'.zo4 The reference to Virgil's absent and dead body remarks his temporal 
failure to recognise the potential offered by that body and that body's true significance. 
203 This idea has also been raised by Vittorio Montemagglln his essay "'La rosa In che iI verbo divino carne sl 
fece
N
: Human Bodies and Truth in the Poetic Narrative of the Commedia', in Dante and the Human Body: Eight 
Essays, edited by John C. Barnes and Jennifer Petrie (Dublin, Ireland and Portland, OR: Four Courts Press, 
2007), pp. 159-84 (p. 169). 
204 Lombardi, Syntax of Desire, p. 163. 
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Thus he can only see the virtu which forms the souls of the afterlife as disposing to 
suffering rather than disposing to joy, just as his own dead body reflects the absence of its 
true vivification in life. Instead for the souls of Purgatory, Dante stages a repetition of their 
original creation; formed by virtu, they are placed within an environment which tests and 
perfects them, perfectly ordering their activity towards the divine reward which they are 
guaranteed. 
The possibility offered to the purgating souls is one also offered to the pilgrim himself, as 
suggested by the other dynamic of virtu which appears in Purgatorio Ill. When the 
travellers meet the waiting souls in this area of Purgatory, who are made fearful by the 
appearance of the pilgrim's shadow, Virgil's reassurance makes reference to the divine 
force behind the pilgrim's journey. The pilgrim's corporeality is re-emphasised - 'questo e 
corpo uman che voi vedete' (95) - but his corporeal actions are in dialogue with a divine 
intention: 'non sanza virtu che da ciel vegna / cerchi di soverchiar questa parete' (98-99). 
This virtu da ciel invites a triple interpretation. The first, which will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter Five, makes reference to the divine aid which enables the pilgrim's 
journey. The second perhaps refers to the new order of experience and action to which the 
pilgrim is being privileged: his human capabilities are being uniquely aided and raised 
above their natural potential in order to facilitate his journey. But the third recalls the 
virtu da ciel which is at the centre of all human individualised existence. The virtu, which 
disposes the souls in Purgatory, is the same as that which creates human beings in 
temporal life emphasising that the possibility for salvation, which the pilgrim's journey 
shows, is the same as the possibility for salvation offered to all humankind in their very 
state of existence. 
While canto III focuses upon virtu as that which informs the souls to enable purgation, 
further on in Purgatorio XXIII the term virtu is used to signify the active power behind the 
punishments themselves and as that which links them to divine will.20S In other words, it is 
that which directly informs the reordering of their ethical activity towards God, by linking 
their will to God's. 
The pilgrim, now accompanied by Statius and Virgil, finds himself on the terrace of 
gluttony. He is fascinated, perhaps more than anywhere else in the Purgatorio, by how the 
souls he sees come to look as they do - indeed it is his overt curiosity here which will lead 
205 For analyses of Purgatorio XXIII see: Umberto Bosco, Canto XXIII del Purgatorio: Lectura dantis scaligera 
(Florence: ,L~ Mo?nier, 1968); Gabriele Muresu, 'Forese e la Gola', L'Alighieri 29 (2007),5.29; Matthew 
Treherne, Liturgical Personhood: Creation, Penitence and Praise in the Com media', in Dante's 'Commedia': 
Theology as Poetry, ed. by Vittorio Montemaggl and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2010), pp. 131-60; Also see Patrick Meredith Gardner, 'Dante and the Suffering Soul'. 
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to Statius' explanation in canto XXV. The intense focus upon the physicality of the 
punishment of the gluttons and the reflection upon the mysterious and wondrous nature 
of the cause behind it are techniques familiar to us from the earlier consideration of 
meditative devotional literature. This canto enacts a process by which the reader, through 
focusing on the physicality of its visions, is drawn into the emotional transformative 
drama of the scene. The episode's dramatic tension is built up by the delay in response to 
the pilgrim's initial wonderment over the appearance of the souls. The answer to the 
question is made urgent by delay first by means of the rhetorical question of the authorial 
narrator, which is followed immediately by the curiosity of the pilgrim himself: 
Chi crederebbe che l'odor d'un porno 
s1 governasse, generando brama, 
e quel d'un'acqua, non sappiendo como? 
Gia era in ammirar che slH affama, 
per la cagione ancor non manifesta 
di lor magrezza e di lor trista squama. (Purg. XXllI.34-39) 
The issue is identified as significant through reactions both within and outside the poem's 
temporal narrative. Even the appearance of the pilgrim's lamented friend Forese is not 
enough to drive this question from the pilgrim's mind and he insists on the necessity of an 
answer before he can turn his mind to other things: 
Pero mi di, per Dio, che s1 vi sfoglia; 
non mi far dir mentr'io mi maraviglio, 
che mal puo dir chi e pien d'altra voglia. (Purg. XXIII.58-60). 
Enacted in this delay is in fact a sharpening of the will. By withholding the answer while 
stressing its overwhelming importance, the poet leads his reader into a state of desire. The 
pilgrim's desire, so focused on the answer, is a right desire, one which accepts no personal 
distractions in the search for truth. So while the pilgrim acts as the exemplum for the 
reader's deSire, the narrative structure has established that desire itself. 
It is only from this state of mind that the answer can be properly revealed and properly 
understood. In Forese's answer to the pilgrim, the word virtu becomes explicit within the 
canto, forming an essential part of the answer to the question: "'De l'etterno consiglio / 
cade vertu ne l'acqua e ne la pianta / rimasa dietro, ond'io s1 m'assottiglio'" (61-63). Virtu 
is identified as the active agent which thins the souls, bringing about their particular 
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punishment. Furthermore, this virtu is the agent which carries out a divine plan, coming as 
it does from the 'etterno consiglio'. Why should it be in this particular sin and punishment, 
as opposed to any other, that virtu's role is most explicitly mentioned? The answer lies in 
the manifestation of the punishment and the particular quality of the sin. Kirkpatrick in his 
commentary to this canto has suggested that '[g]reed obscures the proper outline of our 
humanity. Penance clarifies what it is to be human and brings the penitent back to that 
understanding, revealing the general nature of 'man' that is written in our being'.206 The 
souls of the gluttonous are so thinned by the action of virtu that their essential humanity is 
revealed in their faces: 'chi nel viso de Ii uomini legge "omo" / ben avria quivi conosciuta 
l'emme' (32-33). When we consider that virtu is that which makes man distinct as man 
and simultaneously that virtu is that which man fulfils in the fulfilment of his proper 
nature, then its reference here is vital; greed, in which man loses all proportion of correct 
desire in relation to himself, the world and God, is overcome by that force which brings 
about man's initial creation thus restoring him to an original state. This is a state in which 
he is able to correctly respond to the temptations of temporal life, reorientating the 
experiences of that life in the light of divine will. While we have seen that in Purgatorio III 
and XXV virtu is conceived as that which manifests the souls of the afterlife, disposing 
them to punishment, here virtu is the agent which, acting on a divine plan, restores the 
souls to an original state of potential in which their essential human nature is revealed. 
That nature is one which can enact its proper relation to God and the world. 
The punishment and the soul's attitude to it on this terrace is also characterised in a 
distinct and telling way. Even before direct contact is made with Forese, the narrator 
describes the tears and singing heard on this terrace as 'tal che diletto e doglia parturle' 
(12). Further on, the intrinsic connection of joy-pain is reiterated in Forese's self-
correction, 'io dico pena, e dovria dir sollazzo' (72). Unlike the unknowing Virgil for whom 
pain in the afterlife can only ever be hopeless suffering, Forese, as a soul undergoing 
purgation and indeed near the end of his journey, is aware of the positive outcome of pain 
because he is aware of the exemplum of Christ. His own pain he can read in the light of a 
shared experience with Christ, equating as he does his own desire for punishment with 
'quella voglia [ ... ] che menD Cristo lieto a dire "En", / quando ne libero con la sua vena' (74-
75). Recalling the role of virtu in this particular punishment then, we see that in 
responding to the soul's willing desire to be purged, virtu brings the souls actively to an 
imitation of Christ, making their suffering possible while at the same time uniting it to the 
divine plan. It acts as the conduit between man's desire and the desire of God, the 
interactive force which brings one to the other. Virtu, revealing the essential human nature 
206 Kirkpatrick, Commentary to Purgatorio XXIII, p. 436. 
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of the souls, brings them towards a resemblance and imitation of Christ as it focuses and 
'thins' their distracting desires, enabling them to enact the joyful pain which brings them 
to God. 
Patrick Gardner has pointed out, however, that the particular imitation of Christ which the 
souls here enact is not his suffering but his cry: 
it is not that this voglia led Christ to take up the Cross, but that it led him to speak, 
to cry out. [ ... ] [I]f Christ did not in fact despair, if he was Iieto insofar as he was 
willing and obedient to the last [ ... ] then he did not cry for his own sake, but to be 
heard. Whatever exactly the cry shows, it was made to show - to manifest 
something about this suffering to the world. [ ... ] The desire which draws the 
fasting to the trees is the same desire: to make their suffering manifest.207 
Thus the particular imitation brought about by virtu is for the souls to reveal God in their 
words and in doing so bear witness to the transformative experience which has brought 
them to a likeness with Christ. In revealing God through the word they are imitating both 
Christ incarnate and Christ-Logos. As Pelikan has demonstrated: 'As the principle of 
rationality [Christ] became [ ... ] the principle of speech or discourse [ ... ] so in turn the 
Logos was the principle ofrevelation'.2oB The souls' participation in this act of revelation is 
only made possible by their purgation which in their sin Is related directly to the mouth, 
the organ of speech. Thus their newly perfected desire, which has turned away from 
temporal sustenance, can now reveal directly the virtu of their nature. The virtu of human 
nature comes to be the unclouded expression of God. 
Just as this canto calls for emotional engagement on the part of the reader in the tension-
building delay enacted at its opening, it also appeals to a more intense form of 
participation which is significantly caused by aural stimuli. The punishment of the souls 
which focuses their desire only on God to such an extent that they come to physically 
participate in Christ, liberates them from the sinful use of the mouth in gluttony and 
enables the act of praise. As Treherne has suggested, 'through [ ... ] redirection of love and 
through assimilation to Christ, doxology becomes possible'.209 Beyond this, however, the 
effect of the words of praise which the souls speak is itself described as 'incarnational' 
within the listener. While standing on the terrace at the canto's opening, the pilgrim hears 
the weeping and singing of the souls. The effect of these sounds is described in relation to 
207 Gardner, p.131. 
208 Pelikan, I, 188. 
209 Treherne, p. 149. 
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him who hears rather than him who speaks: 'piangere e cantar s'udie / "LabIa mea, 
Domine", per modo / tal che diletto e doglia parturle' (10-12). The singing and weeping of 
the souls gives birth to joy and pain in the listener. The linking of joy, pain and birth is a 
direct recalling of medieval ideas on Incarnation.210 The effect of the terrace's sounds and 
the meditative discourse style, therefore, brings about a sharing on the part of the listener 
in the transformative act of incarnation. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has show that through creation, all created beings participate in the virtu of 
God and have their own virtu to fulfil. Through the dynamic of virtu, the Com media places 
human nature within the order of the universe. This order is formed through God's will. 
The poem casts creation through virtu as the offer of the possibility for ontological 
fulfilment through one's own individualised virtu. But creation, in its multiplicity, appears 
to obscure the unified oneness of its origin. This chapter has considered how Dante shows 
how mUltiplicity itself can come to reveal unity if read correctly, and is in fact essential in 
the revelation of that unity to human understanding. The poet expresses this by exploring 
the metaphysical dynamic in created terms: the perfectly disposed order of the heavens is 
the macrocosm of the perfectly disposed human being; the fertile flora of Eden manifests 
the onto logically fulfilled nature of the soul that has arrived there and the state in which 
creation ceases to be obscuring and instead becomes revelatory. Dante focuses upon the 
revelatory possibility inherent to human life itself which is initiated by the Incarnation. In 
Purgatorio XXIII, Dante considers how man, cleansed and focused by the acquisition of 
virtu, comes to reveal the nature he shares with Christ. Virtu, according to the poet, forms 
the body in both life and afterlife emphaSiSing that the ontological transformation and 
revelation of their essential nature which the purgating souls undergo is inherently 
possible in human life itself. What is required is a reordering of temporal existence in 
which the body comes to be seen as part of creation which should tend towards God as its 
source. Virtu is that which overcomes sin through the removal of difference, enabling man 
to see himself as part of an ontological whole. But at the same time, distinct manifested 
being is essential since material being is the ground of human understanding. Here again, 
virtu is essential, being that which joins with matter to form distinction. Through a 
consideration of human nature, Dante explores how that nature can reveal within itself the 
ontological dynamics of the universe in which mUltiplicity and unity are made 
simultaneous. Virtu, in enabling man to overcome the distraction of distinct being, 




empowers him to fully reveal his ontological nature in an imitation of the revelation of 
Christ. 
Dante's presentation of creative virtu emphasises it as an interactive force between God 
and man, Creator and creature. It is the offer to man of the opportunity for experience and 
understanding which could ultimately lead him back to God as the source of his existence. 
By underlining the role of virtu throughout human existence and experience, Dante is 
emphasising the continuous and positive dialogue which goes on between man and God, 
forming ultimately an idea of created existence as empowered and empowering. 
Dante's originality in respect to the conceptual and representational traditions of 
considering and expressing virtu's role in creation is to bring together the ontological 
distinction which each individualised being has, for example in the Aristotelian 
metaphysical tradition, and combine that with a sense of universal order within which 
man is in an active and dynamic relationship with God. God not only creates through virtu, 
but Dante casts that creation as an opportunity for fulfilment by man, ultimately through 
an imitation of the perfectly fulfilled human existence of Christ. The representational 
traditions' emphasis on fertility as a figure for the fulfilment of virtue, is transformed by 
Dante into the physical settings of his poem's events. While in the Lignum vitae the image 
of the tree was a learning tool, whose 'branches' man ascended through to attain towards 
Christ, Dante's trees are totally absorbed within the narrative events and yet also reveal 
the metaphysical and ethical messages of the fertility of virtu. The metaphysical, ethical 
and poetic, in his presentation, are inseparable. The next chapter will turn to consider how 
Dante envisages how the relationship of man and God is to be acted upon and how it exists 
at different points in man's journey towards God. 
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Divine Interaction in the Commedia 
1. Introduction 
While the previous chapter focused upon how Dante casts virtu within the ontological and 





particular, this chapter will focus upon how Dante stages the actions and interactions F 
which positively (or negatively) vivify the connection of God and man, the nexus of which 
is virtu; it will consider how ontological virtu is to be activated and demonstrated in 
ethical action, as well as showing the results of this interaction. The relationship of God 
and man is at the heart of Dante's narrative of moral and ontological change in the 
Commedia. How the poet presents this relationship through the realms and souls he 
encounters is the preoccupation of this chapter. The full richness of the poet's treatment of 
these preoccupations must be looked for not only in the narrative events of the poem but 
in the fabric of imagery which underlies these events and in the linguistic modes which 
Dante chooses to adopt. By conSidering this, we find virtu, and the nexus of concepts and 
images surrounding it, to be a recurring network, the interpretation of which reveals the 
poet's complex and integrated understanding of virtu and the human-divine relationship. 
As became apparent in the consideration of the conceptual and representational traditions 
and in the Commedia thus far, onto logically speaking, virtu is the creative principle of God 
and the power with which man is endowed by his existence to fulfil and perfect his nature. 
The ethical result of this ontological basis, also understood through virtu, is man's 
responsibility to fulfil his nature specifically as a created being, and therefore to enact 
virtu as the perfect love of God. This perfect love of God has the consequence of reordering 
man's relation to and use of his temporal existence. The term virtu is not always overt in 
the episodes this chapter will conSider, but they have been selected because they explore 
these complex interactions at different stages of the soul's development. Furthermore, the 
episodes not only explore conceptually the idea of human-divine interaction through virtu 
but also manifest the form and results of this interaction in the poetic forms and images 
they adopt. Montemaggi has suggested that language itself is a significant manifestation of 
the dynamics which link man to God. Therefore 
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any attempt to read the [Commedia] as a theological poem [ ... ] must take three 
things into account: first, the dynamics which [ ... ] define properly orientated 
relationships between human beings and God; second, the idea of language which, 
for Dante, is at one with these dynamics; and, third, the way in which Dante 
consciously presents the Com media as an example or model of such a kind of 
language.211 
The Commedia's interactive virtu-dynamic is manifested not only in how Dante 
conceptually explores man's relationship to God, but also in the language he himself 
chooses to express those relationships and in the language forms through which the 
relationships are expressed in the poem. Words and manifested actions are invested with 
the active power to transform an individual's ethical and spiritual course. 
In Chapter Three my analysis progressed, to a certain extent, backwards, beginning 
towards the end of Paradiso, and concluding in Purgator;o. It did so in order to 
demonstrate the connection made between the basis of creation and distinction in Dante's 
thought, and presentation of the individualised redemptive experiences of the souls in 
Purgatory; to shift from the universal to the particular. Instead this chapter will progress 
along more linear paths since it seeks to trace a changing and developing process which 
the Com media constructs. The Commedia's moral drama begins in despair and damnation, 
passes through the reaquisition of goodness and hope, and finally lays out a grand tableau 
of the joyful salvation of man in Paradise. This journey, I will argue, is accompanied by 
developing forms of interaction between the souls, the temporal world and, most 
importantly, God, that contribute to the picture of Dantean virtu I am building up. 
The three realms of Dante's afterlife are characterised by their differing relations to their 
author, God. Francesca's melancholy line, 'se fosse amico iI re de l'universo' (lnf. V.91) 
encapsulates the disjointed relationship between the souls in Inferno and God. The loving 
care which the Creator willingly gives to his creature is forfeited by the creature's own 
betrayal of its potential. The selfishness which typifies the souls in hell is the signal oftheir 
failure; by placing themselves at the centre of their concern, the humility which comes 
from the recognition of the beneficial hierarchy of creation breaks down and the souls are 
forever separated from God. The only relationship which can then exist is one of absolute 
justice on one side, and bitter blindness on the other. While this may be applied to the 
general state of Hell, to appreciate more fully the importance of the human-divine 
relationship as the only thing which can give positive value to human action in Dante's 







conception, I shall consider a somewhat anomalous space within Hell; a place in which the 
consciousness of failed potential is always present and in which the only cause of that 
failure can be traced to the lack of man's relationship to God: Limbo. It is precisely the 
absence of the recognition of the necessary relationship of man to God which damns those 
in Limbo and invalidates all of their 'good' actions. With his strikingly original portrayal of 
Limbo, Dante is experimenting with an idea of virtu. It is an overtly provocative and 
difficult passage whose message the pilgrim himself continues to struggle ~ith up to and 
perhaps beyond the events ofthe Com media. The poet is experimenting to see what would 
happen if he transplanted one ethical system into another; what happens if one 
transplants an ethics of time into one of eternity;212 an ethics without Christ into an ethics 
with Christ. It can never be fair, it can only be absolutely clear in its outcome. Limbo is a 
place of human virtu without God and therefore, if the term is understood in the light of 
the richer Christian, Dantean tradition I am suggesting, of no virtu at all. 
Instead Purgatorio is the realm in which God's action and man's interaction with it are at 
the heart of the soul's ethical and ontological development. We have already seen in 
chapter three how virtu participates in the reformation of the souls in Purgatory, both 
giving them airy bodies to perfect and working as an active agent in this perfection. 
Purgatory is the reassertion of the form which man and God's relationship ought to take. 
Here this relationship is presented as a work in progress. The poet's preoccupation with 
teaching his audience, with leading by example towards a better state of being, makes it 
essential that he presents not only the end but the means to attain that end. To take up an 
idea we saw in Chapter One, the role of virtu within the human-divine relationship is tied 
up with notions of testing and response. Like temporal life, Purgatory is a place in which 
the souls are tested in order to perfect themselves; the difference in Purgatory is that the 
souls always make the right choice and the right response. As typified by the response of 
Forese, they always see in that testing the ultimately beneficial action of God; they always 
see 'sollazzo' and not 'pena'.213 Purgatory is the foundation for the soul's new spiritual life 
and consciousness and the passage I will focus on in Purgatorio, cantos X and XI, is one 
concerned with how the poet conceives the ethical foundations necessary before man can 
rebuild his relationship with God. The terrace of pride marks the entrance into Purgatory 
proper and explores the avenues through which man can start to move towards God. In his 
reworking of the Lord's Prayer, Dante provides a guide to the currents which underpin the 
human-divine relationship, and manifests in its words how that relationship can be 
witnessed and activated. The Lord's Prayer is also closely linked to the lessons of the 
212 Amilcare Iannucci 'Inferno IV', In Lectura Dantis Virginiana, 6, supplement (1990), 42.54. 
213 Purgatorio XXlII.72. 
Ruth Chester 
136 
exempla, which appear on the terrace of pride, and in fact demonstrates the results of 
those lessons learned. 
Finally, in Paradiso, the poet presents the human-divine relationship in its perfected form; 
the souls exist in the perfect awareness of God and in continual openness to divine love. 
They are continually aware of their place in relation to God and there is no tension, no 
doubt. This prevailing peace is perhaps the poet's most compelling argument for 
recognizing the benefits of one's acknowledgement of the creature's place in relation to its 
Creator. While all of Paradise partakes of the perfect relationship between the soul and 
God, I will focus on two passages: Paradiso X-XII and Paradiso XXI. The first of these 
explores the traditional role of saints as a conduit between human activity and divine 
blessing, and considers how Dante imagines the ethical and ontological roles of St Francis 
and St Dominic in revealing the form which the exemplary interaction of God and man 
ought to take. The saints represent a dual form of interaction, perfectly interacting with 
and manifesting the plan of their divine maker, and also act as a perfect model of how man 
should interact with temporal life. Finally I shall consider a particular figuring of 
interaction in heaven which appears in Paradiso XXI. This interaction demonstrates the 
ultimate fruition of the human-divine relationship in which the soul comes to 
simultaneously see and reveal the virtu behind its existence. Occurring in the sphere ofthe 
contemplatives, it makes a further comment on the focus of desire and action away from 
the world and towards God which enables the fulfilment ofthe human-divine relationship. 
2. The Metaphysical Foundations of Interaction 
In our earlier consideration of Christian ideas of virtue, the absolute necessity of God's 
love for man and man's love for God in man's progression towards salvation became 
apparent. It is the human subject's relation to God which determines the value of their 
actions, rather than the actions themselves: as Davis suggested in relation to Augustine's 
thought, '[an act] has no quality, virtuous or vicious, until we determine the relation of the 
agent to God'.214 It becomes vital that the soul acts in such a way that demonstrates its 
consciousness of its ontological state as created and therefore recognises the hierarchical 
relationship which connects the creature to its Creator. Actions must then reflect the 
consciousness of this state of being and be principally marked by humility. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the process of learning humility is an interactive one between the testing 
power of God and man's choice of response. Essentially it is a lesson learned through 
experience. 
214 Davis, p. 12. 
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The question of how the soul comes to a state of recognition and how it learns humility 
are, both in the Christian context and in the Commedia itself, intimately tied up with an 
understanding of the vital role of Christ. Christ is the figure through whom God interacts 
with mankind on several different levels. As we saw in Chapter Three, metaphysically 
speaking, Christ is the virtu of God, that through which God creates and endows man and 
the universe with being. As Christ-Logos, he is also the principle of revelation in the 
universe. Furthermore, through Christ and his crucifixion the relationship between God 
and man, which had been disrupted by Adam's sin, is re-established and the way between 
Heaven and Earth is reopened. As Pelikan explains in summarising eleventh-century 
debates over the nature of Christ, this is tied closely to the doctrine of the Incarnation and 
the two natures of Christ: 'Only man was liable for satisfaction, only God was capable of 
total satisfaction; therefore "it is necessary that a God-man render it"'.215 Only through the 
willing sacrifice of man who is also God can the debt of original sin be satisfied and the 
potential of human nature to come to God be restored. While this is the metaphysical 
significance of Christ's incarnate life and crucifixion, temporally speaking, Christ is the 
person through whom God demonstrates the form which the perfected relationship of God 
and man should take and how man ought to act to fulfil that relationship. Augustine writes 
in De Civitate Dei that God takes on the weakness of man in the Incarnation in order to 
reveal the potential of human nature: 'suscepit a nobis et tenax divinitatis suae nostrae 
infirmitatis particeps factus est, ut nos in melius commutati, quod peccatores mortalesque 
sumus eius inmortalis et iusti participatione amittamus et quod in natura nostra bonum 
fecit impletum summo bono in eius naturae bonitate servemus' CDCD 21.15). Christ's 
Incarnation has both a salvi fie and exemplary purpose: to free mankind from the natural 
chain of original sin by demonstrating the freedom of his will and the potential of his 
nature. 
Most importantly, however, Christ's salvific act of Incarnation is an act of humility. In 
taking on corruptible flesh and dying for the sake of his own creature, Christ's act is 
humble and thus humility is the most significant form of imitatio Christi that mankind can 
adopt. Humility was a recurring preoccupation both in the conceptual and the 
representational traditions. In the latter, Christ's humility became an object for imitation 
and the mode in which man could approach in likeness to God. It will become apparent 
that humility is also a consistent preoccupation in how Dante conceives man's interaction 
with and return towards God. 
215 Pelikan, Ill, 142. Pelikan is here quoting Anselm, Cur Deus homo, 2.6. 
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Christ is both the way man's ultimate end can be achieved and the end itself. Augustine 
expresses this duality through an image which Dante himself reiterates. Again in De 
Civitate Dei, Augustine describes the action of Christ as follows: 
Deus dei filius, homine adsumpto [ ... ] et fundavit fidem, ut ad homines Deum iter 
esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo 
Christus Iesus. Per hoc enim mediator per quod homo, per hoc et via. Quoniam si 
inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tend it via media est, spes est perveniendi [ ... ] sola 
est autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo. 
(DCD 11.2) 
Christ is the way between God and man, both in terms of metaphysical relationship and 
practical exemplum. In Paradiso XXIII, when the pilgrim gets his first distant glimpse of 
Christ in heaven, Beatrice reiterates the metaphysical action of Christ in the redemption of 
mankind precisely through the image of the road: 
[ ... ] Quel che ti sobranza 
e virtu da cui nulla si ripara. 
Quivi e la sapienza e la possanza 
ch'apri Ie strade tra 'I delo e la terra, 
onde fu sllunga disianza. (Par. XXIII.35-39) 
Alongside the traditional names of Christ as sapienza and possanza, is a usage of virtu 
which refers directly to the influence of Christ upon the pilgrim's perception; it is used in 
specific reference to the overwhelming light which overpowers the pilgrim's sight. This 
light is the figuring of the direct virtu of Christ. Dante is again establishing virtu as a name 
of Christ and this time linking it directly to the interaction which Christ makes between 
heaven and earth. This is one both of metaphysical opening and communication with 
human perception. 
Recognition and imitation of Christ, therefore, become fundamental ways in which man is 
called on to interact with God, since Christ-man is the perfect locus of that interaction 
itself. Christ's virtu both manifests the world and sensitises the world to its createdness. In 
his temporal existence he demonstrates the modes of activity by which man can return to 
God: humility of soul, revelation of God in the word and a recognition of the created world 




3. Failed Interaction 
The term 'virtuous pagans' is so frequently and unconsciously applied to the adult souls 
whom the poet assigns to Limbo, that its validity in relation to a Dantean idea of virtu 
receives little critical attention.216 It is accurate to the extent which the text itself asserts; 
Virgil claims that he dwells in Limbo 'con quei che Ie tre sante / virtu non si vestiro, e 
sanza vizio / conobber l'altre e seguir tutte quante' (Purg. VI1.34-36). The debate on virtu 
in relation to the Limbo-pagans has tended to focus upon their possession of the cardinal 
but not the theological virtues. Furthermore, the shock and novelty provided by Dante's 
original inclusion of pagans in Limbo at all has claimed much attention and has fed into 
debates on how the medieval period in general viewed the idea and possibilities of the 
'virtuous pagans'.217 But there has been little real questioning of the virtu of the pagans in 
the context of the Com media itself. In the light of the Commedia's virtu-dynamic, which I 
have been suggesting, the term 'virtuous pagans' can be productively reconsidered. 
In condemning those in Limbo, Dante the poet of the Com media asserts that no matter how 
good a person is in objective, ethical terms, without God they cannot be saved.218 With the 
coming of Christ and the redefinition of virtu which it necessitates, ethical interaction 
must take on a new form which is inseparable from a particular ontological basis. 
'Goodness' is a state of being in which one has recognised the source of one's 'good' and 
has tended one's actions and desires towards the ground of one's being. This is not the 
same thing as to say that humans unaided cannot be 'ethically good' but rather the poet is 
asserting that what is ultimately good for a human being is to be in a positive, reciprocal 
relationship with the divine. If this relationship is unacknowledged or unsought after then 
what is 'good' cannot be so. Dante, the Christian poet, asserts that this relationship can 
only be most full and perfect through adherence to the Christian faith. Virgil's statement in 
Limbo in reference to his companions is totally clear: 's'elli hanno mercedi, / non basta, 
perche non ebber battesmo, / ch'e porta de la fede che tu credi' (In/. IV 34-6). Without the 
relationship of man and God, the value-giving force behind human action, that action is 
worthless. Therefore virtu, as value-holding action, the gift which God gives to those who 
love Him, is impossible for those outside of that relationship. But what Virgil does describe 
216 From the many possible examples oftexts which use this term here are a few examples; Amllcare Iannucci's 
critical essay on Limbo in Dante's Inferno: The Indiana Critical Edition, ed. by Mark Musa (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995); Robert Hollander's commentary to Inferno (New York and London: 
Doubleday, 2000); Cindy L. Vlno, The Virtuous Pagan In Medieval Literature (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1989). 
217 F.or a thorough and perceptive exploration of the problematics of Dante's Limbo and the good pagans, 
particularly in relation to Aristotelian and Thomistic thought, see Foster's three essays 'The Two Dantes (I) (II) (Ill)', pp. 156-253 . 
218 For scholarly work on Inferno IV, see Iannucci 'Inferno IV'; Luciano Anceschi, 'Inferno IV',ln Letture 
dantesche, ed. Giovanni Geno (Florence: Sansoni, 1962), pp. 59-71; G. Padoan '1\ Limbo dantesco', Lettere 
Italiane XXI, 4 (1969), 369-88. 
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as having been possible for the pre-Christians is precisely a form oflove for God, an ability 
to 'adorar debitamente a Dio' (In! IV.38). It is a positive failure on the part of the Limbo 
dwellers to not love as they ought to have done. They fail in the movement of the mind and 
will in the necessary search for the source of one's created being; they fail in active 
fulfilment rather than potential. 
Dante's Limbo is indeed a challenging experiment in trying to come to terms with 
humanity's autonomous capabilities. Coming as it does so close to the beginning of the 
pilgrim's journey, the poet confronts head on the insufficiency of Godless humanity. While 
it is relegated to the eternal hopelessness of Limbo at the opening of the poem, what 
happens to the good man without God is a recurring preoccupation throughout the 
Commedia. Each reoccurrence adds something to the complexity of Dante's presentation. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, in Purgatorio III Virgil comments on the search for 
knowledge of the Limbo-dwellers which remains fruitless without their acknowledgement 
of Incarnation (31-45). In Purgatorio VII, Virgil reiterates lack of faith as the cause of his 
damnation (8). Without this faith to 'infuse' them in such a way that their actions were 
turned towards God, the virtues which he and his fellows practised were insufficient. Both 
these episodes bring to light the importance of man's recognition of God as the source of 
his being for his actions to be endowed with value which makes his fulfilment possible. 
This potential is inherent to human existence itself. It is not enough for man to do good; 
his actions must be reunited with the original source of goodness and existence so that the 
order of his activity can be raised to a value-holding level. This message is ultimately set 
forth in canto XIX of Paradiso in which the pilgrim asks for a final explanation of God's 
justice in condemning good but Godless humanity only to be responded to with a non-
answer; an answer which demands faith, not only on the part ofthe pilgrim but on the part 
of the reader. The point can never be resolved because to resolve it would undermine the 
message that only God can 'know why'. With that in mind, all the poet can then do is to 
show the ways in which humans can, or can fail to, come into a fruitful relationship with 
God. By addressing these ideas so early in the poem as Limbo, the poet establishes a field 
of questions in the mind of the audience which he answers with examples and counter-
examples. As we shall come to see, in Limbo, through the combination of idea and image, 
the poet conceives the results of the failure of the human-divine relationship. 
Limbo is represented by the poet as a place of historical, theological, geographical and 
individual isolation. It lies outside the judgement of Minos, outside of divine justice, 
identifying it, along with the canto of the ignavi, as a place containing those who did not 
use their temporal life enough to deserve either salvation or damnation. However, while 
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Limbo stands outside of judgement, it significantly stands within creation; it is on the 
inside ofthe gate before which 'non fuor cose create' (Inf. 111.7). By this positioning in the 
structure of Hell, a dramatic contrast is made between the faithlessness of the Limbo-
dwellers in not acknowledging their created state and the assertion of their createdness as 
inherent to their existence as humans. In a sense, they are created whether they know it or 
not and thus can be judged by their relation to that existential state. While isolated from 
the Christian ethical scheme, they cannot be isolated from the condition of all humanity 
and are therefore judged by their relation to that standard. The judgement which the poet 
assigns to the Limbo-dwellers is one overtly based on their ontological state and their 
non-acknowledgment of it.' . 
Limbo is distinguished physically from the rest of Hell in several important ways. It is a 
place of calm stillness in sharp contrast to the chaotic innavi on one side and the storm-
tossed lustful on the other. Such an anomalous atmosphere necessarily draws attention to 
itself, highlighting this first instance of the poet's preoccupation with the topic of Godless 
man. Both pilgrim and reader are shocked out of their expectations of Hell and forced to 
re-evaluate preconceived standards of salvation and damnation. The pilgrim's moment of 
realisation when he recognises the famous people he will come to see who are 
nevertheless damned, demands that we rethink the nature of valore for a human being. If 
the individuals here found in Hell are of molto valore, then why are they here? How has the 
pilgrim previously misunderstood human worth? It is revealing to consider the rhyming 
words in this instance of valore: 
Gran duol mi prese al cor quando 10 'ntesi, 
pero che gente di molto valore 
conobbi che 'n quell limbo eran sospesi. 
'Dimmi, maestro mio, dimmi, segnore,' 
comincia' io per voler esser certo 
di quella fede che vince ogne errore: 
uscicci mai alcuno, 0 per suo merto 
o per altrui, che poi fosse beato?' (In/. IV.43-50) 
Up to, and far beyond this point, Virgil is the pilgrim's beloved guide; but he is not 
infallible from the poet's perspective. The rhyming of valore-segnore-errore, draws 
attention to the interrelation of the three ideas; the valore of humanity as understood by 
the pilgrim's sennore, Virgil, has proved itself at this point in Limbo to be errore. Instead 
the pilgrim seeks for the 'fede che vince ogne errore'. His question to Virgil is revealing of 
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the underlying idea that human worth, human actions as having a valore, depends not 
upon themselves ('suo merto') but upon the power of Another - 'per altrui' - to give them 
value. The pilgrim's faith is in fact fulfilled by the unknowing Virgil through reference to 
the Incarnation, the sacrifice of Christ and the Harrowing of Hell: 'vidi venire un possente, 
/ con segno di vittoria coronato. / Trasseci l'ombra del primo parente' (53-55). The souls 
of the Hebrew fathers could only be released because of their hope in Christ and through 
his aid. While the pilgrim can as yet not judge rightly the true valore of humanity and 
remains both impressed and saddened by the condition of those in Limbo, the poet subtly 
establishes that the va/ore of humanity is based on the recognition and aid of this greater 
power. The pilgrim has at this point, in a sense, not appreciated fully the significance of 
Virgil's words 's'elli han no mercedi, / non basta, perche non ebber battesmo, / ch'e porta 
della fede che tu credi' (34-36), biased as he is by his attachment to the speaker. He sees 
the Limbo-dwellers for their historical greatness, imagining them outside of the 
undeniable Christian context in which he finds them and in which their inadequacy is 
clear. Much of the dramatic tension of Limbo comes from this 'misalignment'; the pilgrim 
sees the memory of what these souls were on earth and cannot yet judge them correctly 
within the greater scheme of divine justice in which these souls failed to play their part in 
the ontological dialogue. If we instead look through the poet's eyes, his construction of 
Limbo simultaneously demonstrates respect for and undermines the souls within it This 
undermining continues to be carried out through the physical presentation of Limbo. 
Limbo is further distinguished from the rest of Hell by its light. As the pilgrim approaches 
it he sees, 'un foco / ch'emisperio di tenebre vincia' (69), that is, a point at which light and 
dark meet. Later as he enters the castle he finds himself 'in loco aperto, luminoso e alto' 
(116). Limbo is unusually light, but it is not securely light Even before Its respective canto 
ends, the light emanating from it is swamped and the pilgrim comes to a place 'ove non e 
che luca' (151). Even more explicitly, when Virgil, standing in Purgatory, describes his 
Limbo home to Sordello it is as a place 'di tenebre solo' (Purg. VI 1.29). In comparison with 
the true light which Virgil has now seen in Purgatory, he is able to recognise the 
insufficiency of the light which fills Limbo. Although in an overtly humanistic argument 
which I do not intend to pursue here, Pompeati makes the valid point that Limbo contains 
'una luce che sale dal basso e non scende dal cielu, cioe [ ... ] un lume di ragione umana',Z19 
As we shall come to see, in the Com media light is frequently employed as a metaphor for 
God's grace: that 'unmerited love' which God disperses through creation and which it is 
creation's responsibility to respond to with answering love. It is moreover, frequently a 
figure for virtu. If we think back to Paradiso II, the light ofthe heavens was a mark of their 
219 Arturo Pompeati. Canto IV de/Inferno: Leetura dantis seal/gera (Florence: Le Monnier. 1960). p. 18. 
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virtu; in Paradiso XXX, we will come to see rivers of light which are manifestations of virtu. 
Light then is a mark of the extent to which a being receives and reveals divine virtu. With 
this in mind, the Limbo dwellers are reminiscent of Augustine's philosophers in the 
Confessions who were 'per impiam superbiam recedentes, et deficientes lumine tuO'.220 
The creature's pride in itself separates it from the light of its Creator. The light of Limbo, 
emanating from the place itself, is the light of human reason without grace and 'Ia natura 
umana, se non e illuminata dalla luce della grazia, non puo con Ie sue sole forze 
raggiungere la perfezione di cui e cap ace, che consiste nell'unione con Dio' .221 Limbo's light 
is a false light, an unsustainable light because it finds its source only in itself, and although 
giving temporary light to the pilgrim, indeed to 'Everyman', it does not illuminate beyond 
itself. Limbo's light is a manifestation of ontological limits which man imposes upon 
himself if he believes himself limitless. 
The light of Limbo, furthermore, is one which the poet suggests does not facilitate true 
seein9. On his recounting of the Harrowing of Hell, it is apparent that Virgil did not 
recognise the figure of Christ for what he really was (46-63). While the patriarchs had 
enough faith to be worthy of release by Christ himself, Virgil's self-sustained human 
reason did not and could not reveal truth to him. Limbo's light is only effective in 
retrospect when viewed after the coming of Christ, by which human reason is given new 
value and new autonomy. This idea has been already suggested by the poet's rhyming of 
valore earlier in this canto. Virgil's own text, while unable to enlighten himself, is yet able 
to cast light behind itself, bringing about the conversion of Statius (Purg. XXII.6 7 _69).222 By 
the coming of Christ into the world in which human nature is reformed and elevated even 
pre-Christian texts, seen through the lens of the Incarnation, can be read correctly and 
contain value. 
That the Limbo dwellers existed without faith and therefore without the expectation of 
Christ, is also manifested in the workings of the contrapasso in Limbo in which their 
temporal state is carried to its eschatological outcome: 'sanza speme vivemo in disio' (42). 
In defining hope in the Summa Theo[o9iae, Aquinas describes it as a particular form of 
desire whose object is good, in the future, and difficult, though not impossible, to acquire 
(ST la2ae40,1). Furthermore, hope implies an active movement towards the object of 
desire. The theological virtue hope (as distinct from hope generally) is made a unique form 
of desire because of the nature of its object: God, the transcendent good of man. As the 
ultimate object of hope lies so beyond natural powers, so the virtue to get to this object 
220 Augustine, Confessions, 5.4, 
221 Fausto Montanari, 'Limbo', in ED, III (1971), pp. 651.54. 
m See Albert Ascoll, Dante and the Making of a Modern Author (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 363, on the changing worth of Virgil's text in relation to Statlus's and Dante's own texts. 
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must act with supernatural aid; a circular process of desire and dependence emerges. 
Hope is a form of union with God, as it is by this action that man recognises God as the 
source of the goods promised by faith, activating that faith into a propelling desire for the 
source of that good: 'Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis principium perfectae 
bonitatis, inquantam scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatudinem 
obtinendam' (ST 2a2ae, 17,6). To exist in a state 'sanza speme' and yet 'in disio', therefore, 
is the ultimate result of the faithlessness of the Limbo dwellers; their lack of recognition of 
the correct object condemns them to be excluded from the aid of that object in their 
attainment of itself. They can have no hope because they have made the object of their 
natural desire as created beings impossible to attain. The 'fruits' of faith and hope are 
forever denied them (Pury. 1I1.40) and they are instead condemned to fruitless desire.223 It 
is precisely the absence of interaction between will and object, the souls and God, which is 
implied by their punishment of hopelessness. 
The unchanging isolation of the state of hopelessness and the failed relationship which 
condemns the Limbo-dwellers is further developed by the poet in other physical aspects of 
Limbo. Within the already isolated space of Limbo stands the nobile castello with its seven 
walls into which the pilgrim is led by the bella scuD/a. In all of its various interpretations, 
the castle is a monument to human intellectual and moral achievement.224 However, the 
exact identity of the castle is not perhaps so revealing as what Dante does with it: so little. 
It is an enclosed space, a barrier which includes and excludes but beyond this, Iannucci 
suggests, '[t]he absence of detail betrays its diminished status'.22S It is a half-hearted echo 
of Virgil's Elysium but we thus find in Dante's use of this image a reiteration of the 
problem of applying a temporal scheme onto eternity; while Virgil's Elysium is a place of 
passage, Dante's is one of eternity. The walls of the castle 'separate reason from passion 
and malice, but they also separate reason from revelation and grace',226 The closed walls of 
the castle represent the closed self-sufficiency of the souls within; the seven walls express 
the regulated order of classical human virtue but they also express its limits and 
exclusions. Ultimately Dante rejects, not the classical scheme of virtue but instead the 
absolute solidity and unchangingness of its self-sufficiency, 
The isolation of the castle is overtly a separation and it is this separation which diminishes 
the value of the virtues it represents, The nobile castello stands separated from the rest of 
Limbo 'difeso intorno d'un bel fiumicello. / Questo passammo come terra dura' (108-9). 
223 For a useful explanation of the nature of desire-as-Ioss, see Lombardi pp. 11-13 and p. 163. 
224 This im~ge has been variously interpreted and It Is not the object of this analysis to present a new 
Interpretation or repeat an old one. For Interpretations of the nobile castello, see Domenico Consoli, 'castello', 
In ED, I (1970), pp. 864-66; Pompeati, p. 15. 
225 Iannucci, p. 49. 
226 Jannucci, pp. 48-49. 
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Water, like light, is a figure for grace in Dante and, along with grace, it is a figure for the 
transmission of virtu, as we came to see in the Earthly Paradise. In this case, however, it is 
a symbol of anti-grace and anti-virtu. It isolates the castle and in its hardness becomes a 
symbol of non-interaction. Iannucci has described the passage of the pilgrim and his 
companions over the solid stream as a 'failed baptism';227 it is a figure for the soul's non-
engagement with the virtu of God. Remembering Aquinas's doctrine of the infused moral 
virtues, which are God's reward to humanity which has accepted him, the failed baptism is 
another image of refusal. Walking continually unbaptised over the stream, the souls are 
constantly reminded of their temporal and now eternal non-engagement. Unlike the 
waters of Eden which transform those who pass through them restoring them to the 
original condition of man, 'the river of Limbo shackles those inside the castle to the 
timebound pattern of their own thought'.228 Iannucci's comment here emphasises the 
limitations of the Limbo-dwellers in terms of time and eternity. Their temporal honours 
and achievements are stripped of value once located within the eternal and ontological 
context of Christianity. The souls here are able to carry on being what they always were 
and only when inserted by the poet into the Christian ontological scheme of the Commedia 
does this become a damnation. Only then is their spiritual isolation and therefore ultimate 
lack of virtu revealed; Anceschi describes theirs as 'la situazione di solitudine [ ... ] della 
solitudine della mente dell'uomo [ ... ] abbandonato a se medesimo'.229 The Limbo dwellers' 
non-interaction with God's virtu, which is inherent to their own created state, condemns 
them to a lifeless eternity. 
This lifelessness is powerfully manifested in the figures themselves and makes an 
important comment on their failure of virtu. On hearing Virgil's description, the pilgrim 
forms an idea of who he will see in Limbo. He expects, 'gente di molto valore', and indeed 
he sees the exalted poets of his imagination and the 'spiriti magni' who sit inside the 
castello. But the only life which these spirits seem to have is that given them by historical 
reputation; they are only and eternally their past selves. The long list of names which the 
poet details serves to build up a list of individuals whose only distinguishing features 
depend on what we as readers already know about them. Within the poem they remain 
'unvivified'. 
mi fuor mostrati Ii spiriti magni, 
che del vedere in me stesso m'essalto. 
I' vidi Eletra con molti com pagni 
227 Iannucci, p. 50. 
228 Iannucci, p. SO. . 
229 Anceschi, pp. 66-67. 
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[ ... ] 
Vidi Cammilla e la Pantasilea; 
[ ... ] 
Vidi quel Bruto che caccio Tarquino, 
[ ... ] 
vidi'l maestro di color che sanno ... (Inf.IV.119-31) 
The incessant repetition of 'vidi' involves the reader in an objective tour of the great 
figures of human history who sit like statues, unmoving on the 'verde smalto' (118). It is 
significant to note that these figures are without emotion: 'sembianz' avevan ne trista ne 
lieta' (84). We saw in Chapter One the importance of feeling in the development of virtue; 
it is the testing, trying and reaction of the human will which are the tools with which 
virtue is built within the individual through man's interaction with the life offered him by 
God. To be emotionless is therefore to be unable to become virtuous. The emotionless 
inaction of the Limbo-dwellers is another manifestation of their incompleteness, their 
ontological unfulfilment and their lack of hope as the movement towards God. Kirkpatrick 
points out that while '[i]n Paradise [ ... ] human beings are being human - displayed, that is, 
through their activities', in Hell they stand 'in pseudo-monumental attitudes of self-
aggrandizement'.23o The Limbo-dwellers are what people remember them to have been in 
life, in fact to see them is something of a 'non-experience' if the figures are detached from 
their historical reputation; they remain unable to become anything beyond their temporal 
selves. They are in this sense, totally without virtu as the vivified and vivifying principle 
built up in the Commedia, that simultaneous potential for and fulfilment of ontological 
perfection. 
The figures are vivified only in the memory of the reader and not within the text itself; 
they do not and cannot form an active part of the positive development of the Commedia 
because they are not within the ontological interaction which drives the movement of the 
poem forward. The Limbo-dwellers act as a kind of anti-exemplum. They are without 
detail or positive action worthy of emulation, and their eschatological state is 
overwhelmingly negative. Their place is sustained in Limbo by their earthly reputation 
and God's acknowledgement of it: 'L'onrata nominanza I che di lor suona sit ne la tua vita, 
I grazla acquista in ciel che stH avanza' (In! IV 76-78). But the 'grazia' which this obtains 
is only sufficient to bathe them in a half light surrounded by chaotic darkness. To rely on 
past reputation is insufficient; at the same time by, in a sense, deadening the lists of 
230 Robin Kirkpatrick, 'Polemics of Praise: Theology as Text, Narrative, and Rhetoric In Dante's Com media', In 
Dante's Commedia, Theology as Poetry, ed. by Vittorio Montemaggl and Matthew Treherne (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), pp.14-35 (p. 24). 
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individuals, the poet is also reflecting on the poetic tradition of those lists themselves. The 
transformative ontological message of the Commedia is new and must therefore develop 
new forms of communicating that message. The repeated 'vidi' which the poet employs 
serves to distance the reader from the figures as though observing a sculpture gallery. 
Although the pilgrim does interact with some of these figures, significantly their words are 
not compelling enough to be transmitted through the text to the reader. 
Cosl andammo infino a la lumera, 
parlando cose che 'I tacere e bello, 
sl com' era 'I parlar cola dov' era. (In/. IV.103-S) 
While the poet's affected silence serves to maintain the elitist mystique of his conversation 
with the great poets of history, the fact that their words remain unsaid overtly in the 
Com media is perhaps another example of the two standards at work in the poet's figuring 
of Limbo. While endowing those in Limbo with intellectual prestige, they are mute within 
the poem, their voices not suitable for the Christian narrative, and so the Limbo-dwellers 
remain condemned to eternal silence. 
4. Rebuilding Interaction 
As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, Significant scholarly work has been dedicated 
to considering the virtues in Purgatorio. The virtues are inculcated in the souls through 
exempla and activity, learning and doing. This process draws both from the Aristotelian 
model of the acquisition of moral virtue and the tradition of the exempla. My aim in this 
section is to build from that idea, to consider how Dante figures the interactions behind 
the soul's development in Purgatory; to consider the nature of virtu itself in order to 
understand how it underpins the exempla and acquisition of the virtues. 
Purgatorio is the realm in which the virtu-dynamic which links man and God is most 
evident. The souls are reformed and punished in order to return them to a prelapsarian 
perfect condition of receptivity. Moreover, in its structural dynamic, by which virtues are 
exemplified and inculcated and vices are purged, it presents a practical and tangible idea 
of what it is to be virtuous. This is closely linked to an imitation of Christ. Cantos X and XI 
are the first to fully utilise this structure of contrasting vice with virtue and describe the 
first area in which active transformation of the souls takes place. They detail the 
correction of the foundational sin of pride and, therefore, by correcting the sin from which 
all others spring, the lessons learned are likewise foundational for all development in 
Ruth Chester 
148 
Purgatory. The correction which occurs here is characterised by a rejoining of man and 
God at a most fundamental level, focusing on man and God as creature and Creator and 
establishing how each must interact with the other. Purgatorio XI opens with a rewriting 
of the Lord's Prayer, a rewriting which exposes and establishes the poet's thinking on the 
nature of the human-divine relationship which is established through Purgatory and 
virtu's place within it. The very fact that it is a prayer, and moreover a prayer of the proud 
learning to be humble, brings the theme of that interactive relationship to the fore. Prayer 
is that by which man acknowledges his God. Dante expands the Lord's Prayer in such a 
way as to emphasise the lesson of humility which the first terrace of Purgatory seeks to 
instil.231 
Before the Prayer, however, canto X provides an important context within which the 
prayer must be read. Canto X focuses upon the teaching of humility in the exempla which 
decorate the walls of the terrace, in the difficulty of Dante and Virgil's ascent which makes 
them aware of their own weakness, and in the hints towards artistic and creative humility 
in the face of divine creation, which will be taken up in the Pilgrim's conversation with 
Oderisi later in canto XI. Georges Giintert in his lectura of canto X has argued that at this 
point the poet presents pride and humility through images of hardness and malleability; 
the hard marble becomes alive under Dante's willing gaze, just as the narrow path which 
led the travellers up to this terrace was presented as a moving, fluid entity.232 This 
contrast of hard and soft becomes the manifestation of the stato d'anima of the proud and 
humble: 
II duro sasso, plasmato dal sommo artista, eccolo diventare morbida e preghevole 
materia, poiche la 'cera' [ ... ] atta a ricevere it sigillo, e per Dante sinonimo della 
materia in mano al Creatore e quindi anche dell'umanita ubbidiente, rappresentato 
per eccellenza dalla vergine che accoglie in Sf, con totale dedizione, la parola di 
DiO.233 
Giintert's words reiterate the interaction of divine form and created matter which, as we 
have already seen, is figured by Dante through a virtu-dynamic. In analysing the Earthly 
Paradise it became apparent that the souls arrived there had been remodelled and purged 
in order to properly receive and reveal the image of the divine. This is described by Dante 
in Paradiso XIII as only having happened in the creations of Adam and Christ where it was 
231 On Purgatorio X and XI see: Treherne; Giuseppe Polimeni, 'La gloria della lingua: conslderazlone dl poetlca 
n~l~o snodo di Pur~ator.io X-~I-XII', In Esperimenti danteschi: Purgatorio, pp. 105-33; Georges Guntert, 'Canto 
X, In Lectura dantls tUrlcensIs: Purgatorlo, pp. 139-55; Karlhelnz Stierle, 'Canto XI', In Lectura dantis turicensis: 
Purgatorio, pp.157-172. 
232 Purg. X.37-41; X.7-9. 
233 Giintert, 'Canto X', p. 144. 
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precisely virtu which he described as having imprinted upon perfect matter. Essentially, it 
is only through humility, the removal of the self-will, that divine virtu can be fully revealed. 
Much later in Paradiso I, Beatrice describes how matter can fail to properly reveal the seal 
with which it is imprinted: 
perch' a risponder la materia e sorda, 
cosl da questo corso si diparte 
talor la creatura, c'ha poder 
di piegar, cosl pinta, in altra parte. (Par. 1.129-132) 
It is in the misuse of the will in the bending away from God that the creature can fail to 
reveal its Creator. In the events of Purgatorio X, the images of hard and malleable, fixed 
and receptive, recur as ways in which Dante conceives of the state d'anima of those 
engaged or unengaged in the Creator-creature relationship. This openness or malleability 
to God's informing hand is of especial significance in the exemplum of the Virgin receiving 
the Annunciation: 
[ ... ] iv' era imaginata quella 
ch'ad aprir l'alto amor volse la chiave; 
e avea in atto impressa esta favella 
'Ecce ancilla DeI' propriamente 
come figura in cera si suggella. (Purg. X.40-4S) 
Through the Virgin's humble acceptance of the will of God, Christ is enabled to become 
incarnate and salvation can enter the world.z34 Dante's formulation emphasises that it is 
the interaction of God's virtu with the responding love of his creature which brings about 
the Incarnation. In Purgatorio X, the soul arrived there is shown an example of what it 
itself can achieve in the sacrifice ofits own will and the development of humility. 
What we see in the souls of the proud who appear at the end of Purgotorio X is their 
reformation by the hand of God. They are literally bent, reformed into the position of 
humility and thus made potential matter, ready to receive the informing seal of God. The 
loving willingness of their suffering expressed in prayer encapsulates the reformed, 
malleable state d'onima by which man can receive God, being harmonised to his will. 
234 Steven Bott:rill has explor~d the presentation of Mary as a living, real exemplum on the terraces of 
Purgatory and In the Commed/Q as a whole In Dante and the Mystical Tradition: Bernard ofCIairvaux In the 
'Com media' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See especially p. lS 7. 
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The intense suffering of the souls, here tested to the utmost - 'Piu non posso' (139) - and 
the discomfort (,rancura') which this creates in the viewer, is immediately relieved by the 
tone of canto Xl's opening, which emphasises the souls' loving willingness in suffering. We 
have seen that religious literature of Dante's time was not afraid to focus upon pain to 
drive home its message, but what perhaps surprises us about Dante's prayer is the subtle 
joy and willing acceptance which infuses it, thrown into sharp relief by the horror of the 
closing lines of canto X. 
o Padre nostro, che ne' cieli stai, 
non circunscritto, rna per piu amore 
ch'ai primi effetti di la su tu hai, 
laudato sia 'I tuo nome e 'I tuo valore 
da ogne creatura, com' e degno 
di render grazie al tuo dolce vapore. 
Vegna ver' noi la pace del tuo regno, 
che noi ad essa non potem da noi, 
s'ella non vien, con tutto nostro ingegno. 
Come del suo voler Ii angeli tuoi 
fan sacrificio ate, cantando osanna, 
cosl facciano li uomini de' suoi. 
Da oggi a noi la cotidiana manna, 
sanza la qual per questo aspro diserto 
a retro va chi piu di gir s'affanna. 
E come noi 10 mal ch'avem sofferto 
perdoniamo a ciascuno, e tu perdona 
benigno, e non guardar 10 nostro merto. 
Nostra virtu che di legger s'adona, 
non spermentar con l'antico avversaro, 
rna libera da lui che s11a sprona. 
Quest' ultima preghiera, segnor caro, 
gia non si fa per noi, che non bisogna, 
rna per color che dietro a noi restaro. (Purg. XI.1-24) 
Expression through prayer is itself a significant statement. In Purgatorio VI, Virgil has 
explained the failure of the prayers of the characters of his Aeneid. They were ineffectual 
'perche 'I priego da Dio era disgiunto' (42). Instead, here in Purgatory, prayer is 
reconnected with the true source of generous existence who can give value to the prayer 
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itself. Dante's choice of this prayer, the universal prayer which encompasses all others, 
sets the events of this terrace as foundational, as somehow having a bearing on all to 
come. It is the prayer which encapsulates the nature of the relationship of God to man, that 
of parent and child: '0 Padre nostro' - the 'nostro' breaking down the divisions of self and 
sense of difference which typify the characters of the proud. It is also Christ's prayer, the 
actual Son of the Father, which is then taught by him to the disciples thereby bringing 
them into the community of the Church, which is both a temporal organization and a 
metaphysical state of being. Its significance here is then manifold; those who have now 
entered Purgatory proper have entered into the body of the Church, thus entering into an 
official contract between God and man. We find here a most significant shift; pride, the 
first sin by which Lucifer and Adam separated themselves from God, is overcome by the 
prayer of Christ, who metaphysically reversed the prideful action of Adam through his 
humble self-sacrifice and established the community of the Church. The lines between the 
temporal and metaphysical become blurred and the impact of action upon metaphysical 
reality is revealed; pride leads to damnation, humility to salvation of all. 
The disembodied voice which appears out of nowhere at the opening of the canto, 
combined with the initial familiarity of the words, has also the effect of drawing the reader 
into the act of prayer - an action of temporal humility - as if they are reciting along with 
the words; to read the prayer is to pray and to join in the community united under the 
common Father. The action of prayer itself expresses the foundational unity of the group: 
as Treherne rightly points out, '[t]he version of the Pater Noster of the penitent proud is 
not sung by any particular individual; the communal performance of the prayer 
undermines any residual egotism on their part'.235 This community in particular expresses 
its unity by emphasising its shared ontological origin. 
From the opening, it is specifically God's act of creation which is praised. At the same time 
there is a distinct idea of how that creation takes place, which is reminiscent of the 
Trinitarian interaction of creation we saw in Chapter Three. The only way in which God 
can in any way be 'located' is by understanding where his love is more greatly focused, 
which is upon the things he created first (1-3). Amore, falling in the rhyme position, is 
thereby brought by the poet into a central place in his conception of the creative process, 
being rhymed with the two other terms which express how God creates: Valore and 
Vapore. The variously interpreted terms of valore and vapore, whether distinct 
characteristics of the members of the Trinity or aspects of God the Father alone, are 
nevertheless both connected to the notion of creative virtu: Valore, the power and potency 
235 Treherne, p. 134. 
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of God and vapore the effusion of that potency down to creation.236 And it is specifically as 
creation that the soul must respond with praise: 'laudato sia [ ... ] da ogne creatura'. The 
word va/ore has already been used by the poet on the terrace of pride. But while the usage 
here at XI.4 refers to God's va/ore, the earlier usage was to that of the Emperor Trajan: 
'Quiv'era storiata l'alta Gloria / del roman principato, il cui valore / mosse Gregorio a la 
sua gran vittoria' (Purg. X.73-7S). The va/ore, which Dante here refers to, is Trajan's 
humility; it is Trajan's act of humility towards the widow which encourages Gregory to 
pray for his salvation, thus enabling him to be reborn and saved. Dante's hardly casual 
usage of this precise term in such close proximity, and both times in the rhyme position, 
cannot help but suggest that the connotations which each evokes ought to be read in 
dialogue with one another. Thus we might suggest an implication by the poet that man's 
humility, that by which he recognises himself as a created being, the equal not superior of 
other created beings around him, is the right and necessary fulfilment of and response to 
the creative Valore of God: that Valore which asserts God's power over creation while at 
the same time demonstrating his generosity in creating. This contrasts with the mistaken 
valore of the self-sufficient souls of Limbo which lacks the foundation of faith and God, and 
the humility that faith necessitates. 
Dante's reworking of the Lord's Prayer is a declaration of the insufficiency of man to attain 
salvation without God. Again Treherne points out that Dante's 'additions to the biblical 
version ofthe Pater Noster [ ... ] emphasize the souls' dependence on God and diminish any 
sense of their own strength and ability',237 The poet expresses this insufficiency on an 
ontological level by stressing it in relation to the two fundamental aspects of human 
nature which have already appeared in debates on virtu: ingegno and voler. In Aristotelian 
virtue ethics (and arguably in Dante's own Convivio)238 the perfection of these two 
faculties lies within human power alone. However, here in canto XI, any sense of human 
self-sufficiency is gone; the effort of 'tutto nostro ingegno' (9) is insufficient to achieve the 
peace of heaven, and rather than flaunting the autonomy of the human will, the souls 
instead joyfully make sacrifice of it 'cantando osanna' (11). Jf, as Kirkpatrick suggests, 
'humility and penitence are exact expressions of our existential condition', then in the 
recitation of this prayer the souls are actively moving towards a more profound 
expression of their nature.239 Therefort: to humbly submit the two facets of human nature 
236 Chiavacci-Leonardi in her commentary establishes both Interpretations while favouring that which 
attributes 'nome' 'valore' and 'vapore' all to the Father as being more consistent with Dante's use of the terms 
elsewhere. Chiavacci-Leonardi and Singleton both link 'vapore' to Wisdom 7:25, 'Vapor est enlm vlrtutls del' 
and Chiavacci-Leonardi and Kirkpatrick identify vapore as the effusion which comes down to man of God's 
valore. Chiavaccl-Leonardi commentary (1991-1997), on Purgatorlo 11.4, see http://dante.dartm~uth.edu/ (accessed 29th April 2012). 
237 Treherne, p. 133. 
238 See Foster, 'The Two Dantes 1', pp.160-61. 




which are perfected by virtu to the source of that virtu itself is paradoxically to perfect 
them by recognising their dependency. To separate their existence from God is to bring 
the souls into confusion, conflict and division. Thus, the peace of heaven is that which 
rewards the intellect which has recognised God as its origin; thus, once the human will is 
submitted to God then peace from desire is the prize.240 
The recitation of the Lord's Prayer is an instance in which the duality of Dante's text is 
made overtly visible; it is at once the story of an individual passing through the 
underworld and meeting the souls within its realms, and a comment on (and advice to?) 
the 'here' of the temporal life of his readers.241 It is not until the final terzina ofthe Prayer 
that its conscious duality becomes apparent but once it appears it necessarily influences 
our rereading of the earlier supplications: 'quest'ultima preghiera, segnor caro, /gia non si 
fa per noi, che non bisogna, / rna per color che dietro a noi restaro' (22-24). We have here 
a vision of two distinct stages ofthe same community; the stage of the purgating souls who 
have already attained security, if not yet peace, and the community of the living on earth 
who must still pass through the 'aspro diserto' (14). It is the common prayer which links 
the two communities together. The community of the living is still one which trials and 
suffering can touch. However, we remember from the writings of Gregory the Great that it 
is specifically through such trials that God aids in the development of human virtu, and it is 
precisely virtu which Dante refers to in this context. The proud souls' final prayer is that 
'Nostra virtu che di legger s'adona, / non spermentar con l'antico avversaro, / rna libera da 
lui che sl la sprona' (19-21). There is a distinct parallel between temporal life and 
Purgatory, the realm of salvation which exists in time. In this supplication to end the 
testing of virtu which is an inevitable and necessary part of temporal life, Dante is 
referring to the human ontological state precisely in relation to the way in which the 
Creator of that state interacts with man in order both to create him and to perfect him. The 
stability of 'nostra virtu' is entirely in the hands of 'Padre nostro', God, and dependent on 
his will to test it. The currents which underpin human life and existence are brought to the 
surface in the events of Purgatory; the souls openly recognise God as the source of their 
own virtu, God as its tester and God as its fulfiler. Purgatory as the 'second chance' is a 
mirror of the ontological and ethical possibilities of real temporal life. 
240 Dante's inclusion ofthe 'peace of heaven' again recalls Augustine's connection of virtue and peace. In 
contrast to the trials of the world, In heaven there will be no conflict and the temporal virtues which maintain 
and protect the soul during its earthly trials will be rewarded with peace: 'ibl vlrtutes, non contra una vitia vel 
mala quaecumque certantes, sed habentes victoriae praemlum aeternam pacem, quam nullus adversarlus 
inquietet' (DCD. 19.10). In the ConfeSSions we saw Augustine's Internal conflict over whether to renounce his 
own will and follow God's, the renunciation then leading to freedom, peace and the state of stable virtue: 'et 
hoc erat totum nolle, quod volebam, et velie, quod volebas. Sed ubi erat tam annoso tempore, et de quo Imo 
altoque secreto evocatum est in momento liberum arbitrium meum, quo subderem cervicem lenllugo tuo, et 
umeros levi sarcinae tuae' (Con/. 9.1.1). 




Purgatorio X and Xl reveal the form in which man is called on to interact with God in order 
to come to ultimate perfection. In developing humility, man comes to see God not only as 
the source of his existence but as the source of the good potential of his nature: the source 
of his virtu. This recognition must be enacted through language which testifies the nature 
of this relationship. It is not purely a given, 'mechanical' state of affairs, but rather a 
relationship of great emotional interaction which must be constantly fluid and active. It is 
a relationship of parent and child which presents the parent as freely giving of himself and 
the child as lovingly responding. Through the 'child's' willing acknowledgment of the 
generosity of his existence, he is led through the experiences of life to develop into a 
fulfilled individual. Most necessary, however, is his continued remembrance of his 
ontological state and the constant acknowledgement of that through humility. It is this 
humility which can then enable man to, in a sense, 'give birth' to Christ within himself, 
imitating the willing love of the Virgin. So it is that the virtu of man (found in the will and 
intellect) once subjugated or harmonised with the will of God, becomes fully receptive to 
God's virtu which draws the soul up towards Himself. 
5. Saints: A Nexus of Interaction 
If Purgatorio represents man's positive interaction with God at a potential stage, Paradiso 
shows that interaction perfected. It does not present this perfection as totally 
disconnected from temporal life, however, showing how that perfect interaction can exist 
through the lives of saints. The biographies of St Francis and St Dominic are among the 
most extended in the Commedia and are Significant both in their distinctive content and as 
feeding and taking meaning from the context which they inhabit. These two biographies 
identify the forms in which Dante establishes the figures of saints as nexus of interaction. 
Christian theology of Dante's period, as outlined by Jaroslav Pelikan, emphasised saints as 
a dual pOint of metaphysical interaction between man and God and of social communion 
between believers, the Church and God. Pelikan writes that the communion of the saints 
was read as having as its metaphysical ground 'the inner nature of God who, as Trinity, 
was "neither singular nor solitary"'.242 Saints in communion were a manifestation of the 
perfect relation of the Trinity, and existed themselves in a special relation to God. As we 
saw in the hagiographical traditions explored in Chapter Two, saints were also read as 
practical exempla for the lives of Christians. The goodness of the saints demonstrated how 
other believers could move closer towards the perfection necessary for salvation: 'the 
saints served [ ... ] as "a mirror and an example, and indeed as a seasoning of human life on 
242 Pelikan. Ill. 175. Pelikan is here quoting Baldwin of Ford. Tractates 15. 
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earth." Their footsteps were to be imitated and followed'.243 Beyond being a practical 
exemplum, however, the virtues of the saints were a particular kind of exempla being 'a 
reflection of the virtues of Christ'.244 Saints, therefore, manifested both a privileged 
relationship to God and a privileged form of revealing God in their actions. Because their 
virtues reflected the virtues of Christ they also, like Christ, overtly revealed the source of 
their goodness: God. The goodness of the saints revealed not their own personal 
achievement but rather their God-given perfection; their 'virtues had their origin in God, 
not in the saints themselves'.245 To focus on the role of saints then is to make a particular 
statement about the source of human goodness and what that goodness actually reveals; it 
reveals not the individual's power but the divine force behind it By doing so their lives 
and characters reveal God's hand in human salvation and link human action to a divine 
providential plan. The saint becomes the site on which that plan for the redemption of 
mankind is revealed and the means for demonstrating how that divine plan can be fulfilled 
by the individual. As nexus of interaction, saints reveal the source of human goodness, 
reveal how that source works for man's salvation, and what the result of a perfected 
relationship with God in temporal life actually is. 
In the Com media's biographies of Francis and Dominic, Dante, rather than focusing on the 
many individual acts of goodness which make up the details of traditional hagiographies, 
emphasises the most overt ways in which the figures of Francis and Dominic revealed God 
in their actions.246 The lives of the two saints are cast as acts of God's providence and thus 
are directly in relation to and in manifestation of the source of their existence. They are 
cast as having a closer knowledge of the will of God, which was an aspect of the attainment 
of virtue in the conceptual tradition.247 The particular acts ofthe saints are focused upon a 
rebalancing of man's desire for the world and man's desire for God, demonstrating God as 
the only true object of desire. The poet describes the result of the two saints' perfect 
relationship with God as becoming physically manifested in their lives and they are thus 
transformed into agents of revelation. In such a way they reflect the life of Christ, revealing 
the otherwise unknowable details of God's plan. Most significantly, the poet expresses the 
positive influence which the saints have on earth and that by which they manifest their 
243 Pelikan, 111,175. Pelikan Is here drawing from Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Damian. 
244 Pelikan, 111, 176. 
245 Pelikan, III, 177. 
246 On the cantos of the Heaven of the Sun see: Lucia Battaglia RiCCi, 'Nel clelo del Sole: Paradiso X.XI.X11', 
Esperimenti danteschi: Paradiso ed by by Luca Azzetta, Tommaso Montorfano et al. (Genoa and Milan: Marlettl, 
2010), pp. 113·55. On Paradiso XI see: Bruno Nardi 'II canto di Francesco', L 'Alighierl 5:2 (1964),9·20; Erich 
Auerbach, 'St Francis of Assisi in Dante's Com media', In Scenes from the Drama of European Literature 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 79·98' Luciano Rossi 'Canto XI' In Lectura dantis 
turicensis: Paradiso, pp. 167·18.; On Paradiso X11 see: Alessa~dro Ghisalbe~i 'Canto xiI' In Lecura dantis 
turicensis: Paradiso, pp. 181·92; Antonio dl Pietro, Canto XII del Paradiso: Le:tura dantis'scaligera (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 19M). 
247 This was pointed out by G. Scott Davis In relation to Augustine's thought 
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divine purpose in terms of virtu. Virtu, overtly originating in God, is transmitted through 
the interactive nexus of the saints' lives and stories. The form in which the poet tells the 
lives of the two saints is again a careful paralleling of content and form. The metaphysical 
forces and purposes which underpin the saints' lives and actions are transformed into 
living allegory, so that the metaphysical becomes conceptually real. At the same time, the 
images of allegory directly inform the concepts which they express. 
The context of the two biographies emphasises the value of the saints' differences by 
revealing their similarities. The cantos of the sun, which bring together the disparate 
thinkers of Dante's intellectual heritage and unify them in the dynamic dance, contain at 
their heart a message that unity can ultimately be found in differences which seek the 
same end. Dante's construction of this heaven does away with temporal disagreements, 
setting 'enemies' beside each other and making opposing sides praise one another and 
criticise themselves. The narrative consciously avoids taking sides, in order to 
demonstrate that there are many roads by which to reach God. In the figures of Francis 
and Dominic, Dante emphasises two saints of distinct abilities and experiences who are 
yet ordained by God to bring about the same end. The praise of each is almost 
interchangeable 'perch' ad un fine fu l'opere sue' (Par. XI.42). In Paradiso XI, the end aim of 
the two saints is characterised by the poet as being to return the Bride-Church to her 
Bridegroom-Christ. The saints' existence is presented as the direct action of 'La 
provedenza, che governa il mondo' (XI.28). Their role is specifically the revelation of that 
plan to human perception since it, unmanifested, transcends human understanding: 'quel 
consiglio nel qual ogne aspetto / creato e vinto pria che vada al fondo' (XI.29-30). The 
saints' lives are presented as a physical nexus in which God's otherwise invisible plan is 
made visible in human life, an echo here of the revelation of the Logos. The actions of the 
saints are characterised specifically as continUing the plan for salvation which had begun 
with the crucifixion, as suggested by the way the poet describes the saints' appointed 
mission: 
pero che andasse ver' 10 suo diletto 
la sposa di colui ch'ad alte grida 
disposo lei col sangue benedetto, 
in se sicura e anche a lui pill fida (Par. XI.31-34) 
We are reminded that Christ's providential sacrifice is that which underpins the 
connection of man and God which can bring about man's redemption. This end is the 
mission of both Francis and Dominic: 'due principi ordino in suo favore, / che quinci e 
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quindi Ie fosser per guida' (35-36). The unified mission of the two saints is reiterated in 
Paradiso XII. 37-45. Here, rather than a recollection of the mystical marriage of Christ and 
Church, Dante couches his explanation of their mission in the language of battle: 'l'esercito 
di Cristo', 'riarmar', 'la 'nsegna', 'milizia' (37-41). Within this context, the two saints 
transform into the noble knights battling to save the endangered bride, an imagery we saw 
used previously in reference to Francis by Tommaso da Celano: 'a sua sposa soccorse I con 
due campioni, al cui fare, al cui dire I 10 popol disviato si raccorse' (43-45). In this 
description of the due campioni, Dante picks out the particular modes which will become 
significant in how the saints fulfil their providential roles: fare and dire. The two saints are 
unified in their purpose and success and thus 'Degno e che, doy' e run, l'altro s'induca I s1 
che com'elli ad una militaro, / cos} la gloria loro insieme luca' (XII.34-36). But this unity 
does not deny the importance of their distinctness. It is perhaps significant that the lines 
from canto XI, with their emphasis on the bride of Christ and her connection to Christ's 
suffering, precede Francis's biography and are those aspects of Francis's particular 
imitation of Christ which are made most important in Dante's retelling of his story: instead 
those in canto XII emphasise the militant saving of the Church through word and action 
and precede the account of Dominic while at the same time being his particular attributes. 
There are only two instances of the word virtu in these cantos but both tellingly reveal the 
particular role in which Dante is casting the two saints. The usages relate to the Influence 
which each saint has over their surroundings and they way in which they reveal their 
proper natures. Reading these usages within the two narratives as a whole reveals virtu as 
an underlying dynamic of interaction and revelation, and expresses the ways the saints 
carry out their works of revelation: through the body and through the word. 
In focusing on the three overtly Christi cal elements of Francis' hagiography - marriage to 
Lady Poverty, the Stigmata and the image of the rising sun - Dante constructs his figure of 
the saint in the tradition of the imitator Christi and as he who, through his love for Christ, 
is transformed into the object of that love.248 Love is central to the Christian religious 
experience; as Lombardi suggests, by '[p ]ositing divinity as Love, Christianity established 
desire as the very nature of the human experience'.249 Francis is characterised by Dante as 
one who has fully given himself over to love as the centre of his faith, even comparing him 
to the angelic exemplum of love, 'tutto serafico in ardore' (Par. XI.37). By focusing upon 
the tradition of the saint's mystical marriage to Lady Poverty, Dante is both continuing a 
form of representation associated to the saint and using a real, tangible situation to 
248 Transformation through love was also a significant feature of Bonaventure's account of Francis in the 
Legenda Major. 
249 Lombardi, p. 13. 
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express a metaphysical reality. The saint's mystical and literal marriage to Lady Poverty is 
the manifestation of how man ought to feel towards the things of this world and those of 
the next, not only not desiring but desiring not to have.2SO The following after of God in the 
renunciation of the world is a joyful compelling desire. We remember that for Augustine, it 
is precisely in this following after that virtu is attained. The allegory of marital bliss which 
expresses Francis's joyful turning away from the world, becomes the compelling example 
by which others are driven to follow God: 
La lor concordia e i lor lieti sembianti, 
amore e maraviglia e dolce sguardo 
facieno esser cagion di pensier santi; 
tanto che 'I venerabile Bernardo 
si scalzo prima, e dietro a tanta pace 
corse e, correndo, Ii parve esser tardo. (Par. XI.76-81) 
The exemplum which Francis becomes in Dante's account is not as a moderate, 'saintly' 
man, but as an ardent lover willing to risk everything and suffer for his beloved. In this 
Christi cal marriage, Francis is cast as a successor of Christ not only through 'mystical 
spirituality' but because he followed what Auerbach describes as a way of life 'resting 
directly on Scripture, directly practical [ ... ] the imitation of the practical poverty and 
humility of Christ'.2si But Francis's poverty is not figured through pain but through joy 
which reveals the source for which privation is undergone: God as love. Francis's poverty, 
through the joyful marital images with which Dante surrounds it, is made an object of 
desire. 
It is a bodily, a deeply emotive and sensual form of imitation which distinguishes Francis's 
particular story and which is relevant to the other Christi cal traits with which he is 
associated. In Dante's account, Francis's stigmata are contextualised as bearing witness to 
his Christological imitation. Dante compresses the events ofthe saint's life so that in three 
terzine Francis appears as the preacher of Christ and as he who reveals Christ in his own 
flesh. Word and physical manifestation are picked out as the two principal forms of 
revelation: 
E poi che per la sete del martiro, 
ne la presenza del Soldan superba 
predico Cristo eli altri che '1 seguiro, 
250 Auerbach, 'St Francis', p. 84. 
251 Auerbach, 'St Francis', p. 96. 
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e per trovare a conversione acerba 
troppo la gente e per non stare indarno, 
redissi al frutto de l'italica erba, 
nel crudo sasso intra Tevero e Arno 
da Cristo prese l'ultimo sigillo, 
che Ie sue membra due anni portarno. (Par. XI.100-108) 
By his willingness to re-enact the sacrifice of Christ in martyrdom and by his witnessing of 
Christ in the act of preaching, Francis becomes worthy of a physical imitation of Christ in 
the receipt of the stigmata. This instance of sigillo, referring to the marks made by Christ 
into Francis' willing flesh as he is stands within the crudo sasso, recalls the image of the 
Annunciation that appeared in Purgatorio X, in which, 'quivi intagliato', into the hard rock 
'avea in atto impressa esta favella / "Ecce ancilla DeI", propriamente / come figura in cera 
si suggella' (43-45). In contrast to the proud sultan, Francis's humility makes him worthy 
to reveal God in his own flesh, just as the humility of the Virgin had made her malleable to 
God's imprinting hand and able to take into herself the form of God. Francis, in willing, 
humble subservience and intense love, is transformed into a bodily witness of the 
Incarnation. Because of his own perfected physical desires he became perfect matter onto 
which God could imprint and reveal himself. This instance of sigillo in canto XI is also, by 
its proximity, a close echo of the sigilla which Francis's mendicant order receives from 
Pope Innocent: 'regalmente sua dura intenzione / ad Innocenzio aperse, e da lui ebbe / 
primo sigillo a sua religIone' (XI.91-93). Francis as saint is the joining point between the 
authority of the Church and the authority of God, ordained by both Church and God as 
their temporal representative. His significance spans between the metaphysical and the 
social. He can therefore be a nexus of interaction for the temporal believer. 
Francis, as the representative of metaphysical power and of social and spiritual renewal, is 
identified in the first Christic image to be attached to his biography, Francis as the rising 
sun.2S2 In both the biography of Francis and in that of Dominic, images of natural fertility 
and renewal are used to express the spiritual fertility the two saints bring to the world. 
Francis returns from the unripe land of the Sultan to the more promising Italian fields. 
(105). In h,is figuring as the rising sun he warms all the ground around him and it is thu:, 
that his virtu is evident and felt: 
Non era ancor molto lontan da I'orto, 
ch'el comincio a far sentir la terra 
252 For references on the tradition of the rising sun as a figure for Christ see Auerbach, 'St Francis', p. 86. 
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de la sua gran virtute alcun conforto. (Par. XI.55-57) 
Francis, like the sun, is the visible manifestation of God's life-giving presence and this is his 
virtu, to remind man of the presence of God. In the analysis of the Earthly Paradise in 
Chapter Three, images of terrestrial fertility became evident as images of spiritual renewal 
and natural potential. Perfectly disposed terra, that which is free from the distractions of 
temporal life, can be fully fertile; the human soul which has freed itself from temporal 
greed can fully receive and reveal the divine virtu at the source of its existence. Francis, in 
his perfectly focused love of God which is figured through love of not temporal 
possessions, himself reveals in the stigmata the sign of God. Through his personal virtu 
and the revelation this brings about, Francis is figured as having a spiritually renewing 
effect on those around him. 
Dante's biography of Dominic places strong emphasis on the saint as being sent into the 
world by God to complete a particular mission: the revelation of divine truth through 
preaching the word. While Francis's biography is characterised by loving desire and 
spiritual fervour, Dominic is presented as a man of great spiritual energy and clarity who, 
in his actions and words, reveals the hand of God which moves him. That Dominic's very 
existence and his role as saviour of the Church are instrinsically and inseparably linked In 
Dante's rendering of the character, is encapsulated near the opening of his biography. It is 
significantly expressed through a usage of virtu: 'come fu creata, fu repleta / s1 1a sua 
mente di viva vertute / che, ne la madre, lei fece profeta' (Par. XII.58-60). Dominic's 
virtute, his will to reveal God, is made manifest even before his birth through the words of 
his mother. Ifwe recall that in Dante's scheme virtu is that given to the soul at creation by 
which their individual nature is distinguished and offered the potential for perfection and 
by which they assume their place in the order of existence, then Dominic's divinely 
appointed role is evidenced through the particular characteristics and effect of his virtu. 
Just as the fullness of Francis's virtu spreads his effect to his surrounding environment, so 
the repleteness of Dominic's being overflows into his mother's act of speech. The scene of 
his baptism continues the idea that his nature inspires those around him to reveal his 
relation to God, to demonstrate the divine hand behind Dominic's creation and his 
denomination. So his godmother again in a prophetic vision sees his future and 'quinci sl 
mosse spirito a nomarlo / del possessivo di cui era tutto. / Dominico fu detto' (Par. XII.68-
70). As in Francis's biography, the poet manages to convey the effect of the saint's life on 
his followers, establishing a direct line between his existence and the positive 
consequences of it. So at Dominic's baptism we already have a sense of what will result 
from his life: 'ii mirabil frutto / ch'uscir dovea di lui e de Ie rede' (65-66). Dominic, like 
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Francis, is presented as the agent of a divine mission, but how they effect their missions is 
unique; they not only fulfil them but manifest them in their own being. In Dante's 
biographies of the saints, Dominic and Francis are both marked by God so as to reveal 
God's hand in their existence and action; just as Francis is marked by the spirit physically, 
Dominic is marked by the spirit in his name.253 
Like Francis, Dominic is compared to one of the angelic orders: 'per sapienza in terra fue / 
di cherubica luce uno splendore' (Par. XI.38-39). In his presentation of the Cherubim-like 
Dominic, according to Battaglia Ricci, Dante uses the particular characteristics of the 
cherubim as identified by his contemporary theology: 'iI nome "cherubino" indica [ ... ] 
secondo Dionigi, la possibilita che questi angeli hanno di "conoscere" e di "volgere la 
pupilla verso la divinita" [ ... ] e insieme un inteso zelo'.zs4 As he had emphasised Francis's 
intense desire for 'Lady' poverty through lexical repetition - 'di dl in dl ramo piu forte' 
(XI.63) - Dante captures the intensity of Dominic's focus upon God in the repetitive rhyme 
sequence which can only rhyme Christ with Christ This circular pattern, which allows for 
no interruption of focus, mimics Dominic's own focused adhesion to Christ: 
Dominic fu detto; e io ne parlo 
s1 come di ragricola che Cristo 
elesse a l'orto suo per aiutarlo. 
Ben parve messo e famigliar di Cristo: 
che 'I primo amor che 'n lui fu manifesto. 
fu al primo consiglio che die Cristo. (Par. XII.70-7S) 
Dominic's intense devotion is not directed towards the world. Just as Francis loves Lady 
Poverty, the 'primo am or' of Dominic is Christ's teaching on poverty itself.Z55 The way the 
two saints' love is expressed is again significant; while Francis's is a personified, tangible 
experience which reiterates the Franciscan message of expression through the physical, 
Dominic acts through the word, the consiglio of Christ, and it is thus that he will himself 
express the message. This combination of devotion for the non-worldly is a further echo in 
Dante of a form of Augustinian virtu. Virtu is to love God intensely and from the intensity 
of this love man learns to value and use temporal life correctly. In Dominic this is 
expressed through the intense study which transforms him: 'Non per 10 mondo [ ... ] / rna 
per ram or de la verace manna / in picciol tempo gran dottor si feo' (82-85). Dominic's 
wisdom comes from a loving focus upon God as opposed to distraction by the world. 
253 Ghisalberti, 'Canto XII', p. 190. 
254 Battaglia Ricci, p. 142. 




Lines 70-75 simultaneously capture the form of Dominic's intense devotion in their 
intensive repetition. They also describe the particular mission he is ordained for and the 
form in which he will fulfil that mission. Hollander has pointed out that the reference to 
the farmer who will help Christ in his garden casts Dominic as the counterpoint to Adam 
and Eve's failure to maintain Eden.256 Images of nature and fertility run all through 
Dominic's biography, in which he is cast as their cultivator and protector. In language 
reminiscent of battle, Dominic founds his order to 'control al monto errante / [ ... ] 
combatter per 10 seme / del qual ti fascian ventiquattro piante' (94-96). These beautiful 
celestial plants are the opposite of the 'sterpi eretici' which the torrent of Dominic's 
preaching had washed away in life (99-102). Dominic's role, therefore, is to defend and to 
nourish the essence of the faith he defends; but, by expressing this through images of 
nature and fertility, Dante is both using elements ofthe representational tradition and also 
appealing to the metaphysical currents which he himself uses these images to represent. 
Dominic, as the agricola of Christ, with Christ, restores mankind to a prelapsarian state. He 
is able to do so because of the more direct and privileged relationship he has to Christ as 
his messo e famigliar. The particular way in which he will fulfil his mission is suggested by 
the intertextual reference of line 78, '10 son venuto a questo' which, as Hollander points 
out, is a version of Christ's words in Mark 1:38, 'ad hoc enim veni' in which Christ 
'announces his intention to preach'.zs7 Preaching, the expression through the word as the 
fulfilment of Dominic's providential mission, is the central aspect of his biography. This 
begins at its opening when Dominic's role as a preacher is foreshadowed in the 
overflowing of his virtu which makes his mother prophesy. By beginning from virtu, Dante 
is able to capture Dominic's preaching as the fulfilment of his nature and thus emphasise 
the unique preordained role he is allotted by God, even at the moment of his creation. 
Remembering that virtu designates a being's role in the order of creation, Dante 
establishes how Dominic's divinely created virtu to preach forms parts of God's 
providential plan to reorder that creation itself. 
The extended allegories which underpin the biographies of both Francis and Dominic 
make these biographies distinct from the others which form the fabric of the Com media. 
The strangeness of this, eS}Jt:cially in relation to the historically tangible figure of Francis, 
was noted by Auerbach: 'what [Dante] so often did [ ... ] that of fashioning people through 
their own words and gestures in the most concrete and personal way, he has not done 
here'.ZS8 What emerges from the allegorised biographies of Francis and Dominic, rather 
256 Hollander, commentary to Paradiso XII vv. 71.72. 
257 Hollander, commentary on vv. 76.78. 
258 Auerbach, 'St Francis', p. 83. 
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than a personal history, is a manifestation of their spiritual purpose. Their allegorised 
narratives lift them from the individual and historical to what Mazzotta describes as 'the 
area of meditation between the world of contingency and history and the absolute model 
of Paradise and Christ-like existence'.259 Dante sets Francis and Dominic apart by seeking 
to stress their unique interaction with God in temporal life and thus their unique role as 
meeting points between God and man for those who come after them. By stressing in both 
cases their distancing from the world through poverty and lack of worldly care, Dante is 
establishing a model in which the line between good social behaviour and metaphysical 
revelation is distinctly blurred. However, the allegories which describe their lives are not 
distant and abstract but instead are an incarnation of the allegory. In the case of Francis, 
'[t]he didactic strain of the allegory [ ... ] penetrates our consciousness not as a didactic 
lesson but as a real happening. As Francis's wife, Poverty exists in concrete reality; but, 
because Christ was her first husband, her concrete reality becomes part of the great 
scheme of world history'.26o In the case of Dominic, he is identified with Christ as the 
farmer, but this role is shaped around his own particular historical activity of preaching. 
Real temporal activity and metaphysical, spiritual role are compressed and made 
indistinguishable. The virtu of Francis's ardent love, which expresses itself through Christ-
like love of poverty which comforts the world, and the virtu of Dominic's ardent wisdom, 
expressed through the overpowering word, reveal them as nexus of human-divine 
interaction; points at which God's hand is revealed to be behind human action. They do 
not appear here as tangible exempla of human goodness but instead demonstrate how 
human goodness has its origin in God and how that human goodness -literally in the cases 
of Dominic and Francis - reveals God. 
6. Interaction in Paradise: Canto XXI 
Many episodes of the Paradiso consider the soul's interaction with God in the blessed state 
and its place within the order of heaven. As Cogan has demonstrated, the placing of the 
souls in heaven is predicated on the extent of their own capacity for fulfilment In God; this 
combination of capacity fulfilled in action I am interpreting as part of the Com media's 
virtu-dynamic.261 The pilgrim's encounter with Peter Damian in the Heaven of Saturn, the 
last heaven related to a particular planet and quality, gives rise to a presentation of the 
259 Giuseppe Mazzotta, Dante, Poet of the Desert, p. 111. 
260 Auerbach, 'St Francis', p. 95. 
261 Co?an demonst~a~ed that '~he amount of delight or blessedness a soul experiences depends on the soul's 
capacIty for the activity In which delight resides', p. 158. 
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perfected state of interaction between the soul and God as it exists in Paradise.262 This 
episode draws together several principal aspects of how heavenly interaction has been 
staged while centring them around an interaction governed by virtu. 
When the pilgrim reaches the heaven of Saturn he is told by the soul of Peter Damian that 
it is charity that designates the soul's position: 'l'alta carita che ci fa serve / pronte al 
consiglio che 'I mondo governa, / sorteggia qui s1 come tu osserve' (Par. XXI.70-72). Love 
is that which adheres to and reveals God's providential plan (73-75) and Peter Damian's 
appearance to the pilgrim is part of that plan; it is caused by the dynamiCS of charity which 
order heaven. In the pilgrim's earlier encounter with Piccarda in the Heaven of the Moon, 
charity was identified as that which makes the souls willing and disposed to accept their 
place in the hierarchy: 'la nostra volonta quieta / virtu di carita, che fa volerne / sol quel 
ch'avemo' (Par.III.70-72). While in Purgatorio humility governed the interaction of man to 
God, in Paradiso charity is the abiding principle. In the case of the soul of Peter Damian, his 
particular loving interaction with the divine is figured in language which recalls both the 
parental imagery of Purgatorio Xl while emphasising the natural and loving sustaining of 
man byGod: 
Luce divina sopra me s'appunta, 
penetrando per questa in ch'io m'inventro, 
la cui virtu, col mio veder congiunta, 
mi leva sopra me tanto, ch'i' veggio 
la somma essenza de la quale e munta. (Par. XXI.83-7) 
Even at the exalted heights of heaven, the interaction of God and the soul is figured in 
terms of natural generation and preservation, and appeals directly to the issues of capacity 
and action which underlie virtu-dynamics. In describing the Interaction, the poet figures 
divine virtu as light and the soul's own capacities as sight; the interaction of the two 
results in increased power of vision on the part of the soul so that it can see the source of 
its existence unmediated. Despite the metaphysical grounding of this interaction, the 
sensuality of the language through which it is expressed is striking. The womb-like 
(inventro) soul is penetrated by and then joined with (congiunta) divine virtu. It is then 
raised above itself to see the source of the divine light, the point from which it is milked 
(munta). This strange interaction of images in which the divine source of light is both 
lover and mother, casts virtu as the informing principle of beatified experience; the result 
of this union is a soul able to suckle at the source of virtu, drawing life itself from It. In a 
262 ~n Paradiso X~I see: Giu~epp~ Mazzotta, 'Language and Vision',ln Dante and the Circle of Knowledge 
(Prmceton NI: Pnnceton Umverslty Press, 1993), pp. 155-71; Georges Giintert. 'Canto XXI' In Lectura dantis 
turicensis: Paradiso, pp. 325-39. ' 
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transformation of the parental images of Purgatorio XI, virtu in heaven changes from the 
power of the Father to the sustaining love of the Mother. Furthermore, the interaction of 
capacity and fulfilment becomes directly visible in the soul; the soul's ability to see is 
revealed in the extent to which it shows light: 'la vista mia, quant'ella e chiara, / la chiarita 
de la fiamma pareggio' (XXI.89-90). The soul's ability to receive light-virtu is directly 
manifested in its capacity to reveal it. Virtu is that which interacts directly with the soul to 
raise it up to a new level of perception in which it sees the source and sustainer of its 
existence. This experience is expressed in the most sensual description of union and 
nourishing. 
While the answer to why it is Peter Damian who comes to the pilgrim is, on point of 
doctrine, impossible to reveal to a created intellect (91-96), the significance of the 
character of Peter Damian as being the one to reveal the privilged state of vision of the 
heavenly souls is not so obscure. His soul forms part ofthe group of ascetic contemplatives 
who inhabit the heaven of Saturn. His life was therefore one of focused contemplation 
upon God and away from the things of the world. Mazzotta suggests that 'contemplation 
[ ... ] has no purpose beyond itself; it cuts through the disguises and illusions [ ... ] and 
trascends the impatient, restless entanglements of practical life'.263 Furthermore, as an 
ascetic, Peter Damian represents those who have trained themselves away from the 
desires of the world; who have attained what Kirkpatrick describes as 'that vivid identity 
and clarity of essence that the true ascetic [ ... ] should properly cultivate'.264 Thus the 
clarity of essence which Peter Damian achieved in life is remanifested in heaven. But more 
significantly, the source of its clarity and manifestation is revealed as divine virtu. The 
goodness of Peter's life, just like his state of blessedness, is a direct result of his mutual 
interaction with God. Dante further draws a parallel between Peter's heavenly state and 
temporal life by demonstrating the soul's continuing righteous anger over earthly events. 
As Mazzotta perceptively points out: 'The life of Peter Damian [ ... ] exemplifies and 
reinforces Dante's sense that contemplation is not merely a self-defining realm of inner 
concentration attainable by severing one's inextricable ties to history. What is truly deadly 
in Dante's ethics is the retreat into inaction'.265 Dante's vision of heaven, however 
unperceivable to human intellect, is never unrelated to temporal human life. The perfect 
interaction which Peter describes of himself is accompanied by a description of how he 
moved towards this state of perfection in life. The interaction of virtu as expressed in 
Paradiso XXI is only the perfected version of an interaction that is at the centre of all 
created being. 
263 Mazzotta, Circle of Knowledge, p. 158. 
264 Robin Kirkpatrick, Paradiso, commentary to canto XXI, p. 421. 




This chapter has sought to demonstrate that in the Commedia, Dante overtly makes human 
virtu and the positive value of human action dependent on man's relationship to God. This 
was a very prominent issue within the Christian tradition, particularly evident in the 
thought of Augustine and Gregory. Dante, however, problematises and explores the issue 
in relation to different stages of human spiritual development, showing a developing and 
transforming relationship which recalls the transforming stages of virtue according to 
Aquinas. But while Aquinas explores this transformation abstractly, Dante stages its 
happening. The failed relationship of the Limbo dwellers to God is manifested in the 
images of Inferno IV, so that the consequences of that failure become real and tangible. The 
results of that failed relationship Dante exemplifies in the Limbo figures who exist in 
perpetual hopeless darkness and isolation. How the relationship between man and God 
can be rebuilt, both in the traditions and Dante, made the role of human humility 
paramount. Humility, the 'mother of all virtues' according to Gregory, was the only 
foundation from which that relationship could be constructed. In Purgatorio X and XI, 
Dante stages a demonstration of how humility can be refound through the purgation of 
pride. The result of this humility in the souls of Purgatory is the unified act of praising 
prayer. That the virtues of man are essentially revelations of the goodness of God, as 
opposed to signs of man's autonomous power, became evident in Dante's depiction of 
saints Francis and Dominic. Gregory the Great in particular emphasised the absolute 
dependence of human virtue upon the generous hand of God; because of this, human 
virtue then becomes a sign of God working through man. In his biographies of Francis and 
Dominic, Dante transforms this principle, adapting it to the individual lives of the two 
saints. He emphasises their providential missions and focuses on how they each fulfilled 
them in their historical lives. Rather than historical detail, however, Dante focuses on 
those elements which most strongly characterise the saints as being ordained by God and 
thus revealing God within their actions. Their temporal existence is closely tied to the 
divine source from which it came. We saw a precedent for this approach in Bonaventure's 
Legenda Major, in which Francis's providential role was emphasised. Dante's biography of 
the saint, however, is highly focused upon the elements of Christic imitation, going so far 
as to employ the same imagery of imprinting which he uses to describe the Incarnation of 
Christ himself. In emphasising the poverty and desire focused upon God of both Francis 
and Dominic, Dante is suggesting the way in which the fulfilment of human virtu Is 
ultimately a revelation of God within man. That God is behind man's blessedness was also 
evidenced in the figure of Peter Damian who, like the other souls in heaven, revealed the 
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extent to which he saw God. Even in Heaven, Dante emphasises that the virtu of the 
blessed is only a reflection of the extent to which they receive God's own virtu. In the 
Commedia the soul's movement towards God is constantly vivified and influenced by 
interactions. The virtu-dynamic, which reads ethics as an expression of ontology, means 
that the ontological interaction of man and God as creature and Creator becomes the 
guiding principle for the ethical actions which take place in the Commedia. Dante presents 
the results of these positive interactions as bringing about true vivification, spiritual 
fertility, perfect vision and value-holding action. 
The theological and philosophical traditions considered in Chapter One emphasised 
temporal life as the forum in which human virtue was to be developed, either exclusively 
within the human sphere, as in the thought of Aristotle, or within a dialogue between man 
and God as expressed by the Christian authors. In choosing to represent virtue, the writers 
of the traditions considered in Chapter Two were acknowledging virtue as a principle to 
be communicated to others for their spiritual benefit. In each of the four episodes I have 
considered in this chapter, Dante forms a connection between the characters within the 
narrative and the real temporal world which his readers inhabit. In the case of the Limbo-
dwellers, while continuing respect for them in the world maintained their position outside 
of Hell proper, the poet questioned the contribution they could make to continuing history 
through his negative portrayal of their situation and their ultimate silence. In Purgatory 
the souls, in praying to God, were shown as actively working for the benefit of those 
remaining on earth, forming a connection between temporal and eschatological life. In a 
sense, Dante's own poem's prayer was endowed with the possibility of helping its readers. 
Dante established Francis and Dominic as positive exempla for others to follow by 
building models of this following into his narratives. The saints were emphasised as 
having had a direct impact on the lives of those around them, which Dante expresses 
through images of natural and spiritual fertility. The soul of Peter Damian, although at 
nearly the highest point of Heaven, demonstrates his continuing interest in the temporal 
world in his criticism of its corruption. By referring to temporal life from the perspective 
of the afterlife Dante is emphasising the link between the two states. He is casting his text 
as one which directly aims to influence temporal life but which can do so from a point of 
special knowledge and objectivity. The ethical interactions which surround the notion of 




In the final chapter, I will now turn to consider how the ontological and ethical 
interactions surrounding virtu, which have emerged in Chapters Three and Four, are 
manifested in relation to the individualised experiences of the pilgrim-poet figure. 
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5. The Becoming of a Virtuous Man: Dante's Pilgrim-Poet 
1. Introduction 
Chapters Three and Four have demonstrated how the Com media represents the form and 
results of ontological and ethical interactions: interactions between man, the created 
universe and God. By its use of the term, the Commedia encourages us to read these 
interactions as underpinned by a dynamic of virtu, in which action is an expression of 
being and being is transformed by action. This dynamic leads us to read the ethical and the 
ontological as fundamentally connected in Dante's thought, since virtu itself is a being's 
proper nature perfectly fulfilled in act. Ethical behaviour then comes to be an expression 
of ontological condition. Good human behaviour, which strikes the right balance between 
man, the world and God, becomes an expression of good and fulfilled being. This final 
chapter will turn to consider the personalisation and vivification of the ontological and 
ethical interactions of virtu, which have emerged from Chapters Three and Four, in the 
central narrative feature of the Commedia's drama: the journey of the pilgrim-poet. This 
will enable a more specific exploration of how the poet conceives the role of virtu within 
the actual events of a human life. The Commedia's narrative is structured around the moral 
and spiritual development of its protagonist as he undertakes his journey, which is 
simultanouesly a literally figured physical journey and an allegorical journey of his 
ontological and ethical transformation. The Commedia's principal narrative element is 
then one which focuses directly on the internal development of the individual from a state 
of weakness and loss to one of fulfilment and union; this transformation is a 
transformation in and through virtu and locates the ethical stance of the Com media firmly 
within virtue ethics. It also places the Commedia within a tradition of representing virtu 
which draws both on the tangible experiences of an exemplary human life and employs 
allegorical imagery to both convey and construct its message. Using the figure of his 
pilgrim-self acting within real situations, the poet is able both to build a process of 
personal reflection into his narrative structure and use his pilgrim-self as a lens through 
which to reflect on the human condition as a whole, as mankind passes through temporal 
life and comes to God. The communicative strategies of the Commedia, however, also 
enable the poet to shift constantly between metaphysical and physical development, 
revealing the ontological currents which underpin the protagonist's ethical progress. Virtu 




In order both to begin to see the Commedia's place within the tradition of writing on virtu, 
particularly in relation to human life, this chapter will be structured around the same 
three questions utilised in my discussion of the theological and philosophical traditions in 
Chapter One: what is virtu? How is virtu acquired? And what is the result ofthe attainment 
of virtu? Focusing upon the pilgrim-poet character will enable us to make connections 
between the greater metaphysical and theological undercurrents concerning virtu within 
the Com media, and their relation to actual human experience; the abstract can become 
real, tangible and relevant. Significantly, this mode of reading is overtly necessitated by 
the poem's dramatic form itself. Before turning to the three questions, I will therefore 
consider some of the implications and possibilities suggested by the embodiment of 
virtue-ethics which the Com media proposes. 
2. The Commedia's Embodied Virtue-Ethic 
As became apparent in Chapter One, virtue-ethics is primarily a character based ethics. 
The goodness or badness of human behaviour is linked to the internal moral state of the 
subject. This state is the result of 'the moral formation and the development of the 
character over time'.266 This progress of development over time is one which the 
Commedia manifests in its central protagonist Time is evident both in the narrative 
present, in the glances backwards and forwards into the protagonist's life, and in the 
interjections of the authorial narrator into the text, who is writing after the event. This 
structure enables the Com media to show the development both of the pilgrim and of the 
poet. As Ascoli has suggested, 'the journey of the personaggio provides not only the subject 
matter for the poeta, but also the story of how the individual called Dante became capable 
of writing the Commedia'.267 Dante's becoming as a writer is intrinsically linked to the 
pilgrim's becoming as a virtuous man, since his process of poetic and ethical development 
go hand in hand. The pilgrim character, in the moral formation he undergoes during the 
journey, comes to a state of ontological fulfilment and ethical perfection by which he is 
presented as becoming able to express his experience in the persona of the poet. By 
writing about his constructed past self, the poet can establish the steps by which he 
conceives himself - and by extension mankind - as coming to a state of ontological and 
moral fulfilment, as well as showing what that state of fulfilment might be. The pilgrim is 
shown at different stages of development, learning, making mistakes and finally becoming 
both morally sound and ontologically fulfilled: the hallmarks of a state of virtue. The 
266 Barton, p. 13. 
267 Ascoli, p. 305. 
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beginning and end pOints of the pilgrim's journey locate his development within a 
framework which, based on ideas which emerged in Chapter One, we can now see as part 
of the virtu-dynamic. At the poem's opening the pilgrim is lost, confused and unable to 
progress independently, being in a state of doubt, fear and conflicted will. It is only the 
guidance of Virgil, the intercession of Beatrice and the pilgrim's submission of will that 
enable the pilgrim to progress. Passing through a journey in which he is shown not only 
the sins of others but also his own, the pilgrim exemplifies a process of self-reflection and 
self-confession. Based on this he develops the fixed disposition and clarity of desire which 
are the attainment of virtue as proposed in elements of the tradition. By the end of his 
journey, the pilgrim reaches a point of clear vision and a will liberated from sin and 
harmonised to the will of God. Simultaneously he represents a fulfilled condition of 
mankind which, in his particular case, is manifested in the ability to express himself. 
The tension of the pilgrim's will, which is problematised at the poem's opening and 
resolved at its end, traces the centrality of the will in notions of virtue as it appeared In 
Chapter One. Will is at the nexus of ontology, ethics and their simultaneous fulfilment in 
virtue. Will, as that which empowers and guides human action and its perfection, 
therefore, becomes central to the perfection of human action. Only a will trained in virtue, 
which has God as its object, will be consistent in the choice of the ultimate good of human 
nature and order all activity in relation to this essential desire. In Aquinas's thought. the 
will is the site of transformation in which man's faculties are elevated by God in order for 
him to attain towards the divine end beyond his human nature.268 For Augustine, the will 
has to be reordered away from desiring the distractions of the world and Instead directed 
only towards God; perfect loving of God is virtue itself.269 Intrinsic to this Is an act of 
submission of independent will to the supreme will of God. Will then, is a central player in 
the dynamics of virtue within the tradition, and, as we will come to see, it continues to be 
central to Dante's portrayal of the pilgrim's development. The narrative structure of the 
Commedia, in which the 'I' is split between a protagonist and poet who appear as one and 
the same, enables the creation of a dramatic tension between past and present selves. As 
well as being a tension which adds to the drama of the story, however, it is also the 
manifestation of the very real ethical tension between memory and current desire which 
marks the development of the will. As evidenced in Augustine, the memory of past desire 
is enough to impede the development of the present self, however much that present self 
may desire to progress. As Wetzel writes, '[o]ur present state of will [ ... ] includes its past 
268 As we saw in Chapter One. For example: 'Sed sl quod bonum Immineat homlnl volendum quod excedat 
proportionem volentis, slve quantum ad totam speclem humanam, slcut bonum dlvlnum q;od transcendlt 
Jimites humanre naturre, sive quantum ad Individuum, sicut bonum proxlrnl, Ibl voluntas'lndlget virtute. Et 
ideo huisumodi virtutes qure ordinat affectum homlnls In Deum vel In proxlmum sunt In voluntate slcut In 
subjecto, ut caritas, justitia et huiusmodi', (ST. 1a2re 56,6), ' 
269 As appeared In Chapter One, Augustine casts virtue as 'summum amorem del' (OME IS.25). 
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states in the form of habit and therefore the discrepancy between our past practices of 
willing and our present willingness for change can be expressed as volitional paralysis, or 
our experience being constrained from within'.27o This conflict of will, which is such a 
stumbling block on the road to the acquisition of virtue, is dramatically played out through 
the construction of the Com media's protagonist, narrator and author as the same 
individual all appearing in the same moment. His past, present and future desires are 
placed side by side for comparison and come to dramatically influence his progression. 
Not only does the Commedia's focus on character development itself demonstrate a choice 
to focus on an ethics of virtue, but the portrayal of moral and spiritual dilemma through an 
individualised character places the poet within a representational tradition. The wayan 
individual's temporal life could be demonstrated as being the forum for acquiring and 
demonstrating virtue was evident in the thought of Gregory the Great, who validated 
temporal experience as the period in which man was tested and learned to depend upon 
God. An individual's response to the events of their life was a mark of the degree to which 
they had engaged with God in the testing progression as which human life was to be 
interpreted. Life stories were the means by which ideas of virtue could be communicated 
in the hagiographical traditions, particularly surrounding St Francis. Human daily 
activities could be read in the light of their moral and spiritual significance through 
processes of interpreting allegory or through authorial comment which dictated the 
significance of texts. Although the poet certainly does not cast the pilgrim as a saintly 
figure, he emphasises the divine hand behind his journey as well as the pilgrim's flaws, 
and establishes both the role of the divine in human development and a recognisable 
exemplum of virtue being learned. In the activites of the pilgrim and in the recreation of 
the embodied souls, the poem represents mirror images oftemporal encounters which are 
recontextualised to contain within them their eschatological outcome. The poet can draw a 
clear link between real temporal life and, in consequence, real eternal existence. 
The pilgrim undergoes his journey in an overtly embodied form which acts as a connection 
between the 'real' world of his readers and the imagined realms of the afterlife. This 
embodiment also dictates both the way the pilgrim apprehends his experiences and the 
way those expel iences come to be represented in the poem. As Ghlsalbertl suggests, 
focusing on an embodied figure gives 'la capacita di communicare con gli altri attraverso II 
corpo'.271 By using an embodied format, the poem is also accessing a tradition of 
representing the invisible through the manifested - as the Commedia itself points out, In 
the attributing of hands and feet to God, 'la Scritturacondescende I a vostra facultate' 
270 Wetzel, pp. 130-35. 
271 Ghisalbertl, 'II pensiero medievale dl fronte al corpo'. p. 56. 
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(Par. IV.43-44). That the human body can both conceal and reveal the divine hand and 
metaphysical significance behind it, comes about through the revaluation of human 
existence made possible by the Incarnation of Christ. In representing the spiritual 
transformation ofthe pilgrim through bodily experience Dante is following a tradition; the 
association of body and spirit is made possible, again as Ghisalberti writes, 'dal rapporto 
del corpo umano con il corpo di Cristo, che e stato i1 velo sotto cui Dio si e reso visibile 
all'uomo'.272 The human body in the Commedia is conceived as both revealing and 
concealing the metaphysical truth behind it, as became evident in Paradiso II. It is also a 
ground for understanding that truth. Through the Incarnation of Christ, the body is given 
'queUe possibilita di una dimensione eterna che era stata un giorno nei piani della 
creazione divina', as Ernesto Travi writes.273 In fact, in the medieval Christian tradition, it 
is overtly through bodily experiences, the experiences of temporal life, that man may 
return to God because the birth and sacrifice of Christ have revalued that existence.274 
The focus on an individualised character enables the manifested enacting of a virtue-ethic, 
but it also makes a particular statement about human existence as that through which the 
divine can be both perceived and attained. The pilgrim's journey is presented as an 
episode within his own temporal life - 'Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita' - whose 
origins begin before the story starts and whose results will extend beyond the story's end. 
The poet is therefore locating the pilgrim's trans formative experience firmly within 
human life and, by doing so, validating the possibilities offered by that life itself. While the 
pilgrim's journey through the afterlife is unique, he himself, as a human being with faults 
and loves, is not, and his experiences are therefore part of the experiences of the human 
condition as a whole. The way that virtu is manifested within the pilgrim's experience then 
becomes an allegory for how it functions within all human life. The pilgrim's own 
experiences are only the more overt manifestation of how the divine works in the 
salvation of all mankind. The pilgrim's experiences also demonstrate how that divine can 
be approached both emotionally and intellectually. The visions, emotions, dialogues and 
interactions of the pilgrim's journey become exempla of how man moves towards God. 
Having established the possible Significances and potentials of the Commedia's focus upon 
an embodied protagonist as the centre of ethical and ontological transformation, we can 
272 Ghisalbertl, '1\ pensiero medievale dl fronte al corpo', p. 60. 
273 Travi, p. 107. 
274 Ghisalberti: '11 riscatto, la rlabilitazione viene sanclta da un Intervento salvll1co dl 010: una nuova creazlone 
dl Cristo Immette nella storia un nuovo uomo, \I cui corpo non ~ conceplto secondo concuplscenza. 11 
concepimento dl Cristo rinnova iI concepimento umano, facendo rlassurgere II corpo dell'uomo a nuovl vertlcl 
di plenezza e di intergrita. II corpo umano di Cristo ~ 11 punto dl partenza per rlscattare la reglo dlsslmllltudlnis 
e ripristinare quella reglone della similitudlne che diventa I'asplrazlone dl ognl credente In Cristo' (,II penslero 
medievale di fronte al corpo', p. 60). 
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turn to address how Dante constructs virtu in relation to his pilgrim-selfs experiences. 
Dante locates his pilgrim's experiences within the virtu-dynamic as a whole, manifesting it 
in the interactions which the pilgrim goes through. By doing so, he can explore more 
generally the place of the individual and his role within those dynamics. 
3. What is virtu? 
Virtu is an ontological and ethical nexus. Ontologically speaking it is the perfect expression 
of being in action. Ethically speaking it is those actions which best express and fulfil an 
entity's essential nature. In relation to man, that nature must be understood 
fundamentally as created and therefore virtuous action is that which acknowledges that 
createdness. To be virtuous is to love the source of one's creation and manifest that love in 
one's relation to the world. From this more general understanding of virtu In Dante's 
universe, we now move closer to questioning the nature of human virtu and what it 
actually entails. In the poem's many moments of theoretical explication, two in particular 
stand out as relevant to understanding the nature of human virtu as presented In the 
Commedia: Purgatorio XVII and XVIII, and Paradiso I. Both discourses focus on love and its 
relation to the end aim of human desire, and the power human beings have to control and 
direct their love. In the light of the Augustinian tradition which equates virtue with perfect 
love of God, these two discourses can emerge as central to the virtu-dynamic. 
Virgil's discourse of Purgatorio XVII and XVIII arises from the pilgrim's question over the 
vice of the terrace on which the two travellers find themselves.275 The explanation of the 
vice of sloth, a vice of insufficient love, gives rise to an explanation of the nature of love 
itself. Love is at the source of every action, both human and divine; in man, love Is the 
product of both good and bad action: 'amor sementa In vol d'ogne virtute / e d'ogne 
operazion che merta pena' (XVII.104-105). Virtute here implies actions which merit 
rewards, in opposition to condemnable actions. So love is the source of both good action 
(virtute) and bad. Love well directed has been previously identified by Virgil as that 'nel 
primo ben diretto' (XVI1.97). Furthermore, love focused on the 'primo ben' orders the love 
of secondary things (XVII.98). In essence, the love which Virgil Is here describing is the 
source of virtu. Human virtu is made dependent upon, even equated with, love directed 
towards the 'primo ben'. However, in canto XVIII, Virgil adds a further aspect to human 
m On Purgatorio XVII and XVIII see: Mira Mocan, 'Amore. libero arbitrio e fantasia: Cant! XVI.XVII.XVI\1',ln 
Esperimenti danteschi: Purgatorio, pp. 147·74; Georges Guntert 'Canto XVII' and 'Canto XVlll' In Lectura dallt/s 
turicensis: Purgatorio. pp. 261-74 and pp. 275-85; Kenelm Foster. 'The Human Spirit In ACtlo~', Dante Studies. 
with the Annual Report o/the Dante Society 88 (1970). 17.29. 
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virtu. Virgil first describes love as the instinctive 'bending towards' an object of desire 
(XVlll.26) and as the producer of active motion. This Virgil describes in relation to all 
nature. But the pilgrim requires an explanation of the human condition and how love can 
relate to merit (XVIII.43-4S). As became apparent in the analysis of Paradiso II, in the 
union of form and matter which makes up every substance, virtu describes an entity's 
specific nature which is only demonstrated in act, and this idea is iterated here also: 'Ogne 
forma sustanzYal [ ... ] specifica vertute ha in Sf colletta Ila qual sanza operar non e sentita' 
(49-52). The particular virtu of human nature is 'la virtu che consiglia' (62) which 
manifests itself in the choosing of the correct objects of love, directing all love according to 
'la prima voglia' (59). The power to freely choose love is cast as the essential nature of 
man which is demonstrated in the choice of the first good. Only towards the end of Virgil's 
discourse does he identify human virtu specifically as free will. Significantly, however, this 
is not his term but instead one he 'borrows' from Beatrice: 'La nobile virtu Beatrice 
intende I per 10 libero arbitrio' (73-74). It will soon become clear that Beatrice has 
privileged knowledge of the nature of human virtu which springs from the access she has 
to the 'primo ben' and the ontological and theological order to which it relates; this is 
something Virgil only apprehends in the abstract. 
Virgil's discourse is central for understanding what the Com media conceives human virtu 
to be. Like the virtu of any created thing, human virtu is the defining aspect of its nature, as 
well as the most perfect form of its potential activity. Furthermore, man's virtu places man 
within a universal order; the fulfilment of virtu is man's correct interaction with that 
order. Virgil casts human virtu specifically within the order of love in the universe which is 
essentially an ontological order. Love misdirected is an upsetting of that order, in which 
creation turns against its Creator: 'quando al mal si torce, 0 con piu cura, / 0 con men che 
non dee corre nel bene, / contra '1 fattore adovra sua fattura' (XVII.l00-02). lIuman virtu 
which, like all individualised natures, is given in creation, is the facility to choose to fulfil 
one's place within the ontological order of love in the universe; man Is able to choose to 
love the 'primo ben' and order his activites according to this love. Human virtu is made 
part of a dynamic of love which begins to recall Augustinian virtue as perfect love of God. 
The choice to love God then becomes the perfect expression of human nature. 
However, despite its clarity and general validity, Virgil's discourse is openly Incomplete, 
turning, as it does at the end, to Beatrice to ultimately complete the picture. Virgil 
expresses the peculiarity of human virtu only within a natural order of desire as expressed 
by his examples and comparisons. The movement of love In humans Is hardly 
distinguished from the natural movement of fire which moves itself upwards (XVIII.2a-30) 
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or from the desire of bees to make honey (XVIII.S8-60). Missing from Virgil's discourse is 
the acknowledged orientating figure of God and the active role God plays in drawing man's 
love towards himself. While identifying love as the source of both human and divine 
action, he is unable to represent the role of divine love. He cannot communicate the 
relationship between man as creature and God as Creator from which he is eternally 
excluded. Virgil's is an overtly rational discourse, as Kirkpatrick says, 'rejecting all 
confusing appeals to emotion so as to clarify the mind of his pupil, yet implicitly 
acknowledging that his own experience of truth remains in the negative, as a merely 
formulaic understanding'.276 Virgil provides a conceptual foundation for the pilgrim but 
his discourse is unvivified. Emotion is not necessarily distracting but is instead 
transformative in the right context. The lack of transformation and vivification of Virgil's 
speech is perhaps played out in the pilgrim's immediate response; despite having listened 
to a discourse on the motivating movement of love and free will, the pilgrim afterwards 
'stava com' om che sonnolento vana' (XVIlI.87). Essentially, Virgil's discourse is abstracted 
from the pilgrim's own experience and while it has clarified his mind it has not 
transformed his will. We might recall here the construction of Dominican sermons; the 
virtu which the pilgrim has begun to acquire here is clarity of understanding, a beginning 
to see the way forward, but what is lacking is personal involvement or emotional energy. 
Virgil's discourse focuses on the nature of natural love, and human virtu appears as that by 
which humans can freely choose to love a particular object. This virtu is fulfilled when free 
will is used to direct love towards the primo ben. At the end of Paradiso I, Beatrice gives a 
discourse which, I suggest, is a completion of that given by Virgil.277 While Virgil's 
discourse considers the love which moves entities by looking into their specific natures -
their identity originates from within - instead Beatrice sees entities, mankind included, as 
part of a universal order directed towards a specific end which is also the origin of that 
order itself. Within her discourse, virtu is that which brings man towards his end through 
the workings of divine providence. Beatrice, like Virgil, explains the forces of movement 
between an entity and its object of desire. But instead of Virgil's earth-bound stance, 
Beatrice begins with the universal order. It is within this order that entities move: 'Ne 
l'ordine ch'io dico sono accline / tutte nature, per diverse sorti' (Par. 1.109-110). The 
recontextualisation of natural desire within an overarching order establishes a more 
defined purpose and aim to that desire. The aim lies particularly In a return to origins; 
entities move 'pill al principio loro e men vicine' (111). As in Paradiso II, individualised 
creation is figured as elements of a greater whole, a 'gran mar de l'essere' (113), in which 
276 Kirkpatrick, commentary on Purgatorlo XVIII, p. 403. 
277 On Paradiso I see: Robert Hollander, '1\ Prologo alia terza canUca',In Esperlmentl danteschl: Paradiso, pp. 3. 
25; Selene Sarteschl, 'Canto 1', In Lectura dantis turicens/s: Paradiso, pp. 13.34. 
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entities have distinct roles and aims but are ultimately ontologically united. The particular 
motions of entities are then governed by their ontological place within the hierarchy of 
being, but all share in the 'istinto' to return to their source (114). Beatrice then makes the 
important shift from considering the instinct of all beings to focusing on that of beings 
with 'intelletto e amore' (120). In a total recontextualisation of an image used by Aristotle, 
this instinct is figured as an 'arco', the power of which compels a loving and knowing 
entity to its allotted place (119).278 It is within this image that virtu becomes evident: 
La provedenza, che cotanto ass etta, 
del suo lume fa '1 ciel sempre qUIeto 
nel qual si volge quel c'ha maggior fretta; 
e ora 11, come a sito decreto, 
cen porta la virtu di quella corda 
che do che scocca drizza in segno lieto. (Par. 1.121-26) 
Beatrice iterates here an idea which, as we have seen, becomes even more evident in 
Paradiso II. At the top of the created universe is an interaction between the Empyrean and 
the Primo Mobile. In Paradiso I the Empyrean appears as the end point of the Instinctual 
motion of the universe; it is the place to which all desires aim. The Empyrean's very 
existence, however, is made part of a providential plan and consequently the order of 
creation itself, whose elements all instinctively desire to return to their source, also forms 
part of that plan. Within this it is the 'virtu di quella corda' which fulfils a being's 
instinctive desire by returning it to its origin. Virtu is no longer only the power to choose 
what to love but it is the power to carry one to the ultimate object of one's love. 
Human love has come to be contextualised within the movements of the universe and the 
divine providential plan. Although the return towards the origin Is both a natural Instinct 
and providentially allotted, this is no guarantee of that return and Beatrice's description of 
the potential failure, as we will come to see, resonates strongly with the pilgrim's own 
experiences. Despite 'l'intenzion de l'arte' (128), a perfect disposition of form Is not 
guaranteed due to the unresponsiveness of matter (129). As we saw both In the episode of 
the Earthly Paradise and the narrative of St Francis, Dante establishes the Importance of 
perfectly prepared 'ground' in which the divine can be revealed and this relies on a clarity 
of desire only for God. Instead, creatures with free will are capable of turning away from 
this perfect object so that 'l'impeto primo /l'atterra torto da falso piacere' (134-135), 
278 We saw In Chapter One that Aristotle uses the Image of archers aiming at a target also to express the active 
movement of man towards their Supreme Good In NE 1.11.2. This Image also become a commonplace of 
scholastic /philosophy theology. See for example Aquinas Summa contra gentiles 3.24.2049. 
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thereby making themselves imperfect. It will become apparent in the pilgrim's own 
process of developing virtu that the clarification and focusing of his desires is essential 
before he can be properly fulfilled. 
Beatrice's discourse is significantly contextualised by the pilgrim's new situation and his 
questions arising from it The pilgrim is unable to understand how he has so swiftly 
ascended above the earth. Beatrice's response demonstrates how his own ascent is only a 
manifestation of the natural ascent of all creation freed from the distractions of temporal 
desire. In fact, 'Maraviglia sarebbe in te se, privo / d'impedimento, gill ti fossi assiso' (139-
140). Even before Beatrice's explanation, the authorial narrator interjects with an 
explanation of the pilgrim's ascent into the heavens: 'amor che'l del governi, / tu '1 sal, che 
col tuo lume me levasti' (Par. 1.74-75). The pilgrim is raised up by the love which orders 
the universe, just as he raises himself up through his own perfected, natural love. In both 
the conceptual tradition and within the Commedia itself, we have already begun to see the 
centrality of a loving relationship between man and God to man's ontological and ethical 
development. Without the basis of that relationship man cannot progress. Love, we 
remember, is a movement of the will and is therefore directly relevant to action. The 
loving relationship of man and God is also, however, that which gives value to human 
action. Virgil's discourse posits love as the centre of all praise or blameworthy action but 
beyond this Augustine considered the relationship which that love manifests as the source 
of value for human action. Praise or blame is not just dependent on love for a right or 
wrong object but on that love being part of a greater relationship. 
The relationships through which the pilgrim learns about love are therefore themselves 
significant. Both Virgil and Beatrice are cast in roles of authority to which the pilgrim 
willingly submits. The pilgrim's address to Virgil at the opening of Purgatorio XVIll Is, in 
fact, marked by great emotional impetus. As 'Maestro', Virgil has the knowledge to enliven 
the pilgrim's mind; as 'dolce padre caro' he has the emotional relationship to the pilgrim 
which means that his words have impact. Virgil's words, however, impel the pilgrim 
towards intellectual enlightenment rather than emotional change. However, by submitting 
his knowledge and will to that of another, the pilgrim is enacting the necessary steps of 
intellectual and willful submission to a loving figure of authority which mankind must 
enact in coming to God. In Paradiso I, Beatrice is cast as a 'madre' correcting the mistakes 
of a delirious son (101). The combination of authority and tenderness which the mother-
figure suggests, as well as the more intimate knowledge of the pilgrim's particular 
problems, enable Beatrice's words to be both enlightening and motivating. This is 
suggested by the pilgrim's response to them in Paradiso II, in which he Is impelled 
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upwards, enacting directly the movement of the empowered arrow Beatrice has just 
described, which shoots towards its target (Par. 11.19-26). 
In both Purgatorio XVII and XVIII, human virtu is considered in relation to man's 
movement towards the object of his desires. Virgil's explanation equates human love with 
other natural forms of love and can only conceive of love as a one-way process. Human 
virtu is then the autonomous power to choose to follow the correct object of human love 
or not. Virgil's virtu is the free, rational choice of love. It is in the freedom of choice that the 
value of human virtu is found. Virgil reveals to the pilgrim 'Quanto ragion qui vede' (Purg. 
XVlll.46) and his idea of virtu recalls much of the virtue of classical philosophy with its 
emphasis on intrinsic nature, self-fulfilment in action, and freedom of choice as the source 
of value. This idea is not dismissed within Dante's text but it is presented as incomplete. 
Virgil himself acknowledges that for complete understanding 'da indi la t'aspetta / pur a 
Beatrice, ch'e opera di fede' (Purg. XVIII.47-48). Beatrice's discourse of Paradiso 1, as well 
as its context, goes some way further to answering the pilgrim's questions both on the 
nature of love and the reason behind his own ascent. The two are, in fact, fundamentally 
connected. The pilgrim ascends both because he chooses to love and because his ascent Is 
aided by the source of love itself. Beatrice's explanation does not deny free will as the 
essence of human virtu but considers what that liberated will enables humanity to do. 
Virtu in her discourse is the power which returns man to his origins; human virtu is not 
only to choose to return but to be empowered to return by the source of existence itself. 
By existing one is empowered and this empowerment forms part of the providential plan 
of the universe. Human virtu fails when it turns away from this plan and becomes 
distracted by the transient attractions of the world; it succeeds when It recognises the 
source of its existence and virtu as being outside of itself, and interacts with that source. 
4. How is virtu acquired? 
How the Com media conceives the acquisition of virtu process is expressed most readily 
through the pilgrim's own journey and in the 'how' and 'why' of its taking place. The 
nature of the pilgrim's failings, which necessitate his journey, arE" vitally linked to the 
virtu-dynamic. Human virtu depends on freedom of will and clarity of understanding to be 
able to be fulfilled; a will unable to perceive the correct object of its desires will naturally 
desire other objects and so lose itself in sin. But if human virtu Is a liberated state of will 
with a clear view of its end aim, how can this state be arrived at? As we shall come to see, 
the freeing of human will and the reforming of its interaction with the ultimate object of Its 
desires is a dynamic played out within the pilgrim's own story. 
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The place to begin to answer these questions is the beginning of the pilgrim's journey. 
Despite the hope promised by the appearance of Virgil in the first canto of Inferno, in the 
second canto the pilgrim is assailed with doubts.279 These doubts he expresses in a request 
to Virgil to 'guarda[re] la mia virtu s' ell' e possente' (Inf. I1.11). The meaning of'mia virtu' 
is not yet clear, but what follows suggests that what is in doubt here is a correct state of 
will in the pilgrim. This is one of those points where the conflict of will earlier described 
by Wetzel becomes apparent. The pilgrim is caught between past fears, new desires and 
present insecurities. While wanting to go ahead on the journey, he at the same time does 
not want and 'disvuol cio che volle' (37). The state which Wetzel described as 'volitional 
paralysis' and which the pilgrim's situation here echoes, recalls the tension of overcoming 
sin as it appeared in Augustine's thought. Sin is the state in which the soul has 
misapprehended the correct object of its desire and has put itself in thrall to that object, 
relinquishing the ability to 'self-determine'. While an object may be recognised as 
unworthy, this recognition alone does not guarantee freedom from desiring it. According 
to both Augustine and Gregory the Great this is a situation from which man cannot escape 
unaided. The Commedia's drama plays out this conflict and manifests the aid the pilgrim 
requires in the figures of Virgil and Beatrice. Only by submission of his own will to that of 
his two guides and through the redirection of his desires towards a correct object can the 
pilgrim begin his journey. In relation to his will this is marked by a joining of his own will 
with that of Virgil: 'un sol volere e d'ambedue' (139). In submitting his will to that of Virgil 
the pilgrim is freed from his self-doubt and empowered to begin his journey proper. But in 
order for the pilgrim to reapprehend the correct object of deSire, a vision of Beatrice Is 
needed. 
Freedom of Will, we have begun to see, is integral to the Com media's presentation of 
human virtu. That this is the expression of a distinctly human characteristic Is suggested 
by a significant comparison which Virgil makes. On seeing the pilgrim's fear, Virgil 
upbraids him with the charge of being like a beast shying at a shadow (47·48).280 This 
undercurrent, which begins in this canto but which will not be resolved until much later, Is 
the implied failure of the pilgrim in terms of the human condition which is demonstrated 
by his weakness and indecision of will. The misapprehension of signs Is a fault which 
accompanies both the pilgrim as an individual and the pilgrim as representative of the 
human condition. 
219 On Infer~o II see: Charles Singleton, 'Virgil Recognises Beatrice', Annual Report o/the Dante Society with 
AccompanYing Paper, 74 (1956), 29-38; Rachel lacoff, 'The Tears of Beatrice: Inferno II' Annual Report o/the 
Dante Society with Accompanying Paper, 100 (1982), 1-12. • 
280 This perhaps recalls the beast simile used to describe man's forfeiting of his humanity which appears In 
Dante's 'Doglia mi reca' as we saw In Chapter Two.. ' 
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So far the undercurrents of the will which mark Inferno II have been described, but the 
canto says much more about how virtu can be attained and it is important to consider how 
the pilgrim's conflicted will is overcome. The pilgrim is unable to save himself without the 
intercession of Beatrice. Her portrayal within Virgil's narrative recalls the figure of the 
beloved in the poetry of the Stilnovo, who stands as the incarnated mediator between the 
heavenly goal and the human way, and she appears overtly as the channeller of the 
metaphysical forces which appeared in Paradiso I: 
10 son Beatrice che ti faccio andare; 
vegno del loco ove tornar disio; 
amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare. (In! 11.70-72) 
These lines manifest the motions of love which were worked out in the ordering of the 
universe. Beatrice's desire to return to the Paradise from which she has come is 
emblematic of the desire of all creation to return to its source. But her movement down 
into Hell is also a movement caused by love, the outpouring of the source which draws 
creation back to itself. This is love as the producer of both movement and speech which 
moves others. While these are the forces which underpin Beatrice's appearance, her 
physical reality is equally vital. Hers is a personal intercession for 'amico mio' (61). The 
combination of the metaphysical and the real in Beatrice is a further Iteration of the 
Christic analogy of Beatrice in the pilgrim's journey. She, like Christ, 'opens the way 
between Heaven and Earth' for the pilgrim, revealing to him the motions by which he can 
return there in both their temporal and metaphysical forms. This analogy Is captured in 
Virgil's address to her as 'donna di virtu' (In! 11.76). Like the virtu which overcomes the 
pilgrim in Paradiso XXIII and which he is told opened the way between Heaven and Earth, 
Beatrice here in Inferno II is cast in a similar role as the lady 'sola per cui / I'umana spezie 
ecce de ogne contento / di quel ciel c'ha minor Ii cerchi sui' (In/. 11.76-78). By her tangible 
reality in the pilgrim's memory and by the reassertion of that memory through Virgil's 
account of her descent into Hell, Beatrice activates the reconnection of the pilgrim's virtu 
with the heavenly virtu to which he must return. The third and final appearance of the 
term virtu in this canto expresses the results of this interaction. Having heard Virgil's 
account of the coming of the 'donna di virtu' for his sake, the virtu of the pilgrim, which 
was in doubt at the canto's opening, is reinvigorated: 
Quali fioretti dal notturno gelo 
chinati e chiusi, poi che 'I solli 'mbianca, 
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si drizzan tutti aperti in loro stelo: 
tal mi fee' io di mia virtude stanca (/n/.II.127-30) 
We find again a reiteration of the representational tradition which figures the 
strengthening of virtu in terms of natural growth. The images stress the dependence of 
one element on another as well as the revelatory overtones of the rising sun. As in the 
image of St Francis as the rising sun whose virtu fertilises the earth around him, so the 
story of Beatrice reinvigorates the pilgrim's virtu like the sun reinvigorates the flower. The 
sun too is the visible manifestation of the metaphysical life-giving of Creator to creature. 
The metaphor expresses the interaction of virtu between Creator and creature which is a 
metaphysical holding in existence and a tangibly expressed relationship. Both this 
metaphor and the event which precede it stress the dependence of the pilgrim upon the 
external aid brought to him. Without first the help of Virgil then the help of Beatrice, the 
pilgrim would be unable to progress. His dependence upon his two guides becomes a 
microcosm of the dependence of all humanity upon God for liberation from sin and 
fulfilment of their existence. 
The ability of Beatrice to manifest the interaction of Creator and creature for the pilgrim, 
however, is dependent upon the traces she leaves of herself for him to follow, and what 
emerges as his sin is his failure to follow those traces. This failure Is characterised as a 
more essential failure of his human nature. As became apparent in Paradiso 1, a being with 
free will can fail to love the ultimate good of its being by dragging itself earthwards In 
pursuit of 'falso piacere', When the pilgrim comes face to face with Beatrice In the Earthly 
Paradise this is precisely the charge she lays at his door,281 As the pilgrim's donna di virtu, 
the love of Beatrice would lead to love of the ultimate good: 'Per entro I mie' disirl, / che tl 
menavano ad amar 10 Bene I di la dal qual non e ache s'aspiri' (Purg. XXXI.22-24),lnstead, 
following Beatrice's death, the pilgrim 'volse i pass! suoi per via non vera, / Imagini di ben 
seguendo false' (Purg, XXX.130-131). Loving Beatrice represents loving the eternal, stable 
and real as opposed to 'Ie presenti cose / col lor falso piacer' (Purg. XXXI.34-35) as the 
pilgrim later describes his wayward desires, Beatrice is a way towards rather than an end 
in herself, but a way towards which is absolutely necessary in the engagement of the 
human desire and comprehension of the pilgrim. In his encounter with Beatrice in the 
Earthly Paradise the pilgrim undergoes a shift in the way he reads and feels towards the 
invisible. 
281 On the meeting ofthe pilgrim and Beatrice in the Earthly Paradise see: Nicola Fosca 'Dante e Beatrice 
nell'Eden', L 'A lighieri 33 (2009),45-63; Eugenio Chiarinl, II canto XXX del PurgatorIo: L~ctura dantls scatlgera 
(Florence: Le Monnie~, 1 ~65); An~onjo ~tauble, 'Cant~ XXX', In Lectura dantis turlcensis: Purgatorlo, pp. 463. 
72; Corrado Bologna, II rttorno dl Beatrice: PurgatorJo XXX-XXX!', Esper/mentl danteschl: Purgatorlo, pp. 295. 
317; Francesco Mazzoni, II canto XXXI del Pugatorio: Lectura dant/s scaligera (Florence: Le Monnier, 1965). 
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In light of the considerations of the Earthly Paradise made in Chapter Three of this thesis, 
the lessons which the pilgrim learns here on the proper value of material creation situate 
his personal development within the development of the human condition as a whole. I 
argued in Chapter Three that Dante presents the Earthly Paradise as a place freed from 
meteorological disturbance and that this freedom in the natural surroundings was 
paralleled by a freedom from temporal distractions of the souls who had come there. Here 
this state is further echoed in the internal development of the pilgrim, who In his 
confession to Beatrice is criticised for being distracted by temporal desires before being 
freed from the memory of those desires. His newly established, virtuous condition is part 
of the virtuous human condition which Eden represents as a whole. As we saw in the 
earlier analysis of Purgatorio XXVIII, the Earthly Paradise is created directly by 'il Sommo 
Ben' and is also the natural, material place which most reveals that creative hand. In 
recalling Virgil's earlier explanation of human virtu as 'nel primo ben diretto', it becomes 
hardly surprising that it is within this context that the pilgrim's wayward vision and thus 
his wayward virtu can begin to be restored. 
A consistently important dynamic in the relationship of Beatrice and Dante is that of sight, 
beginning with his first sight of her in the account of the Vita nuova, the reassertlon of her 
power over him in the vision at that text's end, the displaced sight of her in Virgil's account 
in In/erno 11, and finally the renewed sight of her in the Earthly Paradise. What Is striking 
in this final instance is that the pilgrim here comprehends Beatrice not In terms of her 
physical appearance but in terms of the emotional and spiritual effect she has upon 
himself: 
sanza de li occhi aver piu conoscenza, 
per occulta virtu che da lei mosse 
d'antico amor sentlla gran potenza. (Purg. XXX.37·39) 
The pilgrim's eyes, which have misled him into desiring false pleasures, are rendered 
unnecessary in the recognition of what is truly good. The love and virtu which Beatrice 
manifested in life are revealed as not tied to temporal existence but instead as taking part 
in a universal and eternal dynamic by which man returns to God. The temporal physicality 
of Beatrice was, however, a necessary indicator and mode of communication between the 
ultimate good she represented and the understanding and desires of the human pilgrim. 
By orientating those desires towards herself as an object immediately connected to God, 
those desires could be correctly directed through her towards God. The pilgrim's failure 
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had been to read her temporal existence as an end in itself. In the traditions considered in 
Chapter One, and particularly in the thought of Plato, Augustine and Gregory, we saw the 
notion that virtue focuses the desires away from the temporal towards the eternal. Dante 
is staging a similar process here with respect to Beatrice and the pilgrim. Through desiring 
Beatrice, who focuses the pilgrim's will and leads from the temporal to the eternal, the 
pilgrim is attaining virtu. 
Dante's dependence on Beatrice is itself a manifestation of the necessary dependence of 
any soul on a higher power to attain its object, that power itself; man reaches God through 
God himself as Christ. The staging of the necessary interaction of Dante and Beatrice, 
however, is a sign of the importance the poet gives to human relationships in the 
attainment of God. As Montemaggi suggests, 'what man can and ought to do and most 
perfectly will do in heaven, is to participate in the love that God is. And for Dante, human 
beings may participate, may be the love which God is through their relationships with one 
another'.2B2 Through the staging of his relationship with Beatrice, the poet is suggesting 
the steps through which the human object of one's love may lead to the ultimate 
transcendent object. Furthermore, within the staging of his personal relationship, he is at 
the same time reflecting the universal relationship between mankind and Christ. Beatrice, 
the unifier of Dante's desires, acts as Christ acts for humanity, providing the focalising 
bridge across which man returns to God.283 
While these are the metaphysical forces, changes of character and interactions through 
which the pilgrim and by extension mankind come to attain virtu, the form of the 
Com media itself adds a further important aspect to how the poem presents virtu as being 
attained. The poem stages the pilgrim's real interactions with Beatrice as being central to 
his development of virtu and in this way validates human experience as the forum in 
which virtu can and must be acquired. The pilgrim's whole journey demonstrates the 
importance of lived experience. In Purgatorio XXX, Beatrice states that the pilgrim 
[t]anto giu cadde che tutti argomenti 
a la salute sua eran gia corti, 
fuor che mostrarli Ie perdute genti (Purg. XXX.136-138) 
These lines add a further aspect to the realigning of the pilgrim's sight which we have 
already seen as a dynamic within his relationship with Beatrice. But it Is further tempting 
282 Montemaggi, 'In Unknowability as Love', p. 62. 
~8;.~~;~~Pter One we saw that for Augustine, Christ was the unifier of man's desires. See Co,,/' 10.29.40 and 
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to read that the representational form which the poet here aligns himself with is the 
manifested, experiential representations of Franciscan literature in which moral change 
takes place through active engagement. Abstractions ('argomenti') are revealed as 
insufficient to effect real change, ineffectual as they are in the reshaping of the will which 
takes place in virtu. Instead, it has become apparent at various points in the analysis so far 
(especially Inferno II and Paradiso 1 and II), that at significant moments of learning, the 
pilgrim is somehow physically and emotionally involved in the process itself. The pilgrim 
is presented as learning by living through experiences, meeting people, seeing happenings, 
in short, engaging in the interactions which make up human life. These interactions are 
paralleled, however, by explanations of their signficance, a narrative feature which 
appeared in the hagiographical traditions considered in Chapter Two. The lived emotional 
and physical experiences of the pilgrim are interpreted for his benefit. 
It is not only that the pilgrim learns when he experiences himself but also when he hears 
about the lived experiences of others. Throughout the text moments of reaction to various 
narratives are staged, which demonstrate the pilgrim learning how to respond and 
provide models for reader response in general. While, for example, in the Meditationes 
vitae Christi the reader was told how to respond, in the Commedia they are shown how to 
respond. So in the ultimately disastrous narrative of Francesca da Rimini, the pilgrim Is 
overcome with guilt and grief and rendered 'come corpo morto' (In/. V.142); Instead when 
Virgil describes the salvific intercession of Beatrice for his sake, the pilgrim is vivified and 
filled with the desire to begin his journey of transformation. The Commedia's form 
validates itself as a tool for moral and spiritual development. The pilgrim's seeing and 
interpreting is mirrored by the seeing and interpreting of the reader; the pilgrim's 
reactions to stories and his interactions with individuals become models for the reactions 
and interactions of the audience both in relation to the text they are reading and the lives 
they are living. They too are 'mostrato Ie perduti gente' In order to reveal to them their 
own flaws, while they are also shown the spirits of the blessed to reveal their own 
potentials. 
5. What is the result of the attainment of virtu? 
If I have successfully established the pilgrim's journey as one underpinned by the virtu-
dynamiC, then the result of virtu attained must be that which the pilgrim attains at the end 
of his journey: the vision of God. But before this ultimate vision Is achieved, virtu Is 
fulfilled in the pilgrim in different preliminary steps which enable him to reach this vision 
itself. Human virtu, we have come to see in the Com media, Is freedom of the will In loving 
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the best object of its desires. This is necessarily tied to a correct seeing of and relationship 
to that object, and furthermore is dependent on the aid of that object itself. The result of 
virtu is both a fulfilled relationship with that object and a state of personal fulfilment of 
nature. The pilgrim's own journey is marked at significant points by increasing liberty, 
increasing vision and increasing personal powers, all of which are expressed through 
virtu. 
As became apparent in Inferno II, the principal problem which affected the pilgrim at the 
opening of his journey was a conflicted will, still bound by the memory of sin. Through the 
intercessions of Virgil and Beatrice his will is liberated from these ties. That liberation is 
one of the principal aims of the pilgrim's journey is suggested by Virgil's words to Cato In 
his explanation of the pilgrim's unexpected presence in Purgatory: 'libertA va cercando' 
(Purg. 1.71). Through the visions and experiences of Purgatory, this is what the pilgrim 
seeks and ultimately achieves and this achievement is acknowledged by Virgil's final 
words to him: 'Non aspettar mio dir piu ne mio cenno: / libero, dritto e sa no e tuo arbitrlo' 
(Purg. XXVll.139-140). That the liberation of the will is what marks the final stage of 
Virgil's tutelage of the pilgrim, is consistent with how the poet has constructed Virgil's idea 
of human virtu. Having a correct virtu che consiglia, which could correctly guide human 
action, marked the limit of Virgil's understanding of virtu and love In Purgatorio XVll1. 
Now his pupil has achieved this and Virgil can finally advise him to follow the dictates of 
his will: 'fallo fora non fare a suo senno' (Purg. XXVII.141). Virgil's acknowledgement of 
the pilgrim's success is in keeping with the character's own understanding of the 
potentials and limits of human nature. Virgil describes the pilgrim as now self-reliant - '10 
te sovra te corono e mitrio' (142) - and independent. However, this Is only a stage on the 
pilgrim's development. In fact what follows in his encounter with Beatrice Is an 
undermining of the pilgrim's new found autnomy and self-security In his confession to 
Beatrice. The liberty which Virgil describes is not of the same nature as the liberty which 
the pilgrim finally achieves. This liberty is again dictated by his relationship to Beatrice. In 
the pilgrim's final hymn of praise to Beatrice in Paradiso XXXI, liberty is no longer what he 
possesses himself but what he could not have achieved without Beatrice: 'Tu m'hal dl 
servo tratto a libertate' (Par. XXXJ.BS). The liberty which the pilgrim finally achieves Is the 
renunciation of autonomous power, it is the recognition of not being alone in the 
movement towards God. The human will alone cannot free itself from sin, but neither Is It 




The pilgrim's final address to Beatrice is his statement of this realisation; that her 
generous action is the source of his salvation. His ability to see this is part of the results of 
his attainment of virtu. Despite the immense physical distance between them, the pilgrim 
can see Beatrice more clearly than ever: 'sua effige / non discendea a me per mezzo mista' 
(Par. XXXI.77-78).284 This is significantly a moment of recognition, in which the pilgrim 
sees not only the physical Beatrice more dearly, but the metaphysical attributes which 
have underpinned their interaction: 
di tante cose quant' i' ho vedute, 
dal tuo podere e da la tua bontate 
riconosco la grazia e la virtute. (Par, XXXI.82-84) 
Through his interactions with Beatrice, the pilgrim has learned to see beyond creation to 
understand the forces which hold that creation in existence and together; furthermore she 
has acted as a channel for the interpretation of the invisible to enable the pilgrim to 
correctly read the things he has seen so that they become revelatory, The following of 
Beatrice through focusing his desire upon her has been a movement from slavery to 
liberty, which recalls the Augustinian movement from the multiple desires of the flesh to 
the unified desires of the spirit as described by Bochet: 'L'une, par la mUltiplicite de ses 
objets, est source de dispersion; l'autre au contra ire unifie, car Dieu est un. La premiere 
captive, enchaine dans 1a tyrannie de l'habitude; 1a seconde, a l'inverse, libere',285 Just as 
his coronation by Virgil marks the liberation of the pilgrim's rational knots, Beatrice, by 
presenting a simultaneously humanly compelling and incarnationally revealing object of 
desire, liberates the pilgrim from the misleading desires of the world and leads him to the 
freeing desire for God. 
Seeing and vision are presented as one of the most overt results of the pilgrim's 
attainment of virtu, This is both in relation to his physical powers of sight and the 
furthering of his powers to perceive the invisible nature of things. One of the central 
currents of thought on virtue in the theological tradition and In the Commedia has been 
virtue's role in leading human kind to a correct perception of the nature of the created 
universe and its relation to its Creator. Virtue, having its focus beyond the material world. 
orders human desire not to individualised material objects but to the supreme object 
which underpins them all, Once in a state of virtue, man is no longer fatally distracted by 
creation but instead reads it as coming from God and can thus properly interact with It. 
284 On the pilgrim's sojourn at the top of Paradise and on the changes In his guides from Be<1trlce to St nl'mard 
see Steven Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition. 
285 Isabelle Bochet, St Augustin et Ie desir de Dieu (Paris: Etudes augustinlennes, 1982) p. 388.89. 
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Although the term virtu itself is not present, this state is encapsulated in the pilgrim in 
canto X of Paradiso. As the pilgrim under Beatrice's guidance is called to 'ringrazia[r] it Sol 
de li angeli' (53) which has empowered his ascent and vision, he is called to enact the 
correct interaction between man and God: an interaction of praise. The freedom of the 
pilgrim's will, aided by Beatrice, enables him to turn willingly and intensely to the act of 
praise: 'Cor mortal non fu mai s1 digesto / a divozione e a rendersi a Dio' (55-56). What 
follows is a condensed staging of the pilgrim's successfully learned reading of the universe 
in which multiplicity is entirely revelatory of unity: 
[ ... ] s1 tutto'l mio amore in lui si mise, 
che Beatrice eclisso ne l'oblio. 
Non Ie dispiacque, rna s1 se ne rise, 
che 10 splendor de Ii occhi suoi ridenti 
mia mente unita in piu cose divise. (Par. X.59-63) 
It is not precisely a vision of God which the pilgrim has here but rather an experience of 
the intensity of love through which one sees God unmediated. The truly mediating object 
of love, Beatrice, remains untroubled by her own disappearance as this disappearance 
means that the lover is seeing her in her real state - at once distinct and totally one with 
God. By the end of the passage the pilgrim's mind has itself consciously become 
multiplicity in unity. The destructive splitting of desires is here resolved and there is no 
danger when all divided things in the apprehension remain whole. The pilgrim's reaction 
to Beatrice's laughter and smiling eyes iterates the state to which he has now come; the 
unity of his mind, focused in love upon God, can be split into many objects of Interest and 
desire and yet remain whole. This state of volitional and intellectual unity recalls the state 
described by Augustine in the ConfeSSions in which the mind, loving God, Is brought to a 
state of perfect unity.286 This is linked to the possibilities for love and perception offered 
by the incarnate Christ, through whom man passes from the many to the One.2a? That 
Beatrice is the locus through which the pilgrim comes to perceive this interaction of 
mUltiplicity and unity represented by the incarnate Christ, has already been suggested In 
the text in Purgatorio XXXI. As Beatrice stands gazing at the Gryphon and the pilgrim 
stands gazing into her eyes, he can see: 
Come in 10 specchio il sol, non altrimenti 
la doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava 
or con altri, or con altri reggimenti. 
286 Augustine, Confessions, 10.29.40. 




Looking through Beatrice, the pilgrim can come to perceive and experience (as he will do 
in Paradiso X), the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of the universe and come to see 
how it is revealed in the figure of the incarnate Christ.288 
The structure of the Commedia's narrative, focusing as it does on the development of the 
pilgrim, stresses the active interaction of the human individual in their process of moving 
towards a vision of God. That the individual is simultaneously the active, responsible 
subject in his own redemption while at the same time is necessarily reliant on aid from his 
(mediated) Creator, is one of the principal aspects of the Commedia's virtu-dynamic and 
thus its ethical stance. The participation of man in his own redemption is central to the 
poem's message and this participation we have seen as significant at various points: In 
Inferno II, where it is the pilgrim's personal memories which draw him into the journey: In 
the confession of his own errors which the pilgrim makes in Purgatorio XXX and XXXI: in 
Paradiso II in which the pilgrim's own body becomes the ground for understanding the 
universe. And so it is not surprising that in the movement towards the final vision of God 
in cantos XXX and XXXI of Paradiso, the pilgrim is an active subject, interacting with the 
possibilities offered to him. The physical interactions which the narrative describes 
manifest the metaphysical interactions which we have seen consistently In relation to 
virtu. 
The ability of the pilgrim to see has already been linked to the poet's usage of the term 
virtu in Paradiso I, in which the pilgrim can gaze upon the sun, being In the place created 
for humankind in which 'Molto e licito [ ... ] a Ie nostre virtu' (Par. 1.55-56). On entering the 
Empyrean, however, the pilgrim is again blinded by a 'Iuce viva' (Par. XXX.49) and is thus 
confronted, as so often happens in the Paradiso, with something beyond his own natural 
capacities to apprehend.289 A veil is drawn between the pilgrim's senses and the truth of 
the objects he is unable to physically see. it is only when Beatrice reveals to him the 
interaction which has taken place that his sight returns. This interaction Is one which 
recalls the making ready of created matter to receive the imprinting of the divine: 
Sempre l'amor che queta questo cielo 
accogJie in Sf con s1 fatta salute, 
per far disposto a sua fiamma it candela. (Par. XXX.52-54) 
200 In reading the Gryphon as a Christie figure I am following the commentary to this passage or Durling and 
Martinez, wh.o advocate this reading as opposed to the Gryphon as a political allegory. 
289 On ParadISO XXX see:. Prudence Shaw, 'Paradise XXX',ln Cambridge Readings In Dance's 'Comedy', td. by 
Kenelm F?ster a~d Patr~ck Boyde (Cambridg~ and ~ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1(81), pp, 191.213; 
I·A. Scott, Paradise XXX ,In Dante commentaries: EIght Studies of the 'Divine Comedy' ed by David Nolan 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press,1977), pp.159-80. ' . 
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What Beatrice can reveal to the pilgrim are the interactions of love which underpin the 
universe. In light of this revelation the pilgrim becomes able to see and becomes aware of 
having gone beyond himself: 'io compresi / me sormontar di sopr' a mia virtute' (56-57). 
The pilgrim's increased virtu is in response to the 'amor che queta questo cielo' (52). Thus 
we find manifested and distilled the interaction which must take place for man to rise to 
God; the outpouring of love on the part of the Creator and the ontological rising up of the 
creature. This ontological ascension is only possible, however, through the active 
intervention of the Creator himself. 
The progress of the pilgrim's vision continues to be a process of interaction of love and 
will. The pilgrim's liberated will now impels him towards the ultimate object, towards the 
disio which is both within him and is the object itself: 'L'alto disio che mo t'infiamma e 
urge, / d'aver notizia di cio che tu vei' (Par. XXX.70-71). Desire is both that which moves 
the pilgrim from within - Virgil's natural love - and that which inflames him and draws 
him from without - the universally ordered love of Beatrice. The pilgrim is at a state in 
which these two loves are perfectly harmonised. That this is a natural and essential state 
of the human soul is suggested by the metaphor the poet here employs to suggest the 
eagerness of the pilgrim: 
Non e fantin che s1 subito rua 
col visa verso illatte, se si svegli 
molto tardato da l'usanza sua, 
come fec'io, per far migliori spegli 
ancor de Ii occhi, chinandomi a l'onda 
che si deriva perche vi s'immegli (Par. XXX.B2-B7) 
The pilgrim in his state of virtu is figured as the child who instinctively recognises the 
source of its life-giving sustenance. His turning to drink from the river of light before him 
is at once an instinct and a choice; it is the point at which his ethical and his ontological 
states have finally harmonised. On entering the Empyrean his virtu had been increased by 
the love that greeted him; now his virtu will be increased because of his own loving and 
desiring state of mind and freed will. The pilgrim's compelling desire to apprehend this 
realm of God will enable him to have access to it His openness and willingness to receive 
are, in fact, what make him able to receive - as was 'theoretically' established by Beatrice 
in the previous canto (XXIX.64) - just as the willingness of his gaze in Purgatorlo X 
transformed the hard stone into a substance malleable and receptive to the form of God. 
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Now his willingness allows for his own self-transformation. The poet appeals to the 
naturalness of the trans formative interaction - needing and giving through love - through 
the tender simile of the nursing infant. The infant, soul unformed and desire unclouded, 
can most instinctively recognise the source of its sustaining existence and be In turn 
nourished and fulfilled by it. 
This fulfilled and essential state of human virtu enables the pilgrim to have a direct vision 
of the nature of Paradise which reveals to him, moreover, the nature of creation itself. The 
text figures this through the pilgrim's active participation in that creation. As became 
apparent in the analysis of Inferno IV and Purgatorio XXVIIl, water is an important 'carrier' 
of virtu in the Commedia's images, and (non) interaction with it is a mark of the soul's 
interaction with God. Furthermore, as Patrick Boyde points out, in the tradition, God's 
'first creative act is compared to the overflowing or outpouring of the spring; and thus the 
universe may be imagined as a river "proceeding out of the throne of God"'.290 The 
pilgrim's drinking from the river, therefore, becomes a sign of the interaction of human 
and divine virtu both in his individualised case and as a figure for the interaction of 
mankind in creation as a whole. I have argued that the virtu-dynamiC of the Commedia, and 
thus the poem's ethical stance, is concerned with orientating humankind within creation 
by fulfiling the potentials of human nature. Drinking from the river enables the pilgrim to 
see the Creator himself and thus to come to a state of volitional peace: 
Luce e la su che visibile face 
10 creatore a quella creatura 
che solo in lui vedere ha la sua pace. (Par. xxx. 1 00-02) 
Through the pilgrim's eyes the result of virtu is both experienced and revealed. Only In the 
vision of God, the 'primo ben' of human existence, can human desire be quieted and the 
peace promised by attaining virtu be found. 
But the structure of the Com media, in which the protagonist is both the pilgrim and the 
poet, means that the result of virtu extends both within and beyond the poem's narrative, 
essentially passing between the two. As has been suggested, the Com media makes the 
poet's ability to write dependent on the pilgrim's transformative experiences. While virtu 
is what empowers the pilgrim to see, it is also cast as that which empowers the poet to 
write. The relationship of dependency of creature and Creator for moral and ontological 
fulfilment is also present; the poet cannot write without divine aid figured as virtu. In the 
290 Patrick Boyde. Dante Philomythes and Philosopher: Man In the Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). p. 215. 
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Paradiso there are three appeals to virtu to aid in the poet's task of describing the holy 
realm and each introduces a different stage in what might be considered the poet's 
creativity. The first, in Paradiso I, forms part of the poet's appeal to Apollo to make him 
'del tuo valor sl fatto vaso' (13). The vasa here recalls Paul as the 'Vas d'elezion' to which 
the pilgrim compared himself - and found himself wanting - in Inferno II. Instead, now the 
experienced poet can successfully call on divine aid, being a worthy vessel to receive it. 
Virtu, in the poet's appeal to Apollo, is personfied, making it the god himself, while 
simultaneously being that through which the poet can write: 
o divina virtu, se mi ti presti 
tanto che l'ombra del beato regno 
segnata nel mio capo io manifesti (Par. 1.22-24). 
The reflexive verbs both personify virtu and make it that which the poet himself must 
possess in order to express himself. Again virtu is both the state of fulfilment and the 
correct action itself by which that fulfilment is achieved. The second instance in which 
virtu is tied to the poet's abilities comes in Paradiso XXII, again in an extra-narrative 
address on the part of the poet this time to the stars of Gemini: 
o gloriose stelle, 0 lume pregno 
di gran virtu, dal qual io riconosco 
tutto, qual che si sia, il mio ingegno (Par. XXII.112-14) 
In appealing to the stars which presided over his own birth, the poet Is situating the 
fulfilment of his abilities in relation to their potential at his own creation. Here the cosmic 
interactions of Paradiso II are particularised in the case of the poet. To write Is a fulfilment 
of his own particular ontological nature, the ethical enactment of his particular virtu. 
Again, however, this enactment is made dependent upon a further relationship. As In the 
pilgrim's address to Beatrice, which recognises his dependence upon her, here the poet 
acknowledges a similar dependency, only this time on the generator of his particular 
individuality. The final appeal to virtu to aid the poet's expression appears significantly In 
Paradiso XXX and is closely linked to, and arises directly out of, the experiences of the 
pilgrim at that moment, bringing the poet and pilgrim very closely together. While the two 
previous addresses have been to pagan Apollo and the constellation of Gemini, this final 
appeal is directly to God himself; at this stage of the pilgrim's vision there can be no more 
intermediaries: 
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(Par. XXX.97-99) 
These lines appear immediately before those quoted above in which the light of heaven 
reveals the Creator to his creature (100-02). In order for the poet to enact a recreation of 
this vision in his poem, the divine light and creativity of God in the form of virtu become 
necessary since both the experience and the expression go beyond human natural 
capabilities. These three instances trace a shift in the poem towards a changing source of 
human creativity and thus of human virtu. The first appeal to Apollo echoes the continuing 
influence of the classical past upon the poet's creativity; he writes in the light of that past. 
The second appeal to the stars of Gemini enacts a recognition of the lessons learned by the 
pilgrim in Paradiso II on the source of differentiation and individualised powers in the 
universe. The poet's power's are not autonomous but are instead part of a cosmic order 
within which he is fulfiling himself. But the final appeal marks the final stage of the 
pilgrim-poet's development. Just as the pilgrim can now see things unmediated and 
recognise directly the source of his existence, so the poet can acknowledge the origi n of his 
own creative virtu, as playing a part within the virtu at the basis of all creation. 
6. Dante-pilgrim: Representative of the Human Condition 
The Commedia not only considers virtu in relation to the pilgrim's individualised self, but 
constructs that self as a representative of humanity in its fallen condition. It does this by 
an underlying current of comparison and identification between the pilgrim and Adam. In 
Purgatorio XXX, in Beatrice's criticism of the pilgrim's sin, and in Paradiso VII, when the 
creation of Adam is described, both figures are characterised as having misused their God-
given potential. In the pilgrim's case, Beatrice describes how not only the heavens but the 
'grazie divine' had disposed the pilgrim to the best possible state: 
questi fu tal ne la sua vita nova, 
virtualmente, ch'ogne abito destro 
fatto avrebbe in lui mirabil prova. (Purg. XXX.l1S-117) 
The pilgrim has been endowed with both a perfect natural disposition and, in the events of 
his Vita nuova with Beatrice, had received the beneficial guidance of divine grace. His sin Is 
therefore even more terrible, arising as it does from self-will working against divine ald. 
He"actively turns away from Beatrice - 'sl tolse a me e diessi altrui' (Purg. XXX.126) _ and 
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progresses along the wrong path: 'volse i passi suoi per via non vera' (130). The pilgrim's 
sin is within the virtu che consiglia, which has been established as central to human nature 
in their pursuit of the good. A similar misuse of natural potential and the human virtu of 
free will is also attributed to Adam. His creation was even more perfect than that of the 
pilgrim since he was 'al suo fattore unita' (Par. VII.35) and his creation was fundamentally 
good: 'qual fu creata fu sincera e buona' (36). In his creation, which was directly linked to 
and revealing of God, Adam was a moment of perfect creation. But his sin is described in 
the same terms as that of the pilgrim; he too self-wills to turn from God along the wrong 
path: 'per se stessa fu ella sbandita / di paradiso, pero che si torse / da via di verita e da 
sua vita' (VII.37-39). The echoes in imagery of the via di verita and the misuse of human 
vita, form an identification between the two figures. This identification is intensified in a 
consideration of the root of their sin. We have already seen that a misuse and misguidance 
of will is at the centre of the pilgrim's failings. Similarly, the cause of Adam's sin involves a 
misuse of will: 
Per non sofferire a la virtu che vole 
freno a sua pro de, quell'uom che non nacque, 
dan nan do se, danno tutta sua prole. (Par, VII.25-27) 
To will is an essential aspect of human nature - it is a virtu - but to control that will 
through the 'virtu che consiglia' is what gives value to human action. In not accepting 
controls of the will, in not submitting his own will to a higher purpose, Adam sins. The 
submission ofthe will, frequently figured in Purgatorio in terms of reining in, is the lesson 
learned by the pilgrim throughout his journey. Adam and the pilgrim's fault lies In freely 
chosen self-alienation, which stems from an unwillingness to form part of a hierarchy of 
being and instead to see the self and its desires as paramount. This alienation Is a 
corruption of the ontological order into which they were created and a refusal of all the 
benefits of that order. Adam saw God and turned away from him, just as the pilgrim saw 
Beatrice and turned away from her. The pilgrim's fault cannot be realigned until his arrival 
in the Earthly Paradise in which the restoration of his original, sinless nature can be 
achieved. This further forms a connection between the pilgrim and Adam; it was for Adam, 
'l'uom buono e a bene' (Purg. XXVIII.92), that Eden was created. That the pilgrim's 
restoration takes place here connects his newly achieved state with that of prelapsarlan 
Adam and thus identifies his new state as one most intimately connected with God. lie has 
passed through the self-created alienation from God to which sinning had brought him, In 
entering Eden he can become again 'al suo fattore unita', 
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That the pilgrim's redeemed state is a reassertion of his natural potential and linked to the 
natural potential of all humanity established by Adam, becomes apparent in the pilgrim's 
eventual meeting with Adam himself, which is marked by an emphasis on the connection 
of their essential natures as created, potential beings. Adam is identified through his 
ontological placing within the hierarchy of creation, which he himself has now properly 
recognised - he is not autonomous but is instead a part of creation: 'Dentro da quei rai / 
vagheggia il suo fattor l'anima prima / che la prima virtu creasse mai' (Par. XXVI.82-84). 
The simile which immediately follows this reaches beyond the narrative action to connect 
the metaphysical and imaginary undercurrents which have traced the pilgrim's own 
development: 
Come la fronda che flette la cima 
nel transito del vento, e poi si leva 
per la propria virtu che la soblima, 
fec' io in tanto in quant' ella diceva, 
stupendo, e poi mi rifece sicuro 
un disio di parlare ond' io ardeva. 
E comincia: '0 porno [ ... ]' (Par. XXVI.85-91) 
Adam and the pilgrim are metaphorically made participants in the natural processes of the 
world. We find at the bases of those processes virtu, that which ties the natures of Creator 
and creature together in acts of becoming and self becoming. The meeting with Adam 
places the pilgrim simultaneously in his most basic and most fulfilled place as a human 
being within the ontological hierarchy. 
In light of the progress of the pilgrim which has been traced in this chapter, it is perhaps 
hardly surprising that the interaction of virtu between Adam and the pilgrim is related by 
the poet directly to speech. Ascoli has noted that 'the phrase ffla propria virtu", suggesting 
the act of specific [ ... ] individual will by which Dante raises himself up to communicate 
with his first parent [ ... ] resonate[s] deliberately with the naming of the creator God as "la 
prima virtu" only three lines earlier'.291 The creation of man and the perfection of virtu in 
man are thus both dictated by the word; the creation of man and man's own speech 
become the expression of perfect being. 
7. Conclusion 
291 AscoJi, note 153. 
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Through the figure of the pilgrim, the poet Dante proposes an example of the steps by 
which man can come to God. In focusing on himself as the subject of development, 
engaging in a kind of self-confession, Dante's narrative is perhaps reminiscent of the 
Confessions of Augustine with their personal history and self analysis. But the Com media's 
presentation of the pilgrim is taking part in a wider conceptual and representational 
tradition. The transformations of the pilgrim act as a kind of exemplum which we the 
readers watch and participate in, as in the traditions of hagiography and devotional 
literature. But the transformation experience which the Com media traces is intimately 
bound up the way the sti/novo conceived the experience of romantic love. The pilgrim's 
own historical life is the forum in which he learns. By contextualising the experience the 
pilgrim undergoes in the narrative within his own real life, the Com media validates the 
possibilities offered by human life itself. For the pilgrim, the result of a life fulfilled 
through virtu is the expression of his experiences; for the human condition which the 
pilgrim represents, the fulfilment of human virtu is the expression of man's relationship to 
God. 
The poet constructs the development of virtu at different stages in relation to his pilgrim 
figure's needs and abilities. Reminiscent of the Aristotelian tradition, human virtu under 
Virgil is rational free choice springing from an ordered and enlightened reason and will. It 
is the freedom of choice which gives human action value. Human virtu under Beatrice, 
however, is the reconnection of man to the source of his existence through mutual love. 
This love empowers man to return to his origin. Beatrice's understanding of virtu is much 
closer to the Augustinian tradition of virtue as the perfect love of God. This tradition also 
influences how the Com media presents virtu as being acquired. The Commedia places 
conflict of will as central to the pilgrim's temporal failings, as well as being the centre of 
his positive transformation. The redirection of his will through the combined actions of 
Virgil and Beatrice enables the pilgrim to move towards God. However, the Com media sees 
the development of the will in direct relation to the intellectual, emotional and indeed, 
romantic experience of the pilgrim. In his experience of human love lies the impetus for 
his transformation. In the two aspects of human virtu, which Virgil and Beatrice present to 
the pilgrim, it becomes evident that the Commedia does not cast one as replacing the other, 
but rather hu~an virtu are free will is recontextualised to work within a new theological 
order: human virtu is therefore involved in a process of transformation. Perhaps the 
principal comment which the poem establishes about human virtu is its non-isolation. Just 
as the pilgrim in his progress does not and could not continue his journey alone, so the 
humanity, which the pilgrim represents, is likewise aided in its movement towards 
salvation. Virtu becomes that which reconnects human powers (virtu) with the divine 
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power (virtu) which actively draws man back to itself. Within this interaction, the 
individual is both responsible and dependent; responsible for the choices he makes but 
dependent upon God for the offer of those choices. 
By telling the story of an individual man, Dante is able to make tangible and personal the 
cosmological, metaphysical and theological dynamics which his poem explores. The 
pilgrim himself becomes the conceptual link for understanding the divine mysteries to 
which he is made party. The human love story of the Commedia, in which man can search 
for and meet again his dead beloved, is a translucent veil for the metaphysical love story 
between God and his creation which underpins the poem. But it is an absolutely necessary 
veil. The Com media casts human relations, with their joys, dangers and suffering, as the 
way towards the fulfilment of man's being. By dramatising these relations in the light of 




In Paradiso XXIV-XXVI, the pilgrim stands in the Heaven of the Fixed Stars; he is there 
examined on the nature of the three theological virtues by the saints Peter, James and 
John.292 This is one of the Com media's many moments of doctrinal clarity and naturally 
draws the attention of those looking for details of the poet's presentation of virtue. My aim 
here, at the conclusion of my thesis, is not to give an exhaustive analysis of this passage 
but instead to focus on four elements which draw together issues of the virtu-dynamic 
which have become evident in this thesis. As in so much of the poem, it is in the episode's 
dramatic form and action, as much as its doctrinal content, that the virtu-dynamic 
becomes apparent. That the virtues are revealed and discussed as part of a dramatic 
episode is a reiteration of how virtu appears in the Commedia as a whole: as a vivified 
factor in human existence. By turning at this point to this central episode, following my 
analysis of the far-reaching virtu-dynamic, we can come to see this dynamic at work 
Virtu in the Commedia has become evident as an ethics of character and its nature is 
primarily to be understood through human experience. This appears again in the Heaven 
of the Fixed Stars episode through the figures of the pilgrim's three examiners. One oftMs 
particular episode's more striking features is its examination format, in which the pilgrim 
is questioned by three saints, each of whom is associated personally with the theological 
virtu which the pilgrim is called upon to explicate. In this way the pilgrim's theoretical 
explications are paralleled by the presence of an exemplum figure of that virtu; his 
explications are to be read through the personified figure of virtu to whom he is speaking. 
Virtu, therefore, appears both explained in the pilgrim's words and exemplified In the 
saints' characters and actions. This is a parallel example of the representational form, In 
which each element is read in relation to the other, that was exemplified in Giotto's work 
of the Arena Chapel. Furthermore, as in the case of saints Francis and Dominic as we saw 
in Chapter Four, the use of a saint to exemplify a virtu is also making a particular 
statement about the nature of human goodness. A saint's virtu more overtly reveals God as 
the source from which it comes, and a saint's virtu can be read as a more explicit Imitation 
of the virtu of Christ. 
Virtu in the Commedia, we have come to see, is the fulfilment and perfection of an 
individual's being through the action proper to them. This is reiterated in the figures of 
292 Fo~ readings of these cantos see: Anto~io Ga~liardi, '~ulle tr~cce del plplstrello', In Esperimentl danteschl: 
ParadISO, pp. 214-46; Francesco Zambon, La SCrtttura d amore ,In Esperlmentl danteschl: Paradiso, pp. 241.84. 
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Peter, James and John who are not simply useful examiners but living examples of those 
who have transformed virtu into action. Peter is the living example of faith In action, 
exemplified in his act of faith, walking on water (XXIV.39). Through his faith he Is 
entrusted by Christ with the keys of heaven; he himself is sufficiently 'substantive' of faith 
to guide others towards the same path. Similarly, James Is cast as an emblem of hope 
which inspires others, drawing them to his shrine in Galicia (XXV.t8). The poem further 
emphasises James as a manifestation of hope in an appeal to the tradition of James as the 
figure for hope,293 an echo of the representational tradition of personifying virtu: 
fa risonar la spene in questa altezza: 
tu sai, che tante fiate la figuri, 
quante lesu ai tre fe piu carezza. (Par. XXV.3t-33) 
James' hope - his virtu - accompanies him to martyrdom and, as that which empowered 
him to complete that martydom, it is an object of love: 'L'amore ond'lo avvampo I ancor 
ver'la virtu che mi seguette I Infin la palma e a I'uscir del campo' (XXV.82-84). Hope is the 
virtu which brings James to God and thus his loving of hope appears emblematic of the 
active movement by which man moves towards his salvation. Finally John Is the exemplum 
of love, which love makes him worthy to take on the responsibility of Christ in loving his 
mother, the Virgin Mary (XXV.112-t4). His love, in a sense, transforms him into the 
Virgin's son. In the figures of the three saints the virtu, which the pilgrim is called on to 
describe, is vivified and its results are made evident. Faith, exemplified by Peter, enables 
one to actively follow Christ in his miracles; Hope, as it did for James, empowers one to 
face death for the sake of Christ In the sure expectation of new life: and, as It did for John, 
love transforms the lover Into the manifestation of Christ Virtu is essential, real, 
transformative and salvific. 
The second element of this episode I would like to pick out is how It presents the learning 
of virtu. Most importantly, the episode focuses on the reading of texts as a valid source for 
learning virtu. In each of his explications of faith, hope and love, the pilgrim asserts texts -
specifically philosophical texts and the Old and New Testaments - as the source of his 
knowledge. So for example, in Paradiso XXIV, the pilgrim explains his faith as having Its 
origin In 'La larga plola I de 10 Spirito Santo, ch'c diffusa lin su Ie v('cchle e 'n su Ie nuove 
cuoia' (91-93). He makes similar statements in XXV.73-78 and XXVI.2S-27. In the latter, 
texts are cast as not simply informing the reader about the nature of virtu, but preparing 
them for future, experiential understanding. The explanatlon of coming to love, which the 
2'13 See Robert Iiollander's commentary on these lines for a fuller flCploraUon and bibliography on thlsld.,,1. 
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pilgrim gives, is an explanation of his own approach to God as we have seen it unfold in the 
Commedia: 'Per filosofici argomenti / e per autorita che quinci scende / cotale amor 
convien che in me si 'mprenti' (XXVI.25-27). This approach is made through both 
philosophical and theological paths along which the pilgrim was guided by both Virgil and 
Beatrice. Significantly these paths are envisioned as a preparation to receive something 
more and this reception is figured in terms of imprinting. This should recall to our mind 
images of stamping and imprinting that have gone before and have been especially 
pertinent to questions of virtu in the Com media: Francis perfectly preparing himself 
through love of poverty to receive the imprint of God's love, the stigmata (Par. XJ.107): 
Christ and Adam as the result of the imprinting of divine virtu upon perfectly disposed 
matter (Par. XlII.79-81). Here the poem is asserting that the preparation for a similar 
imprinting can be found through the study of philosophy and the study of scripture. 
Exactly how and why texts can be a source of virtu is suggested In the pilgrim's expression 
of faith. In his response to Peter's question on the nature of faith, the pilgrim gives the 
Pauline description of faith as 'sustanza di cose sperate' e argomentl de Ie non parvenU' 
(XXIV.64-6S). The pilgrim then elucidates his answer In which he describes faith in 
relation to the heavenly reality he himself is now witnessing but which on earth Is 
impossible to see: 'Le profonde cose , che mllargiscon qulla lor parvenza" a II occhl dill 
giu son s1 ascose' (70-72). Faith is the 'substantiating' on earth of the Invisible things of 
heaven. Later, Peter describes faith as 'Questa cara gioia, sopra 13 quale ogne virtu sl 
fonda' (89-90). The substantiating of the Invisible, which is faith, Is cast as the basis for all 
virtu. But since humans cannot know without sensory Input, the Invisible f,llth must be 
substantiated in text and act These are the elements which the pilgrim Identifies as the 
foundation of his own faith: the words of the Old and New Testaments and 'l'opere' which 
followed from them (XXIV.100-Ol). The pilgrim's own declaration then becomes, In a 
sense, a further manifestion offaith In words and act. lie Is called on to '(farsl] manifesto:, 
fede che e1' (52-53: my Italics). Furthermore, this Is what the poet Is aiming to do In his 
poem. In substantiating the Invisible In his presentation of heaven, tht' poet Is re-enactlng 
a process of faith which manifests Itself In words and deeds. lie Is, I suggest. asserting his 
own poem as a manifestation of faith and therefore as a foundation for the development of 
virtu. That the poem Itself must become a source of virtu Is further Iterated within the 
narrative dialogue when the pilgrim Is directly charged with bringing hope to otht'rs: 
Pol che per grazla vuol che tu t'affrontl 
10 nostro Imperador, anzlla morte 
[ ... ] 
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s1 che, veduto il ver di questa corte, 
la spene, che la giu bene innamora, 
in te e in altrui di cio conforte. (Par. XXY.43-45) 
That text could bring about active learning and active emotional transformation was a 
significant feature of the devotional literature considered In Chapter Two, In which to read 
about events was to take part in them and, potentially, be transformed by them. Dante 
appears to be casting his own Com media as a text capable of engaging the emotions and 
intellect while revealing the invisible divine truth and as such, providing a basis for the 
development of virtu. 
The third significant element of the episode returns us to the personal story of the pilgrim 
and the lessons he has learned about love. At the appearance of the soul of John at the end 
of canto XXV, the pilgrim attempts to see the actual body of the soul which he believes to 
be there. He is, however, blinded in this fruitless attempt Frightened by his blindness. the 
pilgrim is quickly comforted by John: 'fa ragione che sla / la vista In te smarrita e non 
defunta' (XXVI.8-9). While sight is denied the pilgrim, he must, however, speak. John tells 
him to 'd} ove s'appunta / l'anima tua' (7-8). The pilgrim must explain love without sight, 
without a vision of its object. Enacted in this examination is the process which the pilgrim 
has learned throughout his experiences in the Commedia: that the true object of his desire, 
which can bring about the fulfilment of his being, is invisible. In this he Is enacting the 
nature of Charity itself; Charity which has God as Its object but which Is also the 
manifestation of a mutual relationship between God and man. In the pilgrim's humble 
renunciation of his powers and his sightless declaration of the source of his love. he Is 
enacting the lessons which he has learned throughout his Journey: 
[ ... ] AI suo piacere e tosto e tardo 
vegna remedio a Ii occhl, che fuor porte 
quand' ella entro col foeo ond' 10 sempr' ardo. 
Lo ben che fa contenta questa corte, 
Alfa e 0 e di quanta scrittura 
mi legge Amore 0 lievemente 0 forte. (Par. XXYI.13·18) 
The pilgrim's powers are fully and willingly submitted to those of another. In this case, 
Beatrice. He no longer needs to see to recognise God as the source of love. Significantly, 
again, Beatrice becomes the locus of seeing and not seeing: she controls the pilgrim's 
vision. This is expressed through virtu: 'Ia donna che per questa dia I region ti conduce, htl 
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ne 10 sguardo / la virtu ch'ebbe la man d'Anania' (10-12). Beatrice's individual virtu, the 
fulfilment of her being, has been to reveal the invisible to the pilgrim through his love for 
her. Now, as in Paradiso X, she, as the object of his love, is eclipsed in his love for God. 
In the pilgrim's declaration of how he has come to recognise the source of love, the focus 
returns to the basic elements through which the Commedia presents man as coming to see 
God: 
[ ... ] Tutti quei morsi 
che posson far 10 cor volgere a Dio, 
ala mia caritate con concorsi: 
che l'essere del mondo e l'esser mio, 
la morte ch'e} sostenne perch' 10 viva, 
e que} che spera ogne fedel com' 10, 
con la predetta conoscenza viva (Par. XXVI.SS-61) 
It is through creation, man's existence within it and the revelation of Christ that man's love 
is refined and focused towards love of God. Through these elements Is man's love, as we 
have seen in the case of the pilgrim, redirected to the straight path: 'tratto m'hanno del 
mar de ramor torto, / e del dritto m'han posto a la riva' (XXVI.62-63). Creation, and man's 
place within it, is the forum in which he comes to recognise the source of his existence and 
to love that source. This is only possible, however, in the light of Christ's sacrUlce. 
The final point I would like to make in relation to the episode of the Heaven of the Fixed 
Stars is to add something to the virtu-dynamic which links the pilgrim and the poet. When 
the soul of Peter first appears, Beatrice points out that the souls In heaven h.we no need of 
hearing the pilgrim speak 'perch~ '1 viso hai quivi I dov' ogne cosa diplnta sl vedc' 
(XXIV.41-42). And yet the examination scenes provide the opportunity for the pilgrim to 
speak, indeed they highlight his words which are not necessary for the understanding of 
the narrative's characters, but are nevertheless spoken. They are, at one tevrl, as we have 
seen, a manifestation of faith. They are spoken for the sake of us the readers. becoming the 
manifestation in spoken act of the invisible truth. Out furthermore, the point of the 
pilgrim's declarations is an act of praise; in being called on to declare f3lth. he Is called on 
to 'glori'arla' (44). This becomes the fulfilment of the pllgrlm-poct's virtu and the purpose 
of his individual existence: to express himself In an act of praise. 
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This thesis began by examining different notions of the idea of virtue, beginning with the 
classical past, passing through early and medieval Christian thinkers and then turning to 
the devotional, literary and artistic production of the thirteenth century. It then turned to 
a consideration of Dante's Commedia in light of the issues raised in the first two chapters. 
In progressing from the intellectual and representational context to Dante's work itself, it 
became apparent that notions of virtue, its nature and its role in human life transform, 
depending on the context and purpose of a text. In order to highlight Dante's own place in 
relation to these traditions, I will give a brief comparative overview of the issues this 
thesis has brought to light. In considering the question - what is virtue? - the answer both 
outside of and within the Com media itself has been dictated by the intellectual and 
theological context. Classical virtue, as an ordering of the self, its reason and its emotions, 
also appeared as a significant element in the Commedia's own ideas on human virtu during 
the pilgrim's early development under the guidance of Virgil. The exercise offree will, both 
in Aristotle and in the Commedia, was an important value-giving factor to human action, 
and thus human virtue became based on human responsibility. In the thought of 
Augustine, Gregory and Aquinas, however, notions of virtue were entirely 
recontextualised. Although virtue continued to be seen as the perfection of the self, the 
very notion of what it meant for the self to be perfect was reorientated In light of the 
Christian faith. In this light, human virtue, the act by which humans could fulfil their 
nature, was in perfectly loving God. Love, as a central element in the Idea of virtue, 
becomes absolutely essential to the Com media's own presentation of virtu. While free will 
is not negated, the responsibility of man becomes to use this free will to love God perfectly. 
Because the Commedia puts such a strong emphasis on love, then the whole dynamic of 
how man can attain to virtu is transformed, as is the way this attainment comes to be 
conceived. 
The ethics of virtu In the Commedia is reminiscent not only of Aristotelian moral virtue, 
but of the tradition of virtue exemplified In Chapter One In the work of Augustine and 
Gregory the Great. In this tradition, human virtue forms part of a hierarchy of exlst('ncc 
and it finds its fulfilment in loving submission to the generous source of Its existence, God. 
The Commedia's ethics, the lessons It teaches about behaviour, are prrdomlnantly focused 
on the ordering of desire In relation to desire for God as the ultimate Good of man's nature. 
The particular virtues which order this relationship, humility and charity, are at the heart 
of the Commedia's ethical message. In focusing upon thl'se issues in partlcul.lr. the 
Com media emerges as a work with strong echoes of the Franciscan thought, forms of 
expression and ideas of virtu, which were so evident In the culture from which the poem 
emerged. Furthermore, In emphasising love, vivified experience and self-transformation 
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as the elements through which man moves towards God, the Com media focuses strongly 
upon the role of the Incarnation and the life of Christ as the ground through which man 
can come to see and achieve union with God. 
In the thought of both Plato and Aristotle the forum of virtue's development was human 
society and interaction, even though in Plato's notion the form of virtue itself was beyond 
the human sphere. This was also the forum for the development of virtue in the thought of 
Augustine, Gregory the Great and Aquinas, although this forum was recontextualised: the 
human temporal world had entered into relationship with the divine. The development of 
human virtue became dependent on God's interaction with man. In terms of the practical 
acquisition of virtue, the representational traditions conceived it as being learned in 
different ways. Dominican sermons, exemplified in those of Giordano da Pisa, taught virtue 
through the lessons of rational thought, teaching the habits of self-control through the 
clarifying of the intellect. Instead Franciscan devotional literature, such as the 
Meditationes vitae Christi or the Lignum Vitae, used the emotions and senses to 
communicate to their audience and transform their will by making them participate 
emotionally in the events of the story. It has become apparent that the Commedia employs 
both of these approaches. Through its explanatory dialogues the pilgrim, and by 
consequence the reader, come to a point of intellectual clarity; in its drama, its pathos and 
its joy the Com media engages the sense and emotions and employs them to bring about 
direct transformation in the text's protagonist and audience. 
All the texts from the conceptual and representational traditions, to some degree or 
another, employ the use of personified exempla to communicate their notion of virtue. For 
Augustine, this was his own self in his act of conversion in the Confessions; in Gregory the 
Great it was the biblical figure of Job; the Meditationes vitae Christi focused upon the 
events of Christ's life, making them a thing of present and immediate experience for the 
reader; in lacopone's Laude and in the allegories of virtue in the Arena chapel, Individual 
virtues themselves were given human characteristics so that the abstract principle they 
represent could be physically communicated. The Commedia, in the personified exempla it 
gives of virtue, employs all of these methods and goes beyond them. The lives of holy 
figures are a principal element of the Commedia's exempla: the acts of the Virgin on the 
terraces of Purgatory; the lives of saints; and the actions of the many people from Dante's 
own history who both failed and succeeded in the achievement of salvation. But the 
Commedia's most intimate and original form of exemplum Is found In the figure of the 
pilgrim-poet. While the precedent for self-analysis is found in Augustine, through the 
development of his pilgrim-self, Dante conceives the steps by which he sees man coming 
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to God. Passing through the classical education of his early life, which leads him to self-
control and freedom from sin, he imagines himself as empowered by the experiences of 
his early love which connects him directly to God. His process of acquiring virtu through 
the aid of others becomes a microcosm of how man can come to God: through the loves of 
one's life. In showing his pilgrim-self development, Dante is making a further claim for the 
perfection he personally achieves in the writing of the Commedia itself. The text becomes 
the expression of his virtu and in doing so casts itself as a tool for the education of others. 
The Com media presents the attainment of virtu as occurring through participation in 
human life in the light of divine revelation. Lessons of virtu are to be found in observing 
the experiences of others and engaging in experiences oneself. Real exempla, which reveal 
not only their own virtu but the source from which they have it, come to demonstrate the 
potentials of human existence. In the Commedia, man's existence, which finds both its 
origin and its highest expression in virtu, is emphasised as not isolated; instead man is 
shown within an ontological and ethical relationship with the universe and with God. 
Human goodness is a component part ofthe well-ordered universe. 
The pilgrim's own development of virtu is set by Dante against a backdrop of cosmic and 
natural virtu. The conceptual and representational traditions employed images of natural 
growth and fertility in describing virtue in different ways. Virtue as spiritually fruitful was 
an image which appeared in the Meditationes vitae Christi; it was explicitly figured as such 
in the Lignum vitae in which the ascension of the tree and the consumptiom of the fruits 
was an allegory for the acquisition of virtues modelled on Christ. The Commedia also 
recalls images of spiritual fertility in relation to virtu, particularly in the biographies of 
saints Francis and Dominic. But the text also couples this tradition of Imagining virtue In 
terms of spiritual fertility with an interest in describing the metaphysics which underpin 
the universe. Trees and fruit, as we)) as stars and light, become the manifestations of 
fulfilled virtu, but these images are underpinned by a metaphysical discourse in which 
virtu is given a central role. As was suggested in the introduction, virtu is a concept caught 
between metaphysical power and physical manifestation: between being and doing. The 
Commedia reveals the metaphysical forces behind the traditional Images of spiritual 
fertility and in so doing emphasises one of the text's central points: that creation is always 
and fundamentally connected to its Creator, and it Is this connection which enables man's 
perfection and salvation. Through considering virtu, we can see that Dante establishes an 
underlying unity to created existence, of which human beings are a vital part. By 
expressing virtu through recurring imagery of plants, water and cosmic elements, as well 
as its role in the specific formation of man, the Commedia builds up a network of Ideas In 
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which the individual is connected to the whole. Joined by the common element of having 
virtu and therefore having a role dictated by their nature, man is placed within creation. 
Creation then becomes the forum for coming to see the source of creation and thus the 
source of man's own virtu. Virtu in the Commedia, in its most basic sense, is the perfection 
of an entity's power in the act proper to it. Virtu applies both to all elements of creation -
including and especially man - and to God. What my analysis has shown is how intensely 
the Commedia focuses upon the nature, process and results of that perfecting, and in doing 
so places virtu at a nexus of human and divine communication. 
In the theological thought of Augustine, in the devotional texts of the Franciscans, in the 
sermons of the Dominican tradition and finally in the Commedia itself, Christ is the 
manifestation of this fundamental communication. Augustine identifies Christ as the 
unifier of desire who returns the many to the One. Both the Meditationes vitae Christi and 
the sermons of Giordano da Pisa emphasised imitation of Christ as the way to return to 
God. The Commedia establishes Christ as a linking point between God and man. The 
incarnate Christ - the incarnation of the virtu of God - is the conceptual bridge by which 
man can move from the physical to the invisible. Christ, as the active agent in creation, 
makes the forum in which man can act and come to see God in all existence. And finally, 
the virtuous actions of the temporal Christ, in their love and humility, demonstrate the 
ethical steps man must take to return to God. 
I believe my work has opened up avenues for further scholarship in several important 
areas of Dante studies. Firstly, it provides grounds for a new consideration of Dantean 
ethics. In considering virtu, it has become clear that the Com media proposes an essential 
link between God and man, and thus makes ethics primarily a theological expression. 
While scholarship has tended to look towards Aristotle for an understanding of Dantean 
ethics, my work suggests that Dante is working within a much more varied tradition which 
should be considered further. Secondly, I believe there is much scope for continuing work 
on poetry as an expression of ethics.z94 The Com media, in its intertextuality, draws on 
many sources for its ethical models, but it is also employing the communication methods 
of those sources to put across its points. Exactly how its communication styles relate to its 
ethical models and the particularities of its poetic forms provides much opportunity for 
development. 
The second area to which my work contributes and opens up future avenues of 
discussion, is the consideration of Dante's political preoccupations. Looking at specific 
29~ This branch of study, as became apparent in the introduction. has already received slgnlncant contribution 
from Claire Honess. 
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political and communal virtues in Dante provides scope for thought, but perhaps more 
interesting would be a consideration of how much Dante's political messages are bound 
up with his ideas about the fulfilment of the individual self and ideas of human goodness. 
Dante's treatment of virtu suggests the importance he gives to individual responsibility 
and individual fulfilment over and above the fulfilment of a political community. This 
could lead to a questioning of the extent to which the Commedia is advocating real 
temporal political change or whether the change it envisages is only conceived as possible 
in the afterlife. The individual relationship between man and God, which the virtu-dynamic 
establishes could, however, be extended to consider Dante's presentation of the 
communities of the afterlife as being similarly dependent on a divine dispensation for 
success. Subsequently, the connection between temporal political communities, the 
community of the faithful and the metaphysical community in God could be explored.295 
From this could be developed an idea of communal fulfilment, and further, how this 
fulfilment could be understood as having a metaphysical component. 
The third area of Dante studies within which 1 believe my work could be developed 
further, is that of Dantean theology. In considering the representative forms in which virtu 
is expressed in Dante's contemporary context followed by my consideration of how these 
influences might appear in the Commedia itself, 1 hope 1 have expanded the scope for 
understanding how other theological questions might have been present in medieval 
culture more broadly and, therefore, how they might come to find an expression in a 
creative text. Contemporary explorations of Dante's theology have focused upon the 
theological interaction of man, God and the created universe.296 I think my own work could 
contribute to further understanding the modes in which these interactions were literally 
enacted in medieval religious practice, how these interactions might figure in the 
Commedia and how they contribute to the didactic aims of the text. In light of the emphasis 
which I believe the poem places on experiential learning and active engagement through 
text, I think a further consideration of the didactic communication methods employed by 
Franciscan devotional literature in relation to the Commedia's own communication 
strategies could prove very fruitful. While contemporary studies on Dante's relation to 
Franciscanism have had a historical emphasis I think there is scope for further 
comparative work focused upon literary and stylistic connections.297 As mentioned above, 
my work has also brought to light a different emphasiS in the Commedia's ethics and in 
many respects its ethics - focused upon humility and a renunciation of worldly desires -
Z9S A c.onsi~era~ion of this has already been begun by Christian Moevs In his essay, 'The Metaphysical Basis or 
Dante s Politics ,In Le culture di Dante: stud; In onore d; Robert Hollander: otti del quarto Semlnarlo dantesco 
Internazionale. University of Notre Dame, IN USA. 25-27 settembre 2003 (Florence: F. Cesati 2004). 
296 See the work of Montemaggl and Treherne. 
297 For a historical reading of this relationship see Nick Haveley Dante and the Franciscans: Poverty alld Papacy 
in the 'Cammedia' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200'4). 
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has strong echoes with Franciscan thought. Further study of this connection might yield a 
richer understanding of Dantean ethics and the poet's relation to the Franciscan tradition 
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